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Editors’ notE

C

urrently we are in an International Polar Year (“IPY”)
and the timing could not be better. The Polar Regions
are taking the first and hardest hit from anthropogenic

climate change. Almost all predictions for climate stability in
the Polar Regions have recently been shattered. Temperature
increases have exceeded expectations, the tree line has pushed
farther north than expected, and ice is melting faster than anticipated. As a result of this IPY and the immediate needs of Polar
people, ecosystems, and environment, Sustainable Development
Law & Policy (“SDLP”) felt it was necessary to have this issue.
Environmental change is happening, and the Polar Regions
are among the least equipped to handle the new stresses. Due
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Regions are acting as repositories for soot and many hazardous
chemicals. This soot is darker than the ice and snow and attracts
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heat, thus increasing the speed at which the poles are thawing.
The chemicals funneled to the Arctic are being accumulated over
time in various species; these concentrations of chemicals would
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normally qualify as hazardous waste under Environmental Protection Agency regulations. Furthermore, changes in the Polar
Regions may speed up global warming and cause abrupt climate
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change events as a result of ice melt raising sea levels or permafrost disappearing and releasing in massive methane emissions.
In this issue we hope to provide information and publicity
to important polar issues. Articles include the effects of climate
change on indigenous populations, possibilities for the creation
of an Arctic treaty system, the global complications of efforts by
Australia to fight whaling, species issues, and growing resource
extraction and shipping in the Arctic. With this issue we hope
SDLP can assist the IPY to move beyond research and debate
to encourage actions that will protect our planet for all future
generations.
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Overview: radical envirOnmental change in the POlar regiOns
is the glObe’s wake-uP call
By William J. Snape, III*

O

ne need only to look at a comparison of summer Arctic
ice extent from 1979 to 2007 to understand something
significant is happening. In the span of a generation, the
millennia-old Arctic has shrunk by roughly two-thirds and could
easily be ice free in the summer within a decade. Or if that is not
enough, consider that in the winter of 2008, a massive chunk
of ice broke off from the Antarctic Peninsula, and another ice
sheet the size of Northern Ireland (or Connecticut, if you prefer)
hangs on by a thread. Over the past fifty years, the Arctic and
Antarctic have warmed by around 3 degrees Celsius, roughly
double the rest of the world. The goal, simply put, is to prevent
this harbinger.
While there are still a few oil industry funded naysayers,
all scientific experts now agree that global warming is here and
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impacting our planet. The impacts are occurring far faster than we
thought just over a decade ago, when the Kyoto Protocol to the
Framework Climate Convention was ratified by most world governments except those such as the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Zimbabwe. Coastal communities, island nation-states,
high-altitude ecosystems, and arid regions are already feeling
the impacts of global warming. But it is on and near our globe’s
two poles that change is occurring most acutely.
Why should we care? There are many reasons. While
much of the polar ice that has melted thus far has rested upon
the ocean already, an increasing proportion of melting ice will
come from land (e.g., Greenland ice caps or the Antarctic continent), meaning that ocean levels could soon rapidly rise to
disastrous levels; this would impact at least hundreds of millions
of coastal-dwelling human beings throughout the world. Flooding, erosion, and contamination of freshwater drinking supplies
would vastly increase from Miami to Shanghai and many places
in between. Further, invasive pests are now proliferating due to
global warming and global warming’s causes, negatively affecting forests, farms, rangelands, and pollination cycles across the
globe. Canada’s great boreal forest, the lungs of North America
that includes part of the Arctic, is in clear decline.
The poles’ snow and ice also form a protective cooling layer
for the rest of the Earth. When the poles melt, particularly in the
Arctic, the rest of the planet absorbs more sunlight and gets hotter. This warming trend, in turn, increases the intense weather
variability events that the entire globe has already experienced
over the past decade or so. Aside from the direct destruction
these storms engender, sectors as diverse as agriculture, transportation, and services suffer billions, if not trillions, of dollars
of losses annually from nature’s increased unpredictability. As
just one of many examples, a recent study on a warming Arctic
predicted that wheat farming in Kansas would be devastated as
winter planting that needs freezing temperatures and summer soil
that needs moisture would both dissipate without Arctic ice.
Biological diversity in the wild is also taking a potentially
permanent hit around our poles. Despite unconscionable foot
dragging by the Bush Administration that has forced repeated
litigation in federal courts, the United States will eventually
list the polar bear under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
because of accelerated global warming, triggering a concerted
effort to save this great iconic beast. However, even the ESA
apparently cannot stop the proliferation of oil and gas projects
* Professor William Snape is an Environmental Law Fellow, American University. He also serves as Senior Counsel, Center for Biological Diversity and is Head
Swim Coach, Gallaudet University.
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pending or ongoing throughout
the Arctic. Unfortunately, the
polar bear is not alone. Many
other species, from whales and
walrus to seals and migratory
birds, are losing their homes,
prey, or breeding grounds to
global warming. In the Antarctic, as a result of a petition
by the Center for Biological
Diversity, federal scientists
acknowledge the perilous
plight of many species of penguin but this Administration,
again, does nothing. As the
now cliché goes, the patter of
“happy feet” grows dimmer.
Our polar ecosystems are in literal collapse.
The good news is that all three remaining U.S. presidential
candidates (from both major parties) acknowledge the threat and
challenge of global warming. The Arctic Council—made up of
the United States, Canada, Russia, Iceland, native groups, and
the Scandinavian countries—is beginning to focus on the myriad
threats facing the North Pole and its surrounding ecosystem. To
the south, the Antarctic Treaty, an effective relic of the Cold
War, could become a basis to address global warming. Yet, we
are really only at the starting line of our effort.
The bevy of articles in this edition of SDLP recognizes the
legal and policy opportunities for positive change. This is exciting. Today’s law students, particularly those with a public interest bent like many at the Washington College of Law, have a
true chance to “save the world.” Thus, the varied international
and domestic legal strategies available to combat global warming and its impacts are far more than an academic exercise. For
many, the ideas contained in this edition are quite directly about
life and death.
How, then, to summarize the road map available to us in our
complex and inter-connected world? First, most clearly, we need
a binding multi-lateral agreement on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions that includes all nations, including the United States,
China, and India. The capital and technologies exist to make our
energy transition a smooth and constructive one, but we lack
political will. Second, to the extent recalcitrant governments and
corporations do want to play ball on global warming, lawyers
should and will do what they have done for years: sue them. And
this is happening in the United States under novel statutory and
common law theories that will grace future legal text books.1
Finally, we need creative lawyers to use existing international

tools under agreements such as the Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the Convention on Biological Diversity, various human
rights conventions, the Polar Bear Treaty, and even the World
Trade Organization (historically a bit hostile toward the environment) to tilt the playing field back in favor of conservation,
equity, and the sustainable use of our limited natural resources.
As I tell my athletes before a big competition, the choice
is ours: we can prepare diligently and rise to the challenge, or
we can take the easy way out through apathy or fear. The difference, of course, is that amateur athletic competition is but
practice for the real world. If the Arctic and Antarctic are indeed
the “canaries in the coal mine” for the rest of the world that scientific experts tell us they are, we may soon lose luxuries we
have deluded ourselves into thinking are necessities. Clean air,
available water, healthy landscapes and public health are all
diminishing from many factors, and global warming is the most
powerful common denominator.2
We can do better. We need political conservatives to
remember that Biblical (or Koran-like) change to our natural
heritage is not conservative but mere cow-towing to Big Oil. We
need political liberals to more aggressively identify the available solutions without fear of appearing “regulatory” (ending
massive subsidies to carbon pollution activities would be a great
start). We need independent entrepreneurs to be empowered to
find energy solutions that work in the short term market-place, as
well as the long-term sustainable health of the planet. We need
the developing world to recognize there are real opportunities to
think in new ways that do not repeat past mistakes. We need the
developed world to pony up its wealth, if not for altruism then
because it will maintain prosperity in the long term. No one is
left off Team Planet. We are truly all in this together.

Endnotes: Radical Environmental Change in the Polar Regions Is the Globe’s Wake-up Call
1

See, e.g., David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1741 (2007).

2

See, e.g., Donald Burke, et al., Under the Weather: Climate, Ecosystems, and Infectious Disease, National Research Council (Washington, DC), June 2001.
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InternatIonal Polar Year as a
CatalYst for sustaInIng arCtIC researCh
by Karen Kraft Sloan & David Hik*

T

introduction

he Arctic covers an area of more than thirty million km2,
and is home to a population of about four million, including over thirty different indigenous peoples. The Arctic
is also a region experiencing rapid environmental, economic,
social, and political change. The health and well-being of northern people and their environments, the sustainability of northern
communities, and the future development of northern resources,
will increasingly define global issues in this century.1 The success and sustainability of an Arctic-focused agenda requires
meaningful and sustained engagement, and leadership from
indigenous and non-indigenous northern peoples, governments
and institutions, in partnership with a wide variety of national
and international interests. This concept has been affirmed,
although not always embraced, by indigenous organizations,
many regional and national governments, the Arctic Council,
and other intergovernmental bodies.2
One important role of science and research is to assist governments in effectively discharging their responsibilities and
mandates.3 In the Arctic, these mandates are necessarily far
reaching, diverse and include a broad range of disciplines, from
the natural sciences, the human behavioral, social and historical
sciences, medical sciences, engineering and applied sciences,
and research in the managerial, economic, and legal fields. This
research is characterized by an abundance of cross-cutting issues
that require interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approaches,
and the knowledge provided by research must address questions
on a wide range of scales from local to global, and from immediate to long-term. It is also recognized that advanced technological knowledge and fundamental or theoretical research must
be combined with the holistic observations and knowledge of
indigenous northern peoples.4
Some of the most compelling examples of scientific cooperation in the Arctic have been the diverse scientific activities conducted under the banner of the International Polar Year (“IPY”)
on four occasions during the past 125 years.5 The present International Polar Year runs from March 2007 to March 2009,
and involves approximately fifty thousand participants from
over sixty nations, engaged in about two hundred international
research projects in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The major
objectives of IPY include efforts to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of the
state of the Polar Regions, to explore new frontiers of science,
and to promote scientific cooperation, training, and outreach.6
Recently, there has been increased discussion of the legacy of this IPY,7 and promotion of the notion that IPY will be
Spring 2008

a “catalyst” for sustaining future Arctic and Antarctic research
efforts. History would suggest this outcome is possible, but what
efforts are required to secure a legacy of sustained interest and
investment in Arctic research?

LeSSonS from the
internationaL geophySicaL year
The scientific outcomes of the International Geophysical
Year (“IGY”) of 1957–1958 (which began as the third IPY) are
remarkable and have been summarized elsewhere.8 But IGY
catalyzed more than just innovative research. Halfway through
the IGY, Dr. Laurence M. Gould, while delivering the American Geographical Society Bowman lecture, declared: “The IGY
may turn out to be a brilliant new approach toward international
understanding and organization.”9 Indeed, a few days after
Gould delivered his address, the Special Committee on Antarctic Research (“SCAR”) was officially organized in The Hague
and became a permanent committee of the International Council
for Science. SCAR then prepared a plan of Antarctic research
that went beyond the original IGY program.
Subsequently, the United Kingdom, followed by other governments, expressed interest in finding an international solution to competing Antarctic territorial claims. This quest led
to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.10 The Treaty
is a remarkable document. It was signed by the twelve nations
active in Antarctica at the time, all of which participated in IGY
and nine of which had made territorial claims in Antarctica or
reserved the right to do so. At the present time, 46 countries
are signatories to this treaty.11 In a preamble and fourteen short
articles, the signatories agreed, among other considerations, that
Antarctica should be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes;”12
to “promote international cooperation in scientific investigation
in Antarctica;”13 and to “the establishment of a firm foundation
for the continuation and development of such cooperation . . . as
applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with
the interests of science and the progress of all mankind.”14
* Karen Kraft Sloan is the former Canadian Ambassador for the Environment.
Before serving as a diplomat, she was a Member of Parliament for eleven years,
where she was active with the Arctic Parliamentarians and chaired the Northern
Science and Research Caucus. Karen is currently special advisor to the Vice-President, Research and Innovation at York University in Toronto, and consults widely
on environmental and science policy issues.
David Hik is a Professor and Canada Research Chair in Northern Ecology in the
Department of Biological Sciences at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. Since
2004 he has served as the Executive Director of the Canadian International Polar
Year Secretariat.
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All of this was agreed to in the shadow of the Cold War “in
a remarkably short time, by disparate, thinly acquainted, mutually wary cultures—military, scientific, and diplomatic,”15 and
in the language of the preamble, “shall continue forever.”16 In
1958, Gould hypothesized that the IGY approach “could provide
a pattern that will move over into other areas and result in further working together of all nations.”17 The Treaty proves him
prescient, by serving as an apt example of how the IGY’s legacy
was both broadened and sustained beyond the immediate scientific program. By inspiring a multinational diplomatic conversation about the future of a continent, and the security for scientific
activity conducted within its borders, the IGY continues to influence the world.18

towarD an arctic
treaty?

Given the unique
contexts of the two poles,
a different institutional
arrangement to
support international
Arctic science cooperation
is needed.

Given this, what promise
does the current International
Polar Year hold for formalizing
international support for Arctic
science cooperation? What kind
of practical measures are needed
to ensure this? Many of the relevant issues have already been
clearly articulated, including
reviews of the options that should
be considered to develop a comprehensive Arctic legal regime.19
More recently, a 2006 editorial
in Nature argued for G8 leaders to commit to improving links
between Arctic research communities, “on the model that has
been tried and tested in the Antarctic.”20 The editorial underlined the value of IPY, noting that it too provides an opportunity for a case to be made for a “more concerted, international
effort” to support research in the Arctic. The authors asserted
that “scientists working in the Arctic are well connected with
each other,” and goes on to say that while an Antarctic treaty
exists that “obliges its signatories to collaborate in scientific
research,” no formal or political framework exists for collaboration on Arctic science.
Nevertheless, what worked in the context of the Antarctic is not directly applicable to the Arctic. The physical, political, economic, ecological, and historical realities of the poles
and their occupation and traditional use by indigenous peoples
and national governments are very different. Gould reminded
us in 1958 that the poles “are distinguished by their dissimilarities rather than by any common characteristics.”21 In a recent
issue of Foreign Affairs, Scott Borgeson agreed: “Although it
is tempting to look to the past for solutions to the Arctic conundrum, no perfect analogy exists. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty . . .
provides some lessons, but it concerns a continent rather than
an ocean.”22 He goes on to say, “there is simply no comparable historical example of a saltwater space with such ambiguous ownership, such a dramatically mutating seascape, and such
extraordinary economic promise.”23 In this context, it is unsur5

prising that there is so much attention on the seabed mapping
and claims process laid out under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, whereby nations bordering the Arctic
Ocean may be able to extend their sovereignty beyond the usual
200-nautical mile limit recognized in international law, if the
seabed is an extension of the continental shelf.24
Given the unique contexts of the two poles, a different
institutional arrangement to support international Arctic science
cooperation is needed. It should be pointed out that the Circumpolar North is not without efforts to increase international cooperation. In fact, there has been a “recent proliferation of efforts
to enhance international cooperation,”25 reflecting the mix of
institutions and organizations
in the region. However, solutions that will be acceptable to
most stakeholders, especially
Arctic nations, and that will
strengthen and support research
and monitoring, regulatory
arrangements, and adaptation
to rapid climate change will
require ingenuity and commitment over the long-term.
Along with regional
efforts to provide opportunities
for bi-lateral and multi-lateral
cooperation, is the maze of
global multi-national environmental agreements (“MEAs”)
that affect the Arctic. Attempts have been made to better understand how various global agreements impact the region. Oran
Young suggested that due consideration should be given to how
“nesting of regional arrangements” could fit with existing global
MEAs; for example the programs of the Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna could
operate within the larger framework provided by the Convention on Biological Diversity.26 There has also been discussion of
establishing the Arctic Ocean as a Marine Protected Area.27
IPY has added to this mix by promoting a Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program.28 Other international conservation non-governmental organizations, like the World Wildlife
Fund have also called for a “new approach, which includes
thinking about a solid Arctic Treaty and a multilateral governance body.”29 And last year an editorial in the New Scientist
concluded, “What more fitting conclusion could there be to this
event [IPY] than for scientists to call for the same protection in
the north—for an Arctic Treaty? Or have scientists lost the nerve
to make such grand demands?”30
In 2006, United Nations Environment Program (“UNEP”)/
Global Resource International Database-Arendal and the Standing Committee for Parliamentarians of the Arctic Regions sponsored a seminar to investigate the implications of global MEAs
for the Arctic in order to better understand the “fit” of current
circum-arctic initiatives with these global agreements. Key recommendations include the need to: undertake an audit of the
SuStainable Development law & policy

effectiveness and relevance of current MEAs; identify gaps in
coverage; evaluate whether or not a unified legal regime, such
as a treaty or a framework convention would be appropriate for
the Arctic region; and explore mechanisms to enhance institutional cooperation such as a permanent Arctic secretariat, Arctic
MEA implementation strategy.31
The seminar report and its recommendations were submitted
to the UNEP, the Arctic Parliamentarians, the Arctic Council,
the Nordic Council of Ministers,
and the governing bodies and
secretariats of MEAs, along
with being distributed to Arctic
stakeholders.
Despite this discussion and
activity, the idea of an Arctic
Treaty may be unattainable.
Timo Koivurova has recently warned that there are potential
down-sides to negotiating an Arctic treaty, including lengthy and
costly preparatory and negotiation processes, the risk of legalizing lowest common denominator standards, and contributing
another layer of complexity to the already fragmented array of
multilateral environmental agreements.32 There is also a growing recognition that indigenous peoples organizations, such as
the Inuit Circumpolar Council, have legitimate interests in these
discussions that have not been fully recognized.33 However, all
of the recent attempts to provide for greater cooperation in the
Circumpolar region bode well for enhancing international support for Arctic science and research. Countless individuals from
many polar and non-polar nations have exerted tremendous
energy in securing scientific, political, and financial support
for IPY. But since these are not easily garnered, the question
remains—how will activity be sustained in the long-term?

meets scientific and societal needs.37 In November 2006, Arctic Council Ministers urged all member nations to maintain and
extend long-term monitoring of change in the Arctic, with a view
to building a lasting legacy of the International Polar Year.38
There is a strong consensus that
scientific understanding of the
changing Arctic system and its
global connections and consequences requires improved Arctic observing capabilities that
are linked to global observing
activities. Numerous observing
sites, systems, and networks
already exist in the Arctic, and
more are being initiated during
IPY. In order to maximize the
likelihood that these disparate
activities can be integrated into
a sustained network for longterm observation that will support the scientific study of Arctic
system change in a global context, there is, among other things,
a vital need to:
• Improve coordination to avoid repetition, duplication and
overlap, and promote synergies;
• Assess user needs, and identify and fill gaps in spatial,
temporal and disciplinary coverage to achieve a circumArctic observing network;
• Guarantee access to data and information in an easy, free,
open and timely fashion, and in standard, internationally
accepted formats, to the broadest possible community of
users;
• Ensure sustainability through long-term funding and
commitments; and
• Establish links to global observing activities, networks,
and systems.
Additionally, many non-Arctic nations have strong Arctic
science programs and interests, yet are restricted from full membership within the Arctic Council. Capturing the enthusiasm and
interest of these nations could contribute greatly to strengthening
international collaboration on Arctic science. Indeed, this is the
intended role of the International Arctic Science Committee.39

The success and
sustainability of an
Arctic-focused agenda
requires meaningful
and sustained engagement,
and leadership.

A roAdmAp for SuStAining Arctic Science
And reSeArch?
The Arctic research community and northern residents cannot act alone. Governments have significant responsibilities for
improving international Arctic science cooperation, and therefore the support of governments is required. The Arctic Council
has most notably advanced cooperation for broader collaboration
in the Circumpolar North. Within the Arctic Council, indigenous
peoples of the Arctic have representation as Permanent Participants, for active engagement, and full consultation on Council
activities. Under the leadership of the Arctic Council, seminal
work has been produced including the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment34 and the Arctic Human Development Report.35
Both featured excellent research work, including traditional and
local knowledge and peer-reviewed science.36 A high level of
international cooperation and a commitment to extend this work
continues.
More recently, emphasis has been placed on the need for a
well coordinated and sustained Arctic Observing Network that
Spring 2008

the LegAcy of ipy 2007
Some of the legacies of IPY 2007–2008 may transpire
regardless of whether efforts are made to secure them, and some
may only come about with some exertion. Collectively, however, they would undoubtedly result in a significant, broad, and
far-reaching impact for IPY, for example:
• Establish permanent observation and monitoring networks;
• Improve the link between observation and monitoring to
modelling;
• Manage the explosion of data that IPY will create, and
ensure access to it;
• Raise the public profile of the polar regions;
6

• Link science and policy more effectively;
• Improve opportunities for northerners by increasing linkages to higher education;
• Ensure that there is a “critical mass” of northerners in the
next generation of Arctic science researchers; and
• Share logistical information more broadly and more
efficiently.
There is still a need to define and pursue the next steps in
securing a broad legacy for IPY, as envisioned by so many of the
scientific and governmental participants. These efforts to secure
the IPY legacy could include:
1. Making the IPY legacy part of the IPY process itself,
like the efforts to secure Sustained Arctic Observing
Networks.40
2. Identifying partners in order to link with and build upon
other efforts, through Arctic Council and other organizations, including national governments.
3. Learning from other efforts to formalise international
polar science cooperation, especially from the implementation of the Antarctic Treaty System and from the
first fifteen years of the evolution of the Arctic Council.
4. Being opportunistic and identifying fora to engage governments and other potential partners and supporters.
5. Identifying champions and providing them with resources
to promote the global and local value of enhancing Arctic science, research, and knowledge capacity.

concluSion
In many ways, IPY has already succeeded in inspiring a discussion about the future of Arctic research. The Arctic research
agenda has been dynamic and full over the past couple of years,
with a number of parallel processes occurring that collectively
have provided space for exploring the future of science and
research in the Circumpolar North. We are well into the fourth
IPY; we must ensure that the opportunity IPY provides as a catalyst to sustain international cooperation for Arctic science and
research is not lost. In doing so, we should remember that those
of us calling to formalize international support for Arctic science
are not the first to do so. That honor belongs to Karl Weyprecht
and his contemporaries in the challenge they made to convene
the first polar year of 1882.41
We should be mindful that like its predecessors, International Polar Year 2007–2008 can serve to advance science,
and to focus the attention of the world on the Polar Regions.
IPY honors the dedication and affirms the contribution to polar
research of so many, past and present. If we are diligent and act
to use the opportunity that International Polar Year provides by
demonstrating to humanity how international science can create
broader societal benefits, then as Dr. Gould put it, competing
interests can be addressed “by the friendliest kind of cooperation
from all of the nations involved.” 42

Endnotes: International Polar Year
1

Welcome to ACIA, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment website, http://www.
acia.uaf.edu/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment]. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment evaluated and synthesized
knowledge on climate variability, climate change, and increased ultraviolet
radiation and their consequences. The aim was to provide useful and reliable
information to the governments, organizations, and peoples of the Arctic on
policy options to meet such changes.
2

See generally Arctic Council website, http://arctic-council.org/section/
the_arctic_council (last visited Apr. 17, 2008); Michaëlle Jean, Governor General, Canada, 2007 Speech from the Throne (Oct. 16, 2007), available at http://
www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sftddt-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008); Yukon
Gov’t et al., northern vision: a stronGer north and a Better Canada
(2007), available at http://www.anorthernvision.ca/photogallery_0526.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2008). In the 2007 Northern Vision document, the territorial leaders in Canada called for partners to aid in developing healthy, viable
communities of self-reliant individuals, in a context where Aboriginal rights
have been successfully negotiated and implemented, and where northerners are
the primary beneficiaries of northern resource development. These goals are
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Snow, Sand, Ice, and Sun: clImate change
and

equIty In the arctIc and Small ISland developIng StateS

by John Crump*

The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is
dying and the new cannot be born.
—Antonio Gramsci1
When we unite for a moral purpose that is manifestly
good and true, the spiritual energy unleashed can transform us.
—Al Gore2

U

introduction

nited Nations (“UN”) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
has called climate change “the moral challenge of our
generation.” At the plenary session of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) Conference of the Parties (“COP”) XIII
meeting in Bali, Ban told assembled delegates that “the situation
is so desperately serious that any
delay could push us past the tipping point, beyond which the ecological, financial, and human costs
would increase dramatically.”3
Ban Ki-moon, Al Gore, and
many others argue that unless the
world embraces this moral challenge, the burden of climate change
will fall on the most vulnerable
regions: areas like the Arctic and
Small Island Developing States
(“SIDS”). Their call for moral clarity echoes what people in some of the world’s most vulnerable
regions have been saying for some time, that there needs to be a
recognition that the impacts of climate change are being felt by
parts of the world that currently lack the resources to cope with
the rapid change they are experiencing.
This Article explores some of the similarities between
the Arctic and SIDS as they confront the challenge of climate
change. Both regions have been identified as among the most
vulnerable to climate change effects yet they have contributed
least to global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. Responses
to the effects of climate change in these regions raise important questions of equity. The Article examines how this issue of
equity is being addressed, both legally and politically, through
an example of a human rights challenge in the Arctic and the
development of an alliance between the Arctic and SIDS called
Many Strong Voices (“MSV”).

LinkS between the Arctic And SmALL iSLAnd
deveLoping StAteS
At first glance, the Arctic and SIDS appear to have little in
common. One is cold, the other is mostly hot. One is seen as an
empty and pristine wilderness, untouched by human activities
or, alternatively, as a storehouse for vast mineral wealth, ripe
for exploitation. The other is portrayed in vacation posters as a
gentle, tropical paradise where the living is easy, the sun always
shines, and the beaches are endless.
But look more closely and you find some interesting similarities. Both regions are homelands to a diverse number of
Indigenous Peoples who, to varying degrees, have been colonized over the last several centuries. People in both regions
continue to rely on natural
resources—animals, fish,
and plants—and the environment. In both regions, traditional knowledge continues
to inform decision-making
and many people retain a connection to the environment
through a body of traditional
knowledge developed over
the centuries.
Another more unfortunate similarity is that the
effects of climate change
are greater and more noticeable in the Arctic and SIDS
than elsewhere around the globe. The 2005 Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment (“ACIA”) predicted that the Arctic will feel
the effects of climate change sooner and more severely than
other regions of the earth.4 It also emphasized the relationship
between Arctic climate change and Arctic biophysical processes
to global climate. The 2007 Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) echoed and amplified the
ACIA findings:
Arctic human communities are already adapting to
climate change, but both external and internal stressors challenge their adaptive capacities. Despite the

The effects of climate
change are greater
and more noticeable in the
Arctic and SIDS
than elsewhere around
the globe.
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resilience shown historically by Arctic indigenous communities, some traditional ways of life are being threatened and substantial investments are needed to adapt or
re-locate physical structures and communities.5
The report also identified similar effects on small islands:
Small islands, whether located in the tropics or higher
latitudes, have characteristics which make them especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, sealevel rise and extreme events. Sea-level rise is expected
to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and
other coastal hazards, thus threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the livelihood of island communities.6
In the SIDS, the adverse effects of sea level rise and continued climate change seriously threaten sustainable development.
Many small islands are already confronting risks from environmental hazards including coastal flooding, cyclones, and storm
surges.

voiceS from vulnerable regionS:
obServing climate change in the arctic
anD SiDS
While the scientific consensus on the impacts of climate
change on vulnerable7 regions like the Arctic and SIDS has been
building over the last few years, people who live there have long
observed environmental changes.
In the Arctic, many of these observations are recorded in the
groundbreaking study, “Voices from the Bay,” published by the
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and the Community of
Sanikiluaq in 1996. That study looked at Inuit and Cree experiences in the huge watershed of Hudson Bay. It found that Indigenous Peoples had been noticing “highly variable” weather in
the northwest corner of the bay since the 1940s.
There used to be more clear, calm days, winters were
colder, and low temperatures persisted longer. By the
early 1990s, weather changes were quick, unexpected,
and difficult to predict. Blizzards, for example, would
occur on clear days in the Chesterfield Inlet area, but on
days when environmental indicators suggested a blizzard, it would not materialize.8
The dilemma of traditional knowledge failing in light of
changing environmental conditions was summed up by Helen
Atkinson from the Cree community of Chisasibi, Québec:
We cannot make predictions anymore. We don’t know
if the water is going to freeze or not. We used to know
what was going to happen at certain seasons but, with
all the changes in the climate and different qualities of
water, we can’t make those predictions anymore.9
SIDS have always been vulnerable to extreme weather
events and other environmental disasters, however there has been
increasing recognition of the threat posed by climate change.10
And like Arctic residents, people in the South Pacific know that
climate change is not a future event but a present reality.
The effect of global warming is now being felt in every
aspect of the lives of people who live in the Pacific.
9

Reliable statistics now show that the western Pacific is
becoming progressively drier while the eastern Pacific
is becoming progressively wetter. Where once we
could expect steady rainfall throughout the year, we
now receive most of our rainfall in a short period often
resulting in floods. These floods, followed by droughts,
ruin our food supplies and hurricanes leave us without
crops for up to three months. They also cause sedimentation in our lagoons.11
Ben Namakin is in his mid-20s, works for the Conservation
Society of Pohnpei in Micronesia, and observes:
During my childhood days in Kiribati, we never experienced severe sea flooding. There were storms, but
they weren’t that bad. As the sea levels continue to rise
in Kiribati, several king tides hit the island. Saltwater
intrusion affects the quality of water in wells, floods
taro patches, gardens, and puts stress on plants/trees
which are very important to the life and culture of an
I-Kiribati. . . . Serious storm surges cause coastal erosion, floods grave yards, and in 2006, led to the collapse of the beautiful Dai Nippon causeway. This
incident bore huge costs on the people of Kiribati. They
had to build new homes with their own finance, and dig
up their deceased relatives from their graves and bury
them further inland.12
This kind of local knowledge and observation is important to developing a complete picture of what is happening in
vulnerable regions. The ACIA report, sponsored by the Arctic
Council, is groundbreaking in two significant ways. First, it
brought together the latest scientific research and analysis and
looked at the implications of climate change on a single region
of the Earth. Second, it incorporated the observations and traditional knowledge of the Arctic’s Indigenous Peoples. The ACIA
showed clearly that the rate of climate induced change in the
Arctic was twice that of the rest of the world.13 While the Arctic
has the lowest GHG emissions of just about anywhere in the
world, the report indicated that the highest price will be paid
by the Arctic’s Indigenous Peoples, many of whose cultures are
directly threatened by these rapid climatic changes.14
Indigenous Peoples’ observations were systematically integrated into the ACIA, making it the first such study to recognize the value of indigenous knowledge. The report’s authors
ensured that local voices were heard and local information
was incorporated in the final results. From northern Russia to
Alaska to the Canadian Arctic, Greenland and Sapmi, where the
indigenous Saami have traditionally herded reindeer throughout
the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola
Peninsula in Russia, people were reporting changes that were
affecting the very structure of their lives and threatening their
economic and cultural survival. A reindeer herder talked about
the uncertainty.
Our income diminishes because of climate change, of
course, and in a very drastic way. Even my wife has
said that it would be time to forget the reindeer. But I
tell her always: ‘Tamara, we depend on these reindeer.
SuStainable Development law & policy

If there are no reindeer, we have nothing to do here
either.’15
Uusaqqak Qujaukitsoq is a hunter in northern Greenland.
He described the changes in his region:
Sea-ice conditions have changed over the last five to six
years. The ice is generally thinner and is slower to form
off the smaller forelands. The appearance of aakkarneq
(“ice thinned by sea currents”) happens earlier in the
year than normal. Also, sea ice, which previously
broke up gradually
from the floe-edge
towards land, now
breaks off all at once.
Glaciers are very notably receding and the
place names are no
longer consistent with
the appearance of the
land. For example,
Sermiarsussuaq (“the
smaller large glacier”), which previously stretched out
to the sea, no longer
exists.16
Since Inuit throughout the Arctic use winter ice for travel
and hunting, the issue of thickness can be a matter of life and
death. Most Canadian Arctic communities have lost hunters
whose snow machines have crashed through thin ice where there
always used to be thick ice. In the Canadian Arctic, a pilot project employing remote observation satellite technology is being
used to supplement hunters’ environmental knowledge.17

Himalayas-Hindu Kush-Tian Shan-Tibet region and concluded
that “1.3 billion people could be exposed to risk of increased
water shortages.”20
Because developing countries (and the Arctic) have had the
lowest emissions, the fewest resources available to tackle the
problems created by climate change, and are most vulnerable
to impacts, Article 3 of the UNFCCC contains another important principle to guide global decision-making. It states that the
“specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially
those that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change
. . . should be given full
consideration.”21
Professor John C.
Dernbach echoes the
views of many people in
the SIDS and Arctic when
he writes that “equity
for developing and vulnerable countries would
counsel for stabilizing
and reducing atmospheric
GHG levels as soon as
possible. That would, after all, reduce or avoid negative impacts
to the most vulnerable (e.g. Inuit peoples [sic], Africa, small
island states).”22
There are questions of equity involved not only in the discussion of how the effects of climate change are distributed, but
how responses and solutions will be developed. Not everyone
will be affected equally and not everyone will have the same
resources to manage effects and adapt.
If all humans were contributing equally to climate
change, the emergence of winners and losers might
be considered an inevitable outcome of human development. However, all humans are not contributing
equally. The drivers of global environmental change—
such as fossil fuel consumption, urban and coastal
development, industrialization, deforestation, and other
land use changes—are also inequitable and can be disproportionately attributed to some nations, regions, and
social groups. In general, higher consumers of energy
are making a more substantial contribution to climate
change than are lower energy consumers. Moreover, all
humans do not have an equal voice—or in some cases
any form of representation—in key decisions about
energy usage patterns, land use changes, industrial
emissions, and so forth even though these decisions
affect the integrity of the ecological systems on which
all humans and all other species depend. Equity is thus
at the heart of the climate change issue.23
This question of equity is being addressed in several ways.
Two of these ways, involving the Arctic and SIDS, are discussed
below.

The petition requested
“relief from human rights
violations resulting from
the impacts of global warming
and climate change caused
by acts and omissions of
the United States.”

Ethical conSidErationS
This question of imbalance between regional contribution
and regional impact is supposed to be addressed in the UNFCCC,
Article 3, which states that “[t]he Parties should protect the climate systems for the benefit of the present and future generations
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.”18 However, current disparities are stark:
The imbalance of responsibility for global warming
is striking when comparing across nations. Average
global carbon emissions approximate one metric ton
per year (tC/yr) per person. In 2004, U.S. per capita
emissions neared 6 tC/yr (with Canada and Australia
not far behind), and Japan and Western European countries range from 2 to 5 tC/yr per capita. Yet developing
countries’ per capita emissions approximate 0.6 tC/yr,
and more than 50 countries are below 0.2 tC/yr.19
Another dramatic example of the striking inequities
between contributors and impact is highlighted in the 2007
United Nations Environment Programme report “Global Outlook for Ice and Snow” that looked at the relationship between
melting ice and snow and its effects on the major rivers of the
Spring 2008
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the inuit anD human RightS
In 2005, sixty-two Inuit in the Canadian and Alaskan Arctic regions filed a petition with the Organization of American
States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Led by
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, the petition requested “relief from human
rights violations resulting from the impacts of global warming
and climate change caused by acts and omissions of the United
States.”24 Erroneously reported in the media as a lawsuit, the
Inuit were not seeking financial compensation but wished to
demonstrate the link between global warming and its impact on
their human rights. The petition requested a hearing, which took
place on March 1, 2007, and asked for the commission to make
an “onsite visit to investigate and confirm the harms suffered”
by the people it named. The petition singled out the United
States, the world’s largest GHG emitter, because it has “repeatedly declined to take steps to regulate and reduce its emissions
of the gases responsible for climate change.”25
The petition argued that United States is in breach of both
human rights law and its international environmental obligations. The impacts of climate change—“caused by acts and
omissions”—by the United States
violate the Inuit’s fundamental human rights protected
by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man and other international instruments. These include
their rights to the benefits of culture, to property, to the
preservation of health, life, physical integrity, security,
and a means of subsistence, and to residence, movement, and inviolability of the home.26
As redress, the Inuit requested that the Commission prepare
a report “declaring that the United States of America is internationally responsible for violations of rights affirmed in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and in other
instruments of international law.”27 They called for the United
States to adopt “mandatory measures to limit its emissions of
greenhouse gases”28 and work towards global limits. The petition also called for the United States to “take into account” the
impact on the Inuit “before approving all major government
actions” and to work with the Inuit on “a plan to protect Inuit
culture and resources.”29 Finally, it called for “a plan to provide
assistance necessary for Inuit to adapt to the impacts of climate
change that cannot be avoided.”30
To date, other than holding a hearing, the Commission has
taken no action. However, the very fact that the Inuit filed a petition garnered enormous attention in the United States and around
the world. As a tool to publicize the situation facing one of the
world’s most vulnerable regions, the petition was a success.
More recently, lawyers for the Alaskan Native coastal village of Kivalina, which is being forced to relocate because of
flooding caused by the changing Arctic climate, filed suit in U.S.
federal court “arguing that 5 oil companies, 14 electric utilities
and the country’s largest coal company were responsible for the
village’s woes.”31
The human rights implications of climate change are being
explored in a number of different fora outside the Arctic and
SIDS context. In January 2007, the African Union issued a dec11

laration on climate change and development that called on the
international community to meet its obligations to cut greenhouse gases and strengthen African institutions to help them
address impacts and adaptation.32
In November 2007, just prior to the UNFCCC meeting
in Bali, members of the Association of Small Island States
(“AOSIS”) meeting in the Maldives signed the Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimensions of Climate Change. The
declaration calls for the UNFCCC to assess the human rights
implications of climate change, asks the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights to “conduct a detailed study into the effects
of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights, which
includes relevant conclusions and recommendations” and for the
UN Human Rights Council to hold a special debate on climate
change and human rights.33
In March 2008, the Advisory Council of Jurists of the Asia
Pacific Forum released a study that said climate change will have
“‘catastrophic’ effects on the physical and social landscape of
the Asia Pacific” and recommended that “the right to a healthy
environment be protected by human rights law.”34

many StRong voiceS – the aRctic anD Small
iSlanD Developing StateS woRking togetheR
Our rights, our human rights that we share with all of
you—to live as we do and to enjoy our unique culture
as part of the globe’s cultural heritage, are at issue.
The Arctic dimension and Inuit perspectives on global
climate change need to be heard in the corridors of
power.35
There are voices always heard, and voices seldom heard,
in the discussions about climate change. People in vulnerable
regions are usually among the latter. However, as this Article
has shown, there are ways for these voices to be heard—in the
scientific research and in political lobbying. “Given the similar
levels of impact, peoples of the Arctic are working together with
people in the small islands of the South Pacific, Caribbean and
elsewhere to cooperate on ensuring that the moral imperative of
taking action on climate change is heard.”36
In 2004, representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, SIDS, and UNEP/GRID-Arendal began discussing the
need for a joint effort to raise awareness about the effects of Climate Change in the world’s most vulnerable regions. Although
small in number, the people of the Arctic and SIDS had participated vigorously in a number of international negotiating processes, including the UNFCCC.
In August 2005, Premier Hans Enoksen of Greenland urged
Environment Ministers from twenty-five countries meeting in
Ilulissat to “bring vulnerable regions of the globe together so
that we may learn from each other and work with each other
internationally.”37 Premier Enoksen went on to say that “the
Arctic, the Small Island Developing States, low lying states, and
sub-Sahara states in Africa need to help each other.”38
These discussions led to the development of the Many
Strong Voices programme.39 With support from the government
of Norway, the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation in CanSuStainable Development law & policy

ada, the UN Foundation, the U.S. National Science Foundation,
and The Christensen Fund, the MSV programme focuses on the
similar concerns and needs of the Arctic and SIDS. MSV is a
consortium of Indigenous Peoples Organizations, researchers,
policy-makers, and community organizations.40 Over the next
five years it will:
• Carry out comparative climate change vulnerability and
adaptation research in the SIDS;
• Exchange knowledge to help develop regionally-appropriate climate change adaptation strategies;
• Produce communications, outreach, and education tools
that will raise the profile of their regions, highlight their
concerns, and enable communities to outline their own
solutions; and
• Combine regional research, the design of adaptation strategies, and communications efforts to increase the visibility of these regions, enhance their influence on global
dialogues on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and
facilitate the articulation of their adaptation needs.
An important focus of attention, though not the only one,
is on negotiations leading to a post-2012 climate change accord
to replace the Kyoto Protocol. Participants in the Many Strong
Voices are working together to ensure that their voices are heard
in discussions on emissions reduction and adaptation in the process outlined in the Bali Action Plan, which was produced at the
December 2007 COP. MSV produced a common message and
position for the last COP and called for:

• Agreement to achieve a peak in global GHG emissions
by no later than 2020, and an eighty percent reduction in
global emissions by 2050.
• Ways to ensure that indigenous and other people from
vulnerable regions can provide meaningful input into the
UNFCCC’s ongoing work on adaptation.
• Adequate funding from major emitting nations to provide
the resources necessary for adaptation at regional and
local levels in vulnerable areas.

ConCluSion
MSV participants agree with one of the key conclusions
of the 2006 Stern Review: “An effective response to climate
change will depend on creating the conditions for international
collective action.”41
This action must happen on a number of fronts. For vulnerable regions and peoples, it means lobbying at the UNFCCC
negotiations, focusing on the equity and human rights implications of climate change. It means pushing for a post-Kyoto
agreement that recognizes the special circumstances and needs
of the people in the Arctic and SIDS. The Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment was referring to the people of the Arctic, but the
words can be applied to all vulnerable regions. For people
“whose future is at stake, having the ability to make choices and
changes is a matter of survival, to which all available resources
must be applied.”42
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Managing arctic Fish stocks
by Michael Distefano*

H

umans depend on marine fish stocks for economic
and nutritional purposes throughout the world. Consequently, commercial fleets and super-trawlers are nothing new and many countries have found ways to regulate fleet
sizes and catch limits within their territorial waters. But something new is happening in the Arctic Circle. As sea ice begins
to disappear during summer months, a previously inaccessible
fishing ground is emerging, and like all fishing grounds, it will
be susceptible to mismanagement and exploitation.
Those who understand the
danger have already begun to
take action. On August 3, 2007,
Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK)
introduced a joint resolution,
Senate Joint Resolution 17, that
calls on the United States to initiate international discussions
and take necessary steps with
other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement for managing
migratory and transboundary
fish stocks. 1 The resolution
passed the Senate on October 4,
2007 and is currently pending in
the House.2 The resolution is an attempt to meet the changing
Arctic environment with an orderly and sustainable framework
to manage regional fisheries.
Gradually warming ocean temperatures have caused many
species of fish to migrate north in search of cold-water habitats.
At the same time, changes in Arctic sea ice have made the northern seas increasingly more navigable. Last summer, for the first
time since satellite measurements began, a fully navigable route
opened between the Atlantic and Pacific.3 This “Northwest Passage” was widely covered in the media and some scientists predict that an iceless Arctic Ocean could be the norm by 2040.4
The concurrence of receding Arctic ice and north-bound
fish stocks is already creating an environment favorable to commercial fishing, and Senator Stevens’ proposed legislation is an
attempt to make sure this transition is handled in an effective
and responsible way. The resolution calls for the creation of a
new international fisheries management organization for the
region and seeks a halt in the expansion of Arctic commercial
fishing activities until this is achieved.5
Successful fishery management programs employ “sciencebased limits on harvest, timely and accurate reporting of catch
data, equitable allocation and access systems, and effective
monitoring and enforcement.”6 This approach protects not only
fish species, but also billions of dollars in commerce and tens

of thousands of jobs. Iceland, for example, relies on commercial fishing for nearly seventy percent of its income.7 When a
particular stock is overfished, smaller and immature fish make
up a greater percentage of the catch, and the stock’s regenerative capabilities may be seriously undermined. The result is a
reduction in overall fishing hauls and a negative ripple effect on
the food chain. Simply put, all countries and all people have a
marked interest in ensuring global fish stocks remain healthy and
sustainable over the long term.
This is by no means the first
attempt at regulating regional
fish stocks. Successful catchshare programs are already
employed in nations such as
Iceland, New Zealand, and the
United States. Observers hail
Alaska as a world leader in managing commercial and recreational fish stocks—as the state
harvests over fifty percent of
U.S. seafood without overfishing any of its stocks.8 Alaska’s
marine fisheries are managed by
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (“NPFMC”), a federally mandated council that
is lending its support to S.J. Res. 17 and actually preempted the
resolution by calling for a ban on Arctic fishing until a sustainable management scheme is developed.
Former chairman of the NPFMC, David Benton, points out
that even the most competent fishery regulation will be unsuccessful without the support of other Arctic nations such as
Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Russia, and the European
Union.9 When nations perceive the opportunity to claim a strategic resource, they may end up in a scramble for the first foothold, or worse yet, attempt to gather as much of that resource as
they can before others get the opportunity.
In the past, management schemes were afterthoughts—they
developed around marine regions that were heavily fished, and
in many cases, there was already damage that would take generations to mend.10 In this case, however, there is an opportunity to
get things right at the beginning. Senator Stevens’ resolution is a
welcome move, but it is merely a start. With any luck, the House
will pass the resolution soon, and the real work can begin.

Gradually warming
ocean temperatures have
caused many species
of fish to migrate
north in search of coldwater habitats.
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Endnotes: Managing Arctic Fish Stocks continued on page 60
* Michael Distefano is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University,
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Climate Change and Biodiversity
in Polar regions
by Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf*

introduction

P

olar ecosystems are home to an array of plants and animals that survive in some of the most extreme conditions in the world. For example, the seas surrounding the
Antarctic are rich in plankton, which support a rich marine food
chain, while the Arctic itself supports many mammals and plays
an important role in the annual
cycle of migratory birds. The
scientific studies carried out at
the occasion of the celebration
of the International Polar Year
have provided additional evidence of the rich, unique nature
of the marine Arctic environment. Indeed the biodiversity of
the Arctic is fundamental to the
livelihoods of Arctic peoples.
However, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, along with recent reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, have made us aware that
climate change negatively impacts existing ecosystems and is
one of the main drivers of biodiversity loss.1 Particular attention is now being paid to Polar Regions, where evidence of
the impacts of climate change have been observed and widely
reported. Indeed, Polar Regions are currently experiencing some
of the most rapid and severe climate change on Earth, which
will contribute to environmental and socio-economic changes,
many of which have already begun. During the twentieth century, Arctic air temperatures increased by approximately five
degrees Celsius, which is an increase that is ten times faster than
the observed global-mean surface temperature.2 An additional
warming of about four to seven degrees Celsius in the Arctic is
predicted over the next hundred years.3 Moreover, Polar Regions
are particularly threatened by climate change since Polar species
and societies have developed very specialized adaptations to the
harsh conditions found at the poles, thus making them extremely
vulnerable to dramatic changes in these conditions.

their average weight was only 507 pounds.4 It is believed that the
progressively earlier breakup of the Arctic sea ice is responsible
for the decrease in the polar bears’ average weight,5 as this ice
loss reduces their hunting season and food intake. Although for
a different reason, reduced sea-ice extent is also believed to have
caused a fifty percent decline in
emperor penguin populations in
Terre Adélie.6 Populations of
krill and other small organisms
may also decline as ice recedes.7
Due to the high importance of
krill in various food chains, the
entire marine food web could
be adversely affected.8
Climate change is already
affecting the livelihood of
indigenous peoples in the Arctic. Losses in biodiversity affect
the traditional practices of
indigenous people, particularly fishing and hunting. For example, the Saami people have observed changes in reindeer grazing
pastures, while the Inuit people of Canada have observed reductions in the ringed seal population, their single most important
source of food.9

Polar Regions are
currently experiencing
some of the most rapid and
severe climate change
on Earth.

obServed and projected impactS
Walruses, polar bears, seals, and other marine mammals that
rely on sea ice for resting, feeding, hunting, and breeding are
particularly threatened by climate change. For example, studies
reveal that in 1980, the average weight of female polar bears in
western Hudson Bay, Canada, was 650 pounds. While in 2004,
Spring 2008

climate change and indigenouS and
local communitieS in the arctic
Due to its unique nature, climate, and sensitivity to climate
changes, the Arctic is an important early warning system as far
as climate change is concerned. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that eleven of the last
twelve years (1995–2006) rank among the twelve warmest years
in the instrumental record of global surface temperatures since
1850.10 In the past one hundred years, average temperatures in
the Arctic increased by almost twice the global average rate.11
Consequently, the annual average Arctic sea ice extent has
shrunk by 2.1 to 3.1 percent per decade. Further, temperatures
at the top of the permafrost layer have generally increased up
to three degrees Celsius since the 1980s.12 It is projected that
higher temperatures will contribute to continuing snow contraction and widespread increases in thaw depth over permafrost
regions. Also, the gradual melting of the Greenland ice sheet is

* Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf is the Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological
Diversity.
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projected to contribute to sea level rise, even beyond the year
2100.13
The consequences of climate change are becoming more
visible in the Arctic, and are greatly influencing the environment, animals, and living conditions of humans, especially the
indigenous peoples who strongly depend on the Arctic ecosystem and natural resources. The Arctic indigenous peoples,
their life, culture, and traditional knowledge, are adapted to and
largely dependent on the cold and extreme physical conditions
of the region. Over the years, they have adapted to the challenges brought about by the
Arctic geography and climate.
Although the Arctic climate
has always undergone change,
the ongoing changes in the climate are taking place at such
an alarming speed that indigenous communities are having
severe difficulties coping.
The Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment (“ACIA”),
commissioned by the Arctic
Council,14 provides important insight into the impacts
of climate change in the Arctic region.15 Over a period of five
years, an international team of over three hundred scientists, others experts, and members of indigenous communities prepared
this assessment. The ACIA Report identifies a range of climate
change impacts including: rising temperatures in the Arctic
with worldwide implications; shifts in Arctic vegetation zones;
changes in animal species’ diversity, ranges, and distribution;
and increased exposure to storms by coastal communities.16
The ACIA Report devotes a separate chapter to address
matters concerning the changing Arctic from an indigenous
perspective. Indigenous peoples have provided case studies
addressing the situation in Kotzebue, the Aleutian and Pribilof
Islands Region, the Yukon Territory, Denendeh, Nunavut,
Greenland, Sápmi, and Kola. An important common theme or
observation in the case studies is that the weather in the Arctic
region has become more variable and less predictable by traditional means.17
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment recognizes that further research is required to understand environmental changes
occurring in the Arctic, as well as the ways in which people view
these changes. It states that in both cases, there is a growing, but
still insufficient, body of research to draw on, in particular in
those Arctic areas where few or no current records of indigenous
observations are available. The assessment concludes that further research needs to detect and interpret climate change, and to
determine appropriate response strategies.

human and natural ecosystems reduced. Biodiversity is essential to the maintenance and delivery of many ecosystem services
including the provision of food and fodder, nutrient cycling, and
the maintenance of hydrological flows. As such, maintaining
biodiversity is an important component of adaptation planning.
Maintaining the ability of resilient species to adapt is critical
because climate change will favour species that are better able
to adapt to changing climatic conditions. In addition, the reduction of other stressors, such as permafrost degradation, chemical
pollution, over-fishing, land-use changes (including unsustainable development), and habitat
fragmentation could improve
polar ecosystems’ resilience to
climate change.
Adaptation activities can
and should make use of local
and indigenous knowledge, and
include their full and effective
participation. Indeed, indigenous
peoples can contribute to the
understanding of changes in the
Arctic through their observations
and perspectives on changes
in biodiversity and ecosystem
functioning. For example, the Inuvialuit Hunters and Trappers in
Canada’s High Arctic, along with the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (“IISD”), initiated a year-long project
to document Arctic climate change and communicate it to Canadian and international audiences. During the initiative, a video
and several scientific journal articles were produced to communicate the negative impacts of climate change observed in the
Arctic and to understand the adaptive strategies that local people
are using in response.18

Inuit people of Canada
have observed reductions in
the ringed seal population,
their single most important
source of food.

aDaptation optionS
Through the adoption of biodiversity-friendly adaptive and
mitigative strategies, the resilience of ecosystems to the impacts
of climate change can be enhanced, and the risk of damage to
15

the path aheaD
The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) establishes the international framework for biodiversity conservation, and very early on looked into the relationship between
biodiversity and climate change. The CBD integrated climate
change components within all of the programmes of work of
the Convention, with the exception of technology transfer and
cooperation. The Convention has also built synergies with the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
and convened an Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on climate
change and biodiversity. The Secretariat of the Convention has
also initiated an exhibition of indigneous and local communities
highly vulnerable to climate change, as well as calling for the
“International Expert Meeting on Responses to Climate Change
for Indigenous and Local Communities and the Impact on Their
Traditional Knowledge related to Biological Diversity—The
Arctic Region,” which was held in Helsinki, Finland, March
25–28, 2008.
There remains, however, a number of challenges and opportunities for the further development of interlinkages between
biodiversity and climate change. These include capacity bulidSuStainable Development law & policy

ing, mainstreaming, communication and awareness raising, and
research and technology.
Indigenous and local communities’ traditional knowledge,
innovations, and practices are an inseparable part of their culture, social structures, economy, livelihoods, beliefs, traditions, customs, customary law, health, and relationship to the
local environment. The totality of all such elements makes their
knowledge, innovations, and practices vital in relation to biological diversity and sustainable development. Consequently,
serious adverse climate change impacts on indigenous and local
communities, in particular the multiple impacts, will also have
adverse consequences on the elements that the Convention on
Biological Diversity identifies as their “knowledge, innovations,
and practices.” Indeed, Article 8(j) of the Convention acknowledges the knowledge, innovation, and practices of indigenous
and local communities, and promotes its wider application in the
context of conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The Convention established specific obligations for State
parties to respect, preserve, and maintain such knowledge, innovations, and practices, as far as this is possible, and as appropriate within the framework of their respective national legislation
and subject to the approval of the knowledge holders.19 In light
of the accelerated threats caused by climate change, it is necessary for Party States to adopt political, administrative, and legal
measures to protect and maintain the knowledge, innovations,
and practices of indigenous and local communities. Such measures should be developed with full and effective participation
of the representatives of indigenous and local communities.

ConCluSion
Recent scientific assessments have provided clear evidence
of the impacts of climate change on the biodiversity of Polar
Regions, and how this in turn affects indigenous and local communities. A number of reports also illustrate the contribution of
biodiversity to adaptation to climate change. Therefore, through
its various programmes and cross-cutting issues, the Conven-

tion seeks to address all threats to biodiversity and ecosystem
services including threats from climate change through scientific assessments, the development of tools, incentives and
processes, the transfer of technologies and good practices, and
the full and active involvement of relevant partners including
Governments, Parties, indigenous and local communities, youth,
NGOs, and Women. It is also for this reason that the international community celebrated the International Day on Biological
Diversity on May 22, 2007 under the theme “Biodiversity and
Climate Change.” In his message delivered for this occasion, the
United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, reminded
the international community that the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity is an essential element of any strategy to
adapt to climate change. He also stated:
Through the Convention on Biological Diversity and
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, the international community is committed to
conserving biodiversity and combating climate change.
The global response to these challenges needs to move
much more rapidly, and with more determination at all
levels—global, national and local. For the sake of current and future generations, we must achieve the goals
of these landmark instruments.20
Therefore, because every person on this planet, whether
they know it or not, draws on biodiversity for their daily lives,
and because climate change is a global problem, protecting
the biodiversity of Polar Regions from the impacts of climate
change requires a multi-layered web of intersecting initiatives
involving all stakeholders and the Convention on Biological
Diversity has to play a crucial role. The international community
is called upon to redouble its effort to achieve the Johannesburg
Biodiversity Target, which is aimed at substantially reducing the
rate of biodiversity decline by 2010. The celebration in 2010 of
the International Year on Biodiversity will offer a unique opportunity to keep the momentum generated by the International
Polar Year going.
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False sanctuary: the australian antarctic
Whale sanctuary and long-term stability in antarctica
by Donald K. Anton*

T

introDuction

he 1959 Antarctic Treaty1 and the subsequent allied
international legal agreements (and related measures)
that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”),2
is fast approaching its golden
anniversary.3 From a contemporary perspective, it is hard to
imagine Antarctica without some
established form of legal governance—a non-juridical Antarctica. Like a number of other
perceived essentials, it seems
certain if the ATS did not exist,
“it would have to be invented.”4
This is especially true today when
global contact with Antarctica in
terms of science, exploration,
exploitation of marine resources,
and tourism continues to expand
and grow in importance.5 In these circumstances, the presence
of effective regulation which serves as a driver of international
cooperation is more and more imperative.
As attention to Antarctica has increased over the past
forty-nine years, the ATS has been subject to periodic pressures
and tensions, but especially so since the end of the 1970s. From
at least 1975, differences (sometimes acrimonious) concerning Antarctic resources, access, and governance began to make
themselves felt between and across groups of claimant and nonclaimant states,6 parties and non-parties,7 and developed and
developing states.8 The ATS, however, has proved remarkably
resilient. As an early example of a “framework” treaty,9 it has
withstood some formidable challenges to both its legitimacy
and effectiveness.10 In contemporary international environmental law circles, the ATS is one of the two treaty regimes11 most
often cited as an example of success.12 Its collective value is
rightly viewed as much “greater than just the sum of its various
parts.”13 Given the underlying stakes in Antarctica—including
contentious issues tied to: (1) latent (but certainly not forgotten) territorial claims; (2) the exercise of jurisdiction; and (3)
governance decision-making—the ability of the ATS to adapt
and retain currency has been remarkable and holds a number of
lessons in normativity and diplomacy.14
The ATS though, like everything else, has vulnerabilities.15
Given the right set of circumstances, the equilibrium of the ATS
could be upset, with resulting turmoil within the system and
increasing pressures from outside. Over the life of the ATS, dif-

ficult political circumstances have occasioned others to sound
the alarm at times of increased tensions.16 It is not difficult to see
why. It seems hard to argue that the failure of the ATS would be
anything but bad; not least because there is no existing alternative
vehicle for international cooperation and governance in Antarctica.17 Among other things,
the failure of the ATS would
create international instability, uncertainty, and increased
tensions in relation to Antarctic activities and resources. It
would no doubt see the revival
of competing, conflicting, and
unrecognized claims that have
been “frozen” for nearly fifty
years.18 Today’s claims, however, would be pressed in a
world where increasing population and resource scarcity are much greater than when the claims
were “frozen.” It is easy to imagine the heightened instability,
competition, and tension this would create. Accordingly, threats
to the ATS pose serious risks and ought to be avoided.
While the ATS is not near collapse, or even nearing crisis, the recent assertion of maritime jurisdiction by Australian
courts over a Japanese whaling company for acts contrary to
Australian law in the Antarctic Southern Ocean is alarming.19
The exercise of jurisdiction by Australia over non-nationals in
this way makes its claim of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
real again. As Professor Bilder noted, “so long as jurisdictional
rights are restricted [to nationals in Antarctica,] the issues of territorial claims remain largely theoretical.”20 Once the genie is
out of the bottle, it has the potential to excite in other states a
new “territorial temptation”21 seaward in Antarctica, and with it,
the potential for a fundamental destabilization of the ATS.

The failure of the ATS
would create international
instability, uncertainty,
and increased tensions
in relation to Antarctic
activities and resources.
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The humane SocieTy
inTernaTional liTigaTion22
On January 15, 2008, the Federal Court of Australia issued
declaratory relief and an injunction against Kyodo Senpaku
Kaisha Ltd. (“Kyodo”), a Japanese whaling company operating in the Southern Ocean, including in the Australian Whale
Sanctuary (“AWS”) within a claimed Exclusive Economic Zone
(“EEZ”) off the Australian Antarctic Territory (“AAT”). The
court declared that Kyodo had breached sections 229–232 and
238 of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (“EPBC Act”) by killing, treating, and possessing whales in the AWS in the EEZ adjacent to the AAT.23 It
also enjoined Kyodo from the further killing, injuring, taking, or
interfering with any Antarctic minke whale, fin whale, or humpback whale in the AWS adjacent to the AAT.24

ApplicAtion for leAve to Serve proceSS in JApAn
The case was brought in 2004 by Humane Society International (“HSI”), which sued Kyodo for alleged illegal whaling
under Australian federal law, seeking the declaration and injunction ultimately granted.25 The law giving rise to the action,
including legal standing for HSI,26 is found in the EPBC Act.27
The AWS is established under section 225, Part 13, Division 3,
Subdivision B of the Act. By virtue of sections 5(1), 5(4), and
5(5) of the EPBC Act, section 8 of the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 (Cth), section 10 of the Seas and Submerged
Lands Act 1973 (Cth) and the 1994 Proclamation of the EEZ
adjacent to the AAT,28 the AWS applies to the declared AAT
EEZ. Sections 229 and 230 of the EPBC Act make it unlawful to
kill, injure, take, interfere with, treat, or possess whales without
an Australian permit, within the AWS.29 The offence provisions
expressly apply to both Australian nationals and non-nationals
within the AWS, but only to non-nationals beyond the outer limits of the AWS.30
One of the elements that the applicant had to satisfy in order
to be granted leave to serve process in Japan was that the violation complained of took place “in the Commonwealth.”31 Such
an investigation, while dictated by Australian law, is also necessary in determining the international legality of the exercise of
Australian prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction in relation
to the AAT EEZ. Initially, Justice Allsop was prepared to treat
as conclusive the determination of the boundaries of the Commonwealth by the Executive Branch of government, including
the EEZ.32
Before denying the initial application for leave to serve process, Justice Allsop took the extraordinary step of inviting the
amicus curiae intervention of the Attorney-General to provide
the government’s views on the application of “legislation and
treaties involved . . . in light of what might be seen to be Australia’s national interest, including . . . relations between Australia
and Japan.”33 The Attorney-General stated that “an assertion of
jurisdiction by an Australian court over claims concerning rights
and obligations in the [EEZ of the AAT] would or may provoke an international disagreement with Japan, undermine the
status quo attending the Antarctic Treaty, and ‘be contrary to
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Australia’s long term national interests.’”34 According to Justice
Allsop, this view was based on the recognition of three realities by the government. First, Japan would regard enforcement
of the EPBC Act against Japanese vessels and its nationals in
the AAT EEZ as a breach of international law.35 Second, the
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction against foreigners generally in the AAT EEZ, based on the Australian territorial claim,
would “prompt a significant adverse reaction from other Antarctic Treaty Parties.”36 Third, the Australian government has not
enforced the Australian law in Antarctica against the nationals
of other state parties, except where there has been voluntary submission to Australian law.37
In accepting that exercising jurisdiction might upset diplomatic concord under the Antarctic Treaty and be contrary to
Australia’s national interest, Justice Allsop also stated that any
injunctive relief granted would ultimately be futile because of
“the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcement of any court
order”38 and could place the Federal Court “at the centre of an
international dispute . . . between Australia and friendly foreign
power.”39 As a result, Allsop ruled that he “should not exercise
a discretion to place the Court in such a position” and denied the
application for leave to serve process in Japan.40
Significantly, following the intervention of the AttorneyGeneral, Allsop appeared prepared to return to consider the merits of the validity of the Australian claim to jurisdiction in the
AAT EEZ as a predicate to granting or denying leave to serve
process related to an event occurring “in the Commonwealth.”
Allsop raised the issue of whether all “the area” of Southern
Ocean south of 60º South Latitude, in which the AAT EEZ is
claimed, is high seas (in which an EEZ may not exist) because
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty protects “the rights . . . of any
State under international law with regard to the high seas within
that area.” 41 In fact, however, it seems that Allsop was really
interested in how Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and its prohibition on making any “new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica” might bear on
the proclamation of Australia to an Antarctic EEZ in 1994.
In particular, Allsop noted the submission by the AttorneyGeneral that there is a distinction between the “enlargement of
an existing claim to territorial sovereignty” and the claim of
Australia to an Antarctic EEZ:
it was submitted on behalf of the Attorney-General,
[that] the claim of Australia to the Antarctic EEZ is
not one of sovereignty in the full sense over the waters
adjacent to the Antarctic Territory (except for the territorial sea), but of claims . . . to exercise the rights of
exploitation, conservation, management and control,
and enforcement thereof, given to coastal States by
UNCLOS. . . . The recognition of the limitations (short
of full claims to sovereignty) of Australia’s claims to the
Antarctic EEZ becomes important in assessing whether
. . . the acts of the respondent and the contraventions
of the EPBC Act took place “in the Commonwealth.”42
In the end, however, Allsop did not decide on the operative
effect of Article IV of the Treaty in relation to the declared AAT
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EEZ. Instead, he used the submission by the Attorney-General
to contrast it with the contrary position of Japan (and most of
the rest of the world). Allsop noted that “[a]s far as Japan is
concerned, the Australian Antarctic EEZ is the high seas which
is not subject to any legitimate control by Australia under
UNCLOS and domestic legislation provided for thereby (such
as the EPBC Act).”43 The conflicting positions thus contrasted,
Allsop accepted the Attorney-General’s position that
international discord that
would follow by granting
leave to serve process and
it became “unnecessary to
decide whether the Antarctic
EEZ is, or can be seen as, ‘in
the Commonwealth.’ ” 44
Significantly too, Allsop
noted cultural differences
with respect to whaling and
hinted that the current stigma
attached to whaling might
signal a move away from
conservation and sustainable
utilization to a wish by some
to preserve charismatic megafauna at all costs.45 Allsop
explained:
The whales being killed . . . are seen by some as not
merely a natural resource that is important to conserve, but as living creatures of intelligence and of
great importance not only for the animal world, but
for humankind and that to slaughter them . . . is deeply
wrong. These views are not shared by all. . . . They
are views which, at an international level, are mediated
through the Whaling Commission and its procedures,
by reference to the Whaling Convention and the views
of nation States. They are views . . . that contain a number of normative and judgmental premises . . . which
do not arise in any simple application of domestic law,
but which do, or may, arise in a wider international
context.46

The majority held that the action was made clearly justiciable by the Australian Parliament under the EPBC Act and
related authority. The court had clear jurisdiction. The applicant
had clear standing. Accordingly, jurisdiction could be assumed
by service or submission and questions of futility would arise,
if at all, at the time of the issuance of injunctive or declaratory
relief.

The TriAl

Expanding jurisdiction
this dramatically
is clearly inconsistent
with uniform past
Australian practice not to
enforce Australian laws
against non-nationals in
Antarctica.

The AppeAl
On appeal, a Full Bench of the Federal Court reversed Justice Allsop. Taking a more dualistic, traditional approach to the
underlying legal and international relations issues, none of the
appellate judges gave any weight to the international political
considerations raised by the Attorney-General. Even the dissent
was in agreement on this point, stating that:
[c]ourts must be prepared to hear and determine matters
whatever their political sensitivity either domestically
or internationally. To approach the matter otherwise,
is to compromise the role of the courts as a forum in
which rights can be vindicated whatever the subject
matter of the proceedings.47
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On remand, the matter was
heard in September 2007. Kyodo,
as expected, did not appear. Instead
of relying on a default, HSI proceeded to prove the facts supporting its claim for declarative and
injunctive relief. Following the
guidance provided by the majority
of the Full Federal Court on Appeal
regarding public interest injunctions, Allsop granted the declaration and injunction sought by HSI.
This, of course, raises the prospect
of contempt proceedings in Australian courts if Kyodo does not comply with the injunction in future
whaling seasons.48 It also raises
the question of whether the Federal government is prepared to
enforce the injunction in the event of violation by intercepting
and seizing Kyodo ships operating in the AAT EEZ. Indeed, it
has the potential to bring the unilateral exercise of Australia prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction to bear on
ships and individuals in an area that almost all other states view
as the high seas and, if they are correct, are thus subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.49
Expanding jurisdiction this dramatically is clearly inconsistent with uniform past Australian practice not to enforce Australian laws against non-nationals in Antarctica.50 Yet, in the 2007
national election campaign, the newly elected Labor government pledged to “enforce Australian law banning the slaughter
of whales in the Australian Whale Sanctuary.”51 Additionally,
the Australian Government Solicitor wrote to Justice Allsop in
December 2007 during the trial of the HSI case on instructions
from the new Attorney-General. The letter stated that the court
should not rely on the views of the Attorney-General of the previous government. Instead, the letter highlighted that the new
“Government believes that the matter would best be considered
by the Court without the Government expressing its view.”52
During the 2007–2008 Southern Hemisphere summer whaling season that has just ended, the Australian government dispatched the Oceanic Viking to monitor whaling in the Southern
Ocean, but it neither intercepted nor seized any Japanese whaler
operating in the AAT EEZ. The government claimed that the
Oceanic Viking was being used to collect evidence that might
be used in international litigation challenging the lawfulness of
Japanese whaling for “scientific purposes” under the InternaSuStainable Development law & policy

tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.53 But, given
the current government’s position, one is still left to wonder if
it is only a matter of time before the Australian government will
act against Japanese ships and Japanese nationals in the AAT
EEZ. This makes it opportune, for the remainder of this Article,
to consider the implications of such a possibility for stability in
Antarctic governance.

implicationS for atS Stability
The HSI case establishes that the application and enforcement of the AWS provisions as applied to the AAT under the
EPBC Act in a private action, against Australian non-nationals,
by Australian courts, is not barred by Australian law.54 From
an international law perspective, this is unfortunate. It is even
more so when one considers the
ramifications for the stability of
the ATS.
In thinking about the use of
jurisdiction established under
Antarctic claims to territory and
maritime zones as a way to provide protection to whales in the
Southern Ocean, it is necessary
to consider the nature of that
jurisdiction. In turn, this requires
a consideration of the ways in
which both sovereignty and jurisdiction have been addressed by
the ATS. In relation to the sovereignty issue, it is important to recognize that Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty55 has not solved the conflict so much as it has
structured a form of words that allow all parties to ambiguously
look past the issue of territorial claims in order to identify with
each other on agreed objectives.56 The admonition of Professor
Watts is worth repeating here:
It does not overstate the case to say that Article IV is
the cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty and thus of the
whole system that has grown up around it. The effectiveness of that article has . . . kept Antarctica free of
the conflicts to which its complex territorial situation
would have been most likely to lead and generally has
removed it from the usual range of international political tensions.
Yet, however satisfactory the results of Article IV
have been so far, there are certain limits to its operation
and effectiveness. These limits are sometimes obscured
by the very success that Article IV has so far had and
the tendency to get around its complex drafting by summarizing its broad effect by some such phrase as that it
“suspends sovereignty claims” in Antarctica or that it
has put “sovereignty in abeyance.”
What is important to always bear in mind is that
the various national claims to and rights of sovereignty in Antarctica are still very much alive – as is
equally the opposition to them of those states that do

not recognize them. The underlying differences of view
remain. In that sense, Article IV has not “solved” the
problem. What it has done is provide a basis on which
conflicts arising out of those continuing differences can
be avoided.
. . . Take Article IV away, and sovereignty rights
and claims, and opposition to them, will immediately
re-emerge, undiminished in vigor. In an extreme case,
involving in some way the Antarctic Treaty or at least
Article IV ceasing to be in force, the consequential possibility of a resurgence of conflicts over sovereignty is
readily apparent.57
It is precisely this situation that the HSI case threatens.
Absent agreement of the parties to introduce positive rules
related to the exercise of jurisdiction in the Treaty Area over
non-nationals,58 it seems almost
certain that Australia’s assertion of maritime jurisdiction
over non-nationals will at the
least create conditions for dispute and discord. If other states
were to follow Australia’s
lead, in a worst case scenario,
it might mean the end of the
ATS altogether and the revival
of old claims and assertion of a
host of new claims. As Gillian
Triggs observed in 1985:
Were Australia or any other claimant state to give effect
to their views of Article IV of [Antarctic] Convention
by, for example, exercising the customary jurisdiction
of a coastal state in relation to waters adjacent to its
sectoral claim in Antarctica, it is likely that the Convention would break down.59
It is important to note that the ATS does not seek to regulate
Antarctica and its marine environment in its entirety. Indeed,
whales are expressly excluded from the ATS in a number of
places and it is important to bear in mind that there are existing multilateral agreements that are both consistent with the
ATS and do apply to whales in the seas adjacent to Antarctica.
The purpose of this Article is not to identify all of these agreements.60 Rather, the argument here is that the contentious and
almost entirely unrecognized exercise of jurisdiction within the
ATS over non-nationals in waters adjacent to Antarctica for the
purpose of regulating whaling is unsound. It is likely to lead to
less overall environmental protection in Antarctica if it engenders conflict and competition.
The crux of the HSI dispute (and any progeny it brings
forth) is whaling. The long-running battle between the antiwhaling forces and whalers is being played out in Australian
courts because of the failure to address the issues within what
is seen as a “dysfunctional” whaling regime.61 However, the
Australian litigation involves what most other states will view
as the unlawful exercise of Australian jurisdiction (based on its

The long-running
battle between the
anti-whaling forces and
whalers is
being played out
in Australian courts.
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Antarctic claim) in the Southern Ocean. This raises the very real
prospect that the ongoing whaling dispute will have a detrimental “ripple effect” on the ATS (and perhaps even beyond).62
Whaling is largely comprised of politics revolving around
a single issue. The danger is that the issue of whales and whaling might distort and obscure the larger environmental picture
in Antarctica. This is especially true when contemporary international negotiations on whales and whaling within the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”) often appear in many
ways to be meant for consumption of domestic political constituencies.63 Fundamental tensions will be created within the
ATS if the battle over the whaling issue is brought within. By
disrupting set patterns of jurisdiction that provide a fundamental
cornerstone for the ATS, the whaling issue will reverberate, and
not likely to the good, in the system.
I want to emphasize that most of my sympathy lies with the
plaintiff’s reasonable objectives in the litigation we are considering.64 It is certain that ensuring the perpetuation of whales in
the Southern Ocean is important. However, this worthy goal is
only a small part of the common interest of all humankind in the
protection and sustainable use of the wider Antarctic environment (marine and terrestrial). Because of this broader common
interest, I depart with HSI and its lawyers when we look at the
means employed to reach the specific objective of perpetuation.
My departure is not so much driven by HSI and its lawyers as it
is by the legal tools put at their disposal by the Commonwealth
Parliament of Australia in form of the Environment Protection
Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1998.
Private litigation, based on an internationally disputed claim
to sovereignty over Antarctic territory and a further contested
claim to an EEZ appurtenant to that territory, ought not to serve
as a proxy for cooperative (and hopefully effective) international
management of the Antarctic environment. The negative incentives presented by such an extreme unilateral measure are just
too dangerous. That is not to say other, less provocative unilateral measures need to be avoided. Indeed, in the appropriate circumstances unilateral measures can be viewed as international
leadership.65 Lower level, less contentious, unilateral measures
might present a possible way forward in the establishment of
effective international management.
Instead of a unilateral Australian approach, what is required
is a more concerted multilateral attempt to address the issue of
whales and whaling through the whaling regime established by
the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling. Even if such an attempt involves a difficult and long drawn
out process, or even if the deadlock remains, a continuing interregnum of uncertainty and contest within the whaling regime66
is better than destabilizing the ATS—an extremely important
regime of broader scope and objective.

concluSion
It is a truism that good faith cooperation between states is
required to successfully tackle environmental and resource problems which are international in scope.67 In the case of whale
stocks, a res nullius common property resource,68 cooperation is
required on account of the externalities that have driven unsustainable exploitation.
It is well-known that over the past ten years or so, the struggle between the conservation and utilisation camps within the
IWC has intensified as stocks (at least minke whale stocks) have
apparently been gradually replenished since the whaling moratorium.69 This increasingly acrimonious struggle seriously threatens the normative effectiveness of the Whaling Convention and
the IWC. By comparison to the IWC, the ATS has been relatively stable since controversy raged around the issue of minerals exploration and exploitation in the 1980s.
The recent HSI case, and the broader context in which it
arises, has the potential to dangerously destabilize the ATS. At
the bottom, this potential is driven by the somewhat jaded, but
I believe basically accurate perspective expressed by Wilbert
Chapman in 1969. Chapman said:
The nature of [humans] abhors something of value not
being owned by an individual, or by groups of individuals organized into states or business entities.70
This acquisitive view of human nature frames, in large part,
the centuries old argument about open and closed seas that all
lawyers of the sea are familiar with. This acquisitive habit lies
behind the capture and use of whales by the nationals of whaling
states, just as much as lies behind claims to sovereign rights in
natural resources in an EEZ off Antarctica. Indeed, the drive to
acquisition applies to all common Antarctic marine biological
resources and helps explain why states have entered into agreements that seek to frame principles for sharing these marine
resources. More troubling though, is that in what appears to be
coming times of increasing scarcity, this acquisitive habit will
apply with equal force to oil and mineral resources (and even
genetic material) found off-shore in Antarctica.71 For many, this
explains why the 1991 Madrid Protocol contains the Article 25
“escape clause” built around disagreement concerning mineral
resource activities.
This habit of acquisition, and the tendency to exclusive use
of what is thus acquired, highlights the great failing of Australia’s unilateral approach to the protection of the Antarctic marine
environment in this case; an approach predicated on a claim to
exclusive sovereign rights and the projection of Australian prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction in the zone.
The big danger is that if other states follow Australia’s lead in
claiming sovereign rights and exercising attendant jurisdiction
the chances of natural resource over-exploitation and environmental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, in the
long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important,
scarce and economically viable resources.
Endnotes: False Sanctuary continued on page 61
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Using the Polar Bear Framework to Protect
the arctic haBitat by Tim P. Shields*
mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe,
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, scarce and economically viable resources.
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isting the polar bear as a threatened species is the predominant manner in which protection and preservation
of the Arctic habitat might be achieved. The U.S. Geological Survey issued a final report on the status of the polar
bear on September 7, 2007.1 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
however, has missed its deadline to list the polar bear as a threatened animal.2 As a result, three non-profit conservation groups
sued the Bush Administration on March 10, 2008,3 requesting
that the court require the agency to comply with the timeline for
completing the listing process.4
If finally implemented, the protections granted to the polar
bear could be used to initiate protection of Arctic habitat. Listing
the polar bear would require the federal government to ensure
that its actions and policies do not harm or jeopardize the bears.
It would also prevent habitat modification where there is a showing of actual injury to wildlife. Further precautions protecting
the polar bear would be the designation of a critical habitat zone
and the preparation of a recovery plan.5
While the regulatory process could potentially provide
much protection from future habitat loss and contamination,
concentrating on the polar bear as the primary protection mechanism simplifies the situation and ignores major factors currently
contributing to habitat loss. Among the most pertinent hazards
facing the Arctic are global warming, traveling chemical pollution, and encroaching human activities.
Greenhouse gases in the Arctic have led to an annual temperature increase nearly twice that observed in other regions of
the Earth.6 One major result of this increased temperature manifested itself further during the 2007 annual summer ice melt
when the ice coverage reached a new low of 1.59 million square
miles, which constituted a loss of nearly 460,000 square miles.7
The loss of ice compounds the problem by reducing the amount
of light that is reflected from the Earth back into space, which
results in a greater absorption of heat, contributing to further ice
loss.8 The loss of ice has also led to an increase in coastal erosion throughout the region,9 which has even resulted in calling
for the costly move of entire towns in Alaska.10 The ice loss
is especially pertinent to polar bears, whose main habitat consists of coastal polar ice caps.11 For the polar bear framework to
stem global warming, the federal government would also have
to effect a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Global warming, however, is not the only threat to the
region. In the 1950s, researchers first came to believe that a wide
array of chemical pollutants, which originated outside the Arctic,
arrived to the Arctic via several pathways, including air, water,
ice, and migratory animals. While some of the pathways result
in quick delivery to the Arctic, others take years and decades to
transport the chemical pollutants to their destination.12 The vari-

Polar bear on whale carcass.

ous routes and protracted delay in chemicals arriving to the Arctic makes preventing contamination difficult in the short run.
The Arctic habitat is further threatened by human encroachment related to mineral exploration and development, logging,
and rural expansion.13 Expansions in human activity led to further
construction of roads, trails, pipelines, and other developments
that fragment and isolate habitats.14 The continued reduction in
ice coverage and increasing demand for oil has already begun
to yield an increase in commercial exploration throughout the
area,15 which could further exacerbate the diminishing polar
habitat, depending on the expanse of the polar bear habitat.
The effects of global warming and human interaction combine to affect regional land ecosystems. Trees and shrubs are
currently expanding into what was once the tundra at a rate that
far exceeds previous predictions.16 This northward advancement
of the forest results in both a trend in movement of animal species and an increased risk for other species that have not adapted
as readily.17 Specifically, millions of migratory birds that use the
tundra as a breeding ground are affected.18
While it is possible that listing the polar bear as a threatened
species could result in protection of parts of the Arctic, the specific location of the polar bears’ habitats could leave other areas
of the Arctic open to further commercialization and to additional
encroachment of human settlements, destroying habitat that is
vital to polar bears and other species upon which it depends for
sustenance. Working within the polar bear framework could
provide for substantial protection to the entire Arctic if interpreted broadly enough; however, further protections would still
be needed to truly protect the Arctic from both global warming
and expanding trade routes in the area.
Endnotes: Using the Polar Bear Framework continued on page 63
* Tim P. Shields is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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Can Climate Change Be good for greenland?
mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe,
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, scarce and economically viable resources.

an arCtiC island’s response to new development opportunities
by James Mitchell*

W

orldwide, Greenland is viewed as an indicator of
global climate change—like Earth’s monitoring station. The world’s largest island consists of eightyone percent ice,1 and its melting
ice contributes to about twentyeight percent of current global
sea-level rise.2 News coverage of
Greenland centers upon the current melting rate of its ice sheets
and scientists’ predictions of how
much global sea level would rise
if all of the ice sheets were to
melt. However, little is written
about how climate change will
affect those who live there.
Despite its location, Greenland shares some similarities
with the global south. Many of
its 60,000 inhabitants subsist at least in part on nature, and its
governance status is akin to a colony of a European nation.3 The
government has welcomed the opportunity to establish greater
economic independence from Denmark by “developing” Greenland. However, given that black carbon, in the form of soot-laden
snow, accounts for about a third of the warming in the Arctic
regions,4 is heavy industry, most of which is foreign-owned, a
viable development path?
Greenland has seen rising temperatures at a more accelerated pace than the global rate. From 1991 to 2003 average winter
temperatures rose eleven degrees Fahrenheit.5 However, many
in Greenland embrace rising temperatures, as it opens up new
opportunities across the island. For now, tourism is receiving a
boost due to “discoveries” of new islands, previously inaccessible because of the ice, and these islands are now becoming
vacation sites for cruise liners.6 Because of the warming temperatures, farmers can now plant vegetables that a few decades
ago would have never survived, and raise fatter livestock.7
The cod industry was once the greatest asset of Greenland,
but in the 1960s it collapsed due to over-fishing and shifting sea
currents. Now that the sea temperatures are the highest since
the 1960s, the cod have returned, as evidenced by government
inspectors, who in 2007 made a “biblical catch” of twenty-five
tons of cod in one hour.8 Finally, the seasonal snowmelt continues to open up previously impassible areas.9
Of course, not all benefit from the rising temperatures. Climate change harms the Inuit peoples’ way of life, particularly in
the realm of hunting.10 The effects are devastating; “[r]etreat-

ing sea ice has exposed Inuit villages to the eroding forces of
wind and waves, causing their homes to topple into the sea . . .
Experienced hunters have fallen through ice that appeared safe,
resulting in injury and death.
The [animals] upon which
the Inuit depend . . . could go
extinct before the end of this
century.”11 Despite these negative impacts on Inuit culture,
Greenland’s Home Rule Government remains interested in
attracting heavy industry to the
region.
The sector most excited
over Greenland’s warming is
also the one whose activities
intensify climate change—
heavy industry. British-based
firm Angus & Ross (“Angus”) used to operate the Black Angel
Mine, a zinc and lead mine on Greenland’s west coast. The mine
had to be closed in 1990 due to declining global zinc prices and
the difficulty of operating in an area often frozen over.12 Now,
with rising commodity prices and milder temperatures that have
allowed for operators to work for eight months per year instead
of only six,13 Angus is scheduled to re-open in late 2008, pending
approval of its mining license from the Greenland government.14
Angus is not alone. By 2007, Greenland’s Bureau of Minerals
and Petroleum tripled the number of exploration licenses it had
issued since 2002.15
U.S. firm Alcoa plans to create an aluminum smelting
plant along the western coast, powered by a nearby hydroelectric power plant.16 Ironically, the hydroelectric power plant’s
“renewable,” zero-greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions source of
energy is the melting ice and snow. The smelter’s operations,
however, would boost Greenland’s GHG emissions by seventyfive percent from their current levels.17
Despite regional economic benefits from climate change,
local inhabitants who live near these industries will have to pay
the costs from the local pollution that results from heavy industry. A 1997 site assessment of the Black Angel mine revealed
heavy metal contamination within a thirty-mile radius of the
mine.18 There is no reason to expect better prospects once it is
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re-opened. Indeed, Alcoa has faced considerable controversy in
Yarloop, Australia for seeking to double its aluminum smelting operations, despite allegations by locals that fumes are contributing to “nosebleeds . . . skin ulcers and rashes, nausea . . .
impaired speech, blackouts and palpitations.”19
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1

CIA website, The World Factbook – Greenland, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gl.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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Century, Says New Study (July 20, 2007), available at http://www.sciencedaily.
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The challenge is how
to establish greater
economic sovereignty,
now that climate change
has introduced more
opportunities.
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Supporting AdAptAtion:
A priority for Action on climAte chAnge for cAnAdiAn inuit
by Dr. James D. Ford*

C

introDuction

limate change is having profound impacts in the Canadian Arctic. Temperatures are increasing at twice the
global average, recent years have witnessed a dramatic reduction in summer sea ice cover, and extreme weather
conditions appear to be increasing in both magnitude and frequency.1 Widely believed to be at least partially attributed to
human emissions of greenhouse gases, climate change is having dramatic implications for Canada’s Inuit population who are
dependant on the biophysical environment and the resources it
provides.2 With future climate change projected to be greatest in
the Arctic,3 communities, governments, and Inuit organizations
have expressed concern. Inuit political leaders have even argued
that climate change is a fundamental human rights issue, violating the ability of Inuit to practice and enjoy the benefits of their
culture.4 Clearly, action on climate change is urgent for Arctic
regions; failure to act could threaten the very existence of the
Inuit way of life.
This Article reviews the evolution of climate change policy
in an international context in general and Canada in particular. The review provides a basis for asking the question: what
constitutes appropriate action on climate change for Inuit in the
Canadian Arctic? The central argument is that while reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is an important goal globally, adaptation to reduce vulnerability to climate change should be a priority for Inuit regions. The paper finishes by identifying key action
areas at a Canadian and international level to help Inuit adapt.
While this Article focuses specifically on the Canadian Inuit
experience, the arguments developed are generally applicable
for Inuit across the circumpolar north.

canaDa’S inuit population
Inuit are indigenous peoples inhabiting Arctic and subArctic regions of Canada, Alaska, Greenland, and Chukotka
(Russia), numbering approximately 155,000 people. The 2001
Canadian census found 45,070 people who define themselves as
being Inuit; 22,560 of whom live in Canada’s newest territory
of Nunavut—see the table and figure below. The other 22,510
live in three Inuit settlement regions: the Inuvialuit Settlement
Region of the Northwest Territories, Nunavik in the province
of Quebec, and Nunatsiavut in the province of Newfoundland
& Labrador.5 Together, Inuit administered regions cover thirty
percent of the Canadian landmass, and have a climate characterized by very cold, long winters, and short, cool summers.6
Sea ice is an integral part of Inuit life, providing a transportation
25

link between communities and a hunting platform for over seven
months of the year in most areas.

Figure 1: inuit regionS oF canaDa with locationS
oF inuit communitieS7

The majority of Inuit in the Canadian north live in small,
remote coastal communities only accessible by air or winter ice
roads, with economies composed of waged employment and
subsistence hunting.8 Many Inuit retain a close relationship with
the environment and a strong knowledge base of their regional
surroundings, with traditional foods derived from hunting having social and cultural importance.9 Hunting also continues to
supply the principal elements of the Inuit diet. In recent surveys
in Nunavut, for instance, forty-one percent of Inuit respondents
identified that more than half of the meat and fish they consumed
was locally harvested.10 Other studies have demonstrated that
the economic value of the traditional food sector is at least equal
to the cost of food imports from Southern Canada.11

* Dr. James D. Ford specializes in climate change vulnerability and adaptation
research in Arctic regions. A postdoctoral fellow at McGill University, he has
collaborated with Inuit communities on climate change projects, advised northern
governments on climate change policy development, and participated in media
debates surrounding climate change. A contributing author to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report, he was recently awarded
a Young Innovator Award by the Government of Canada for his contributions to
the field. He can be reached at james.ford@mcgill.ca.
The author would like to thank Inuit of Canada for their continuing support
in his research activities. This article benefited from contributions of Christina
Goldhar, and Figure 1 was kindly provided by Meghan McKenna of Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami. Funding for the research was provided by ArcticNet, SSHRC, and the
International Polar Year CAVIAR project.
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Table 1: Selected Characteristics of Inuit Regions of Canada

Inuit Region

Province/Territory

Relevant
Land Claim

Inuit Population
(% of total)

Average
Community Size

Territory of Nunavut

Nunavut

Nunavut Land Claim
Agreement (1993)

24,635 (84%)

1,063

Inuvialuit Settlement
Region

Northwest Territories

Inuvialuit Final Agreement
(1984)

3,115 (55%)

876

Nunavik

Québec

James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement (1975)

9,565 (90%)

688

Nunatsiavut

Newfoundland &
Labrador

Nunatsiavut Agreement (2005)

2,169 (89%)

1,767

Many Inuit communities in Canada are challenged by limited access to health services, low socio-economic status, high
unemployment, crowded and poor-quality housing, and concerns regarding basic services such as drinking water quality.12
Consequently, Inuit generally experience low indicators of wellbeing compared to the Canadian population in general. Inuit
men, for example, can expect to live 64.4 years compared to a
Canadian average of 77.0; the figures for women are 69.8 years
and 82.0 years respectively.13 Moreover, Inuit have experienced
sweeping socio-cultural changes in the second half of the twentieth century, as former semi-nomadic hunting groups moved to
permanent settlements beginning in the 1950s. Inuit livelihoods
were transformed in a matter of decades with the introduction
of the waged economy, imposition of hunting regulations, compulsory schooling, rapid population growth, and imposition of
Western governance and legal system.14

Climate Change and inuit:
a human rightS iSSue?
As a hunting people dependent on sea ice and other environmental conditions, Canadian Inuit have been particularly
susceptible to changing climatic conditions documented in the
last decade.15 Unusual sea ice and weather conditions have disrupted livelihoods and households through the associated loss
and damage to hunting equipment. Increasing danger of hunting and travel has forced some Inuit to avoid engaging in traditional activities all together, while life-threatening accidents
are increasing because of rapid changes in ice, snow, and land.
Weather and sea ice conditions are becoming more difficult to
forecast using traditional knowledge, thereby affecting the credibility of elders among younger generations. There is also evidence that warming temperatures are affecting the quality of
some traditional foods and animal skins.
With the impacts of climate change becoming increasingly
apparent in Arctic regions, many Inuit political leaders have
situated climate change as a fundamental human rights issue.
For example, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference—on behalf of
the Inuit population of Canada and the United States—lodged a
“petition” at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
in 2005 seeking relief from human rights violations resulting
Spring 2008

from the impacts of climate change caused by acts and omissions of the United States with respect to greenhouse gas emissions.16 The petition appealed to aspects of international law
established under the Organization of American States (“OAS”),
arguing that subsistence culture is central to Inuit identity and
is being damaged by climate change, thereby violating the right
of Inuit to practice and enjoy the benefits of their culture, use
and enjoy their traditional lands, enjoy personal property, lead
healthy lives, and compromising intellectual property. While
the petition was rejected without prejudice,17 it likely represents
the first of many legal actions as nations and groups adversely
affected by climate change seek legal redress for a problem they
did not cause.
To date, Inuit have not lodged similar proceedings against the
respective countries in which they live. However, legal grounds
for such action exist. In Canada, climate change compromises
the rights of Inuit—as Canadians—as stated in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.18 Section 25(b) of the Charter
states “any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land
claims agreements or may be so acquired,” are to be upheld.19
Several land claims have been signed between the Canadian government and Inuit: Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, Inuvialuit
Final Agreement, James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement,
and the Nunatsiavut Agreement.20 Key principles enshrined in
these agreements include the rights of Inuit to use of the land
and resources, harvesting rights, and the enhancement of cultural and social well-being. The ability to uphold these rights is
being challenged by climate change, which compromises access
to resources and traditional hunting locations.21 Moreover, climate change threatens to undermine the very traditional cultural
practices that land claim agreements have sought to uphold.

Climate Change poliCy: international and
Canadian Context
If, as this Article argues, climate change is a fundamental
human right, Inuit have recourse to international human rights
law and legal obligations governing the citizen-state relationship. Moreover, all states with Inuit populations are parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”)22 which establishes legal obligations of parties
26

to take action on climate change. The UNFCCC outlines two
key areas for climate policy, mitigation and adaptation, both of
which have relevance to Canadian Inuit.
Firstly, the UNFCCC and its principal update, the Kyoto
Protocol, legally obligate parties to “achieve, in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system;”23 a policy option
known as mitigation. The protocol legally binds Annex 1 (industrialized) countries to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by an
average of five percent by the
first commitment period (2008–
2012) compared to the baseline
of 1990. In Canada, a six percent reduction in emissions was
negotiated by the federal government in Kyoto, although the
government has indicated it will
not achieve these targets. Territorial and provincial governments
in Canada have also established their own programs to reduce
emissions. Mitigation is central to global efforts to tackle climate change: unless action is taken to reduce emissions, global
temperatures are likely to exceed the threshold of 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels that scientists have indicated will
result in “dangerous climate change.”24 Such a scenario would
cause irreversible change to globally important biophysical systems25 and stress the ability of human systems to cope.
Secondly, adaptation, which seeks to develop measures to
reduce or moderate the negative effects of climate change and
take advantage of new opportunities, is an important component
of the Framework Convention.26 Article 4.1b, for example, commits parties to “formulate, implement . . . national and where
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to . . .
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.”27 Article 4e
states that parties must “cooperate in preparing for adaptation
to the impacts of climate change . . . .”28 Article 11 of the Kyoto
Protocol also commits parties to promote and facilitate adaptation to address climate change.29
As a response to climate change, adaptation has traditionally
has been overshadowed by mitigation, although this is beginning
to change. The UNFCCC, for example, recently re-affirmed the
importance of adaptation on the policy agenda, establishing several programs of support.30 The Action Plan from the Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) to the UNFCCC meeting in Bali,
December 2007, likewise calls for “enhanced action on adaptation,” including the provision of financial resources to support
adaptation and assessment of adaptation needs.31 Adaptation
is also being recognized as essential at the federal, provincial,
and territorial levels in Canada.32 The Canadian position at the
UNFCCC talks in Bonn, which occurred on May 16, 2006, for
example, stated: “In Canada’s arctic region, the changes noted

by the Inuit community . . . has raised the need to address adaptation measures.”33 Moreover, the federal government has made
commitments to support adaptation, including the recent provision of CN$86 million to help Canadian communities deal with
the effects of climate change. In Arctic Canada, policy makers
have been proactive in pushing adaptation onto the agenda.34 The
federal department of Indian and Northern Affairs, for example,
made a commitment to develop
an Impacts and Adaptation
Strategy, and the Government
of Nunavut is currently developing an adaptation plan.

Forty-one percent of
Inuit respondents
identified that more
than half of the meat and
fish they consumed was
locally harvested.
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mitigate we might,
aDapt we muSt

Stabilizing and reducing greenhouse gas emissions
responsible for climate change
should be a priority for Canadian and international efforts
to tackle climate change. One
could argue that dangerous climate change is already occurring in the Arctic, or will happen
soon, thereby compelling parties to the UNFCCC to act immediately through mitigation to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.”35 Inuit political leaders
should continue to press for action on greenhouse gas emissions,
as unabated or “runaway” climate change could prove disastrous
for Inuit. However, this Article argues that adaptation should
be the central focus of climate change policy in Inuit regions
of Canada, and a priority for Inuit political negotiations both
domestically and internationally. Legal obligations favor support to help Inuit adapt: the UNFCCC legally obligates parties
to act on adaptation, the Canadian Charter establishes rights for
Inuit vis-à-vis the state that can only be upheld through adaptation, and in many instances adaptation is required to help prevent
internationally recognized human rights from being violated.
Two further arguments in support of prioritizing adaptation are
offered.
Firstly, it is now accepted that some degree of climate change
is inevitable, even if atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases were dramatically curtailed.36 Communities, regions, and
economic sectors will therefore have to adapt to some degree
of climate change. This is particularly pertinent in the Canadian
Arctic, where even small changes in future climatic conditions
could force social and physical systems to cross tipping points
due to the significant changes in climate already experienced.37
Moreover, it is widely recognized that climate change is already
occurring in the Arctic and that Inuit populations are vulnerable.
Adaptation can bring immediate benefits in the form of reduced
sensitivity to climatic risks and increased adaptability.
Secondly, it can be argued that focusing on mitigation in
Arctic climate change policy is misplaced on account of low
populations, the absence of a sizable industrial base, and limited
consumption levels in Northern Canada.38 Reducing emissions
SuStainable Development law & policy

in Inuit regions, while symbolically important, will have limited
impact on the speed, magnitude, or effects of climate change.
Adaptation offers a tangible way in which the impacts of current
and future climate change can be reduced.

promoting AdAptAtion
This Article identifies key areas in which national and
international climate policy can support Inuit adaptation. These
policy opportunities are organized according to how they can
serve to uphold internationally recognized human rights for Inuit
within a changing climate.

The RighT To PRacTice and enjoy The BenefiTs of
one’s culTuRe
This Inuit right is violated as climate change reduces access
to traditional hunting areas. Inuit are not passive in the face of
such change, however. Across Northern Canada, hunters are
adopting new technology to maintain access to hunting areas.
More ice-free open water in the summer, for instance, is considered a benefit in many communities and Inuit are using boats
to take advantage of the new hunting opportunities.39 At other
times of the year when the ice is unsafe, All Terrain Vehicles
(“ATVs”) are being used to bypass the frozen ocean. New trails
which detour unsafe and impassable areas are also being developed to access hunting areas.40 Such adaptations, involving
changing resource use patterns in response to environmental circumstances, have defined the very nature of Inuit survival in the
Arctic for millennia.41
In the modern world, however, such responses are not accessible to all Inuit. ATVs and boats are often too expensive for
hunters, and the costs of having to travel further can not always
be afforded. Support programs for harvesters are offered in all
the Inuit regions of Canada by regional governments and land
claim institutions and help hunters access climate adaptations.
However, there are significant shortfalls in resources available
and this will no doubt increase as the impacts of climate change
become pronounced.42 Financial support for harvester programs,
targeted at helping Inuit communities afford to adapt, is one
way in which Canadian and international support can help Inuit
maintain their ability to practice culturally important activities in
a changing climate.

The RighT To healTh and life
Climate change violates this right by increasing the danger
of using traditional lands. Inuit are responding to such risks by
taking along safety equipment such as satellite phones, global
positioning systems, emergency beacons, immersion suits, and
are utilizing available weather and ice forecasts to assess safety
of using the land at certain times of the year. Harvester support,
similar to the programs noted above, is required to help Inuit
access these important but expensive technologies, along with
the provision of training to help local people make full use of
these technologies. Improved hazard forecasting is also required:
at present only four meteorologists cover Canada’s Arctic region
and are unable to provide regularly updated weather forecasts
that hunters need in a changing climate.43 Moreover, there is a
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need to develop key traditional skills among younger generation Inuit. Across Inuit regions, research has noted that many of
today’s youth do not have the detailed knowledge of environmental conditions necessary for safe hunting and travel.44 Climate change is exacerbating this trend, increasing the danger for
young people and reducing opportunities for youth to engage in
traditional activities. Addressing the erosion of traditional skills
through the creation of cultural schools and land skills programs
is a priority across the Canadian north, as land skills and knowledge become even more essential with climate change.45

The RighT To enjoy PeRsonal PRoPeRTy
Across Inuit regions of Canada, research has documented a
trend of increasing damage and loss of expensive hunting equipment with climate change, violating the right to enjoy personal
property.46 For many Inuit, loss or damage to equipment means
temporary or permanent loss of livelihood as many hunters do
not have the financial means to repair or replace equipment. Furthermore, very few, if any, Inuit have insurance on their equipment due to cost and the fact that most Inuit do not have bank
accounts. Regional governments offer disaster compensation
in some instances but this is widely regarded as insufficient,
and claims can expect to increase with climate change.47 In the
future, Inuit leaders will likely push for compensation for lost
and damaged equipment from the Canadian government and
internationally.

inviolaBiliTy of The home
The majority of Inuit cultural sites (graveyards, hunting
camps, etc.) and current settlements are located on the coast and/
or on permanently frozen land (i.e. permafrost). Climate change
threatens to violate Inuit rights to their homelands through sea
level rise, coastal erosion, permafrost thaw, and more active
slope processes. Physical interventions are being considered in
vulnerable communities across the Arctic to protect infrastructure. These include moving buildings, raising buildings, and
installing engineering structures to provide protection from wave
action and permafrost thaw. Any engineering-based measures,
however, will be costly. Recently-announced federal funding
under the government’s Building Canada long-term infrastructure fund will help climate proof key infrastructure, although
cultural sites are not covered by this fund. Documenting cultural
sites at risk with climate change, identifying adaptation options
and needs, and establishing funds to help protect them should all
be a priority to support Inuit adaptation and protect the inviolability of the home.
As all these points make clear, adaptation can help Inuit
manage climate change. Many adaptations, however, are costly
and exceed the financial abilities of Inuit households, regional
governments, and land claims institutions. Establishing compensation funds and procedures accessible by Inuit and regional
governments in advance of future climate change is essential to
helping Inuit maintain their livelihoods and culture in a changing climate. Such action is supported by the human rights law,
the Canadian Charter, and the UNFCCC, which commits parties
to formulate policies to facilitate adequate adaptation.
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DiScuSSion
The need and opportunities for adaptation support outlined
above are by no means exhaustive or fully formulated. They are
intended to outline—based on current understanding—key areas
where support is required to help Inuit adapt to a changing climate. Moreover, they focus on policy needs to help Inuit cope
with changes they are already experiencing and to which they
may be vulnerable in the future. Future climate change brings
the potential for conditions Inuit have not previously experienced, and these risks and response options need to be systematically assessed. Indeed, to address what some have called the
“adaptation deficit” in Inuit regions,48 further understanding of
current and future vulnerability, needs assessment, and prioritization of actions is required. The UNFCCC establishes legal
obligations for Canada to prepare for adaptation in this manner,
an obligation recently reaffirmed in the Bali Action Plan to the
Conference of the Parties.49
It is clear that Inuit have legal recourse both in Canada and
internationally for action to support adaptation. Despite this, formidable barriers exist to achieving support at a Canadian and
international level. Firstly, as non-state actors, Inuit do not have
recourse to international legal institutions that enforce international treaties. For example, only parties to the UNFCCC have
recourse against other signatory states, and the Canadian government has been reluctant to press for significant action on climate change, despite the fact that Article 2 has, or will soon be,
violated in Inuit regions of Canada.
Secondly, adaptation funds available through the UNFCCC
are for developing countries only.50 While socio-economic indicators in Inuit regions of Canada often mirror those in developing
nations, as non-state actors Inuit cannot apply. As a party to the

UNFCCC, however, Canada is legally obliged to “cooperate in
preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change . . . .”51
Notwithstanding, Budreau and McBean52 note that a state’s legal
obligation to adaptation remains vague and is largely limited to
publishing policy documents and official statements. Moreover,
the very concept of adaptation in the UNFCCC as actions taken
in response to climate change impacts resulting from anthropogenic emissions is a barrier to meaningful action.53 Adaptive
responses under the UNFCCC have to demonstrate that they
address the marginal impacts of future climate change. Yet in
many cases it is not possible to separate climate change impacts
from social-economic drivers of climate change vulnerability.54

concluSion
It is now widely accepted that climate change is occurring in the Arctic and that dramatic changes can be expected
in the future. For Inuit, climate change is a fundamental human
rights issue. As such, it is essential to find a way to tackle
climate change in Arctic regions. Inuit political leaders should
continue to push for aggressive efforts globally to curb greenhouse gas emissions. However, mitigation can only offset the
worst impacts of climate change and will not prevent climate
change that is happening today and to which we are committed. Efforts to support Inuit adaptation are therefore of particular
importance in helping maintain livelihoods and the fundamental
right to culture. The majority of Canadian Inuit will be able to
adapt to climate change only if support is provided to implement
adaptation options. Examining how to support adaptation, identifying high risk areas, and establishing funds and procedures
to facilitate adaptation at both a Canadian and international
level, should be priorities for domestic and international climate
policymakers.
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Searching for a Voice: The indigenouS PeoPle in Polar regionS
mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe,
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, scarce and economically viable resources.

by Eunjung Park*

D

espite the perception of outsiders that it is a frozen land,
the Arctic is home to over 3.5 million indigenous people, including the Inuits, the Saami, the Chukchi, and
many more.1 Interestingly, one of
the main differences between the
two Polar Regions is the absence
of indigenous people in the Antarctic and the presence of them in
the Arctic.
These indigenous people’s
lives are affected by environmental changes, including climate
change, chemical contaminants
from their diet of sea-mammals, and over-fishing.2 Climate
change, especially, has impacts on food accessibility, availability, and personal safety. Thawing of permafrost brings instability to the community infrastructure, and substantial investment
will be required to adapt the community structure, or relocate the
community. Coastal indigenous communities are threatened by
erosion because of melting sea ice, and up to eighty percent of
Alaskan communities, comprised mainly of indigenous peoples,
are at risk of coastal erosion.3 Coastal erosion impacts the residents and structures, as waves eat away sea walls and barriers that
the indigenous people have used to build their communities.4
Indigenous people in Arctic observe and experience climate
change first-hand.5 They notice the change in weather and glaciers and notice the changes in the group size or migration routes
of certain species affected by climate change. Indigenous people
are also a source of traditional knowledge as they have responded
to major climatic and environmental changes by altering group
sizes, relocating, and being flexible with seasonal cycles in hunting or employment.6 For example, the Inuit hunters have proved
to be capable of identifying the new travel routes of species such
as geese and caribou as they shift their migration in response to
the climate change.7 However, the indigenous people have very
limited opportunity to effectively voice their opinions in international dialogue on environment.
The Arctic Council, since its establishment, has become a
forum for “circum-Arctic co-operation” where indigenous people are able to contribute to the discussions and cooperation on
sustainable development and environmental protection in the
Arctic.8 In 1991, eight arctic states signed the Declaration on
the Protection of the Arctic Environment and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”) to establish the Arctic Council in 1996.9 In addition to the member countries, the
Arctic Council welcomes the equal participation of indigenous
communities for full consultation with and participation of the

indigenous people who reside in the Arctic, yet do not have a
voice otherwise. The Arctic Council is considered a soft-law
organization essentially operating outside of international law,
and the outcomes of the Council are not considered binding.
Beyond the Arctic Council,
however, indigenous peoples
in the Arctic have no other
opportunity to participate in
the international community’s
decision-making process on
environmental changes, which
affects their daily lives.
The international community should recognize the need
for indigenous people in the Arctic to participate in international
dialogue on environmental issues, like climate change, through
means such as the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.10 Indigenous people should be given a status
equivalent to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues as they have the mandate to “discuss indigenous
issues within the mandate of the United Nations Economic and
Social Council.” Without the indigenous people to provide input,
the Conference of Parties has taken adaptive and mitigating
measure against climate change that have adverse impacts on the
indigenous people in Polar regions and elsewhere.11 Additionally, this lack of platform for the indigenous people results in
disproportionate emphasis on certain issues. For example, protection of polar bears has been emphasized greatly, while preserving the long-standing Inuit culture and source of subsistence
of hunting polar bears failed to receive sufficient attention.12
The Arctic states should also empower the indigenous
people in the Arctic so that they can participate in international
dialogue, and support them as they make efforts for economic
development. Canada has granted a semi-autonomy plan for a
mainly Inuit region of Quebec in 2007 in order to promote the
socioeconomic development that meets the need of the Inuit.13
Canada also has designated a federal funding for the Canadian
Arctic Indigenous Peoples Against POPs to assist the indigenous
people to participate in the international dialogue. 14 Actions
taken to affirmatively support indigenous people in each Arctic
state will contribute to the overall elevation of indigenous status
in environmental dialogue in the Arctic.

Indigenous people in
Arctic observe and
experience climate change
first-hand.
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Persistent Organic POllutant accumulatiOn
in the arctic by Rachel T. Kirby*
mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe,
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, scarce and economically viable resources.

T

he Arctic is one of the last regions of the world that remains
seemingly untouched by modern human existence. A
closer look, however, reveals the effects of pollutants
on the human and animal populations in the Arctic. Persistent
Organic Pollutants (“POPs”) are toxic chemicals such as pesticides and industrial by-products
that break down very slowly in
the environment.1 POPs reach
the Arctic from smokestacks and
factories all over the world and
then accumulate within the tissues of each animal in the food
chain. The higher on the food
chain, the higher the concentration of POPs in the animal.
The nature of the Arctic
environment causes POPs to
break down more slowly and accumulate in the food chain with
more potency than they would in other environments.2 POPs
arrive in the Arctic via atmospheric and ocean circulation patterns which bring pollution from human sources to the Arctic.3
There, POPs typically enter the food chain through plankton in
sea water. When the plankton is eaten by fish, POPs accumulate in the fish, which are then eaten by larger fish or mammals
which accumulate more POPs in their fatty tissues. Each step in
the food chain creates a more concentrated reservoir of POPs.4
The result of this cycle is that at the top of the food chain,
humans, polar bears, and other large predators have chemical
levels high enough to cause health effects5 even though the nearest source of contamination might be thousands of miles away.6
Reduced immune system function, reproductive effects, and
behavior changes have been observed in many predators.7 The
levels of POPs in some Inuit tribes in Greenland are so high that
their breast milk and tissues could be classified as hazardous
waste.8 As a consequence, their infants show altered brain development and suffer greater infection rates because of reduced
immune system function.9
While the eight countries with territory in the Arctic have
established an Arctic Council to provide a forum to discuss
environmental and other issues,10 the very nature of pollution
in the Arctic requires a worldwide solution. In 2001, countries
around the world adopted the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants11 to reduce or eliminate twelve POPs
(the “dirty dozen”), with provisions to include other substances
in the future.12 The Stockholm Convention, which the United
States has yet to ratify,13 is a step towards a real reduction or
elimination of toxic chemicals from the environment in the Arctic and elsewhere.14

The Convention follows the precautionary principle and
allows parties to regulate additional chemicals even if complete
scientific certainty of their adverse effects is lacking.15 Nonetheless, the positive effects of regulated POPs will not yield immediate positive effects in the Arctic due to the large reservoir of
POPs remaining in the Arctic
Ocean.
The Arctic environment is
unique and serves as a warning
sign of the pressures humans
place on the natural world. The
Arctic Council is a forum for
discussing issues facing the Arctic as a whole, especially issues
of environmental protection and
sustainable development.16 The
Stockholm Convention provides
a worldwide framework and channel for countries to limit the
harmful affects from accumulating POPs in the Arctic.17 In order
to provide the special protection that the Arctic requires, parties
to the Stockholm Convention should be ultra “precautious” and
add additional POPs to the banned “dirty dozen.” More chemicals should be added to the Stockholm Convention before accumulation of yet-to-be-banned POPs reaches dangerous levels in
the Arctic.

Each step in the food
chain creates a more
concentrated reservoir
of POPs.
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A TAle of Two Poles: A ComPArATive look
AT The

legAl regimes in The ArCTiC And The AnTArCTiC

by Erika Lennon*

introduction

ent sovereign countries. The Arctic’s geographic make-up poses
difficulties in trying to determine the law governing it, unlike in
he Polar Regions are often linked together due to their
the Antarctic. Further, the isolated nature of the Antarctic has
parallel physical location, frigid temperatures, and limresulted in no permanent population, which is not true of the
ited accessibility. However, when compared by environArctic, an area home to various peoples, including entire indigmental protections and governance, the Arctic and the Antarctic
enous communities.2 The presence of a permanent
greatly differ. While the Antarctic has been propopulation makes the Arctic dramatically
tected by a binding legal regime since the
different from the Antarctic since it
mid-twentieth century, the Arctic
means subsistence is an issue. So
has yet to receive the same treatwhile the Antarctic has been
ment. Now, with global warmdeemed a “nature reserve,”
ing wreaking havoc on both
the Arctic is unlikely to
regions, the need for envibe deemed as such due to
ronmental protections seems
both the need for the Arctic
more imminent. The rapidly
peoples to survive and funcmelting ice cap will likely
tion economically, as well as
have a dramatic effect on
rights that nations currently
the world. A warming Arctic
holding interests in the Arctic
could result in changing global
are unlikely to relinquish.3
weather patterns, a rise in sea levDespite these physical, legal, and
els, and the extinction of both wildlife
political differences, both the Antarctic
species and indigenous peoples. Thus, it is
Photo Courtesy of Manuela Altube
and the Arctic are areas highly vulnerable to the
in the best interest of humanity to encourage action
impacts of climate change and their reactions to this will drive
designed to prevent harm to the Arctic due to global warming.
changes in the rest of the world.4 Though separated by the rest
Currently, the world is in the midst of the International Polar
of the world, the two Polar Regions are inextricably linked, and
Year, a project to conduct research in the Polar Regions, which
thus one may help serve as a governance model for the other.
has increased focus on the poles.1 Given the physical manifestations of climate change, for example melting glaciers and
legAl regimeS
ice caps, it appears as though the Antarctic and the Arctic will
continue to be regions of concentration and concern. While the
The AnTArCTiC TreATy sysTem
Antarctic has a treaty in place to protect it, the Arctic remains
The Antarctic Treaty System provides for the govervulnerable due to its lack of comprehensive laws to determine
nance of Antarctica. At its core is the Antarctic Treaty, but it
a uniform governance system and environmental protections.
also includes the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Moreover, in the Arctic, competition between nations in the race
Antarctic Treaty (“Madrid Protocol”), the Convention for the
to stake claims for resources threatens to further harm the enviConservation of Antarctic Seals, and Convention of Antarctic
ronment, as well as to overtake the debate on stewardship of the
Marine Living Resources. Further, the Antarctic Treaty System
fragile environment. This Article examines the legal regimes in
incorporates the decisions made at the Meetings of the Parties of
the Polar Regions in an effort to inform how existing regimes
the Antarctic Treaty, as well as other decisions adopted by varimay aid in developing Arctic governance and environmental
ous groups within it. Thus, the Antarctic Treaty System provides
protections.
a legal regime with hard law, but it is also flexible and can adapt

T

WorldS ApArt: geogrAphy
Geographically, the Antarctic and the Arctic differ greatly.
Antarctica is a continent, a large, isolated land mass surrounded
by water. In contrast, the Arctic is predominantly composed of
the Arctic Ocean, which is surrounded by numerous countries,
and covered with an ice cap. The Antarctic is more isolated both
geographically and politically than the Arctic, which contains
territories and pieces of land belonging to a number of differSpring 2008

to change.
In the middle of the twentieth century, twelve nations,
including countries from Europe, Asia, North America, and
South America, created the Antarctic Treaty. Designed to promote peace and international cooperation in the region, the Ant-
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arctic Treaty provided a framework for internationalizing and
demilitarizing the continent to protect it for future generations.5
Initially a preventative agreement to deflect conflict and the
spread of a nuclear arms race, the Antarctic Treaty has adapted
to protect the environment.6
In the scramble to increase their influence in the world,
including sovereign control of Antarctica, seven nations staked
their claims on land in Antarctica
based on “discovery, exploration,
or geographic propinquity,” and
still more had engaged in exploration.7 However, the United
States and the Soviet Union
refused to recognize other countries’ claims, but still reserved
their rights to claim land.8 At the
time of the treaty negotiations,
none of these claims resulted in
violent conflicts, but uncertainty
loomed. This instability was
only increased by possibilities of
natural resources existing on the frozen continent. These uncertainties and the potential for the movement of nuclear weapons
to the southern polar region prompted international action and a
group of nations came together to discuss the status and future
of Antarctica.9
The Antarctic Treaty firstly declared that countries and people could use the continent for “peaceful purposes only,” thus
demonstrating that arms limitation was a motivating factor in
the treaty creation.10 However, the Treaty further allows for scientific investigation in the region, and encourages cooperation
amongst the nations engaging in scientific research.11 The negotiating countries wanted to promote scientific research, though
did not want to allow the land grab to continue. Thus, the Treaty
specifies that, while it is in force, no country shall claim sovereignty or attempt to create rights of sovereignty in Antarctica.12
By preventing sovereign claims, the signatories ensured the
continued existence of a peaceful Antarctic and also prevented
future conflict over the control of potential resources. Further,
the Treaty purports to cover the geographic region of Antarctica including ice shelves, but does not attempt to go beyond
the limits of the land, therefore excluding the high seas from the
Treaty.13
Thirty years after signing the Antarctic Treaty, parties
adopted the Madrid Protocol.14 The Madrid Protocol expanded
on the Antarctic Treaty by determining that, in addition to ensuring that Antarctica would be used for peaceful purposes and scientific research, the Antarctic’s ecosystem should be protected
and so it designated the region as a “natural reserve.”15 This
Protocol recognized that Antarctica occupied a unique position in the world, including prior designations of the region as
a conservation area, to support its claims that protection of the
Antarctic ecosystem served all mankind’s interests.16 Therefore,
the Madrid Protocol designated the Antarctic, “a natural reserve,
devoted to peace and science.”17 To ensure this, the Madrid Pro-

tocol contains specific goals to avoid harming the environment,
including limiting adverse effects on climate patterns and air and
water quality, and avoiding activities that would be detrimental
to the environment, further endanger already threatened species,
or significantly alter the environment of the region.18 Additionally, like the Antarctic Treaty, the Madrid Protocol calls for
cooperation amongst the states to promote scientific research
while maintaining the underlying goal of keeping Antarctica a
neutral area with no single country having sovereignty.19
The Madrid Protocol highlighted the importance of the
Antarctic ecosystem protection
and transformed the Antarctic
Treaty System from a Cold War
era anti-arms race agreement
to an environmental protection
one. The Antarctic Treaty initially served to promote peace
and prevent nations, primarily
the United States and the Soviet Union, from using the Antarctic
as a place to stockpile weapons, and while trying to accomplish
this, it created a protected area for research and exploration that
was free from division because no country could claim sovereignty. This also meant that no country could completely exploit
the resources of the region. Then, the Madrid Protocol used these
goals, namely its freedom from sovereignty claims, to declare
the area a nature reserve and to promote the environmental protection of Antarctica and its fragile ecosystem.
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals and
the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources govern
two very specific areas of importance in Antarctica. These two
conventions were enacted under the Antarctic Treaty to help further protect Antarctica.

It is in the best interest
of humanity to encourage
action designed to prevent
harm to the Arctic due
to global warming.
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The ArcTic council
In contrast to the legal regime in place in the Antarctic, the
Arctic remains an area uncontrolled specifically by one international treaty. Currently, several treaties, such as the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”),20 the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (“MARPOL 73/78”),21 the Polar Bear Treaty,22 and various other bilateral and multilateral agreements govern certain
aspects of activity in the Arctic. However, these treaties do not
address all of the potential issues that are likely to arise in the
Arctic, including which country will have sovereign control over
some of the central most regions of the ocean or how to protect
the environment specifically. Instead of a treaty system, there is
the Arctic Council.
The Arctic Council is a soft law regime that has no actual
ability to make binding law, thus it serves as an advisory body.
In 1991, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”)
came into being as one of the first agreements to address the
importance of protecting the Arctic environment.23 In developing the AEPS, the participating countries recognized the need to
SuStainable Development law & policy

work together to protect the Arctic since environmental problems
and impacts were neither caused, nor felt by, just one country.24
The drafting nations, now the Arctic Council, acknowledged that
the vulnerability of the ecosystem necessitated protection of the
Arctic. Further, the AEPS created several of the working groups
that have since been incorporated into the Arctic Council, which
is tasked with implementing the AEPS.
Five years after creating the AEPS, in 1996, several states
formed the Arctic Council.25 Canada, Denmark (via Greenland),
Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and
the United States of America, along with the permanent participants, which currently consists of six indigenous peoples groups,
the Aleut International Association (“AIA”), the Arctic Athabaskan Council (“AAC”), Gwich’in Council International (“GCI”),
Inuit Circumpolar Council (“ICC”), the Russian Association
of Indigenous Peoples of the North (“Raipon”), and the Saami
Council, comprise the Arctic Council.26 These six groups, representing the indigenous people that live in the Arctic, have further
banded together to form the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat to
support the groups and ensure their role in the Arctic Council.27
However, their role is limited because the indigenous peoples
groups are not voting members. Additionally, the Arctic Council
allows other non-Arctic nations, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) to play a
role in the Arctic Council, though with observer status rather
than actual power.28 These countries and groups can apply or be
nominated to obtain Observer status.29 Thus, though not fully
inclusive the Arctic Council does allow for participation by nonArctic countries.
The Arctic Council is a soft law regime created to address
environmental protection and sustainable development 30 and
includes countries with any land in the Arctic, though this is a
larger group then those likely to be able to gain sovereignty over
sea areas under UNCLOS.31 Additionally, unlike many treaties, the Arctic Council has a rotating Secretariat.32 Every two
years, the new chair determines objectives and develops a plan
to achieve them.33 This presents a problem since it means that
goals can change every couple years, which could hinder real
work from getting done. However, Norway, the current chair,
along with Denmark and Sweden, the next two chairs, realized
that the ability to get things done required more then two years.
In response, these countries created a plan with common objectives and priorities, which will help promote Arctic protection
through the continuation of programs designed to fight climate
change through the implementation of ACIA recommendations,
integrated management of resources, and implementation of policies stemming from IPY research, and create stability over the
course of six years.34 Thus, the Arctic Council conducts research
designed to enhance Arctic environmental protections, oversees
activity in the Arctic, and works to protect it, but does so without
creating any binding laws.
Further, the Arctic Council has six working groups each
focusing on a various aspect of Arctic conservation. The working groups are the CAFF (the Conservation of Arctic Flora and
Fauna working group), PAME (the Protection of the Arctic
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Marine Environment working group), SDWG (the Sustainable
Development Working Group), AMAP (the Arctic Monitoring
and Assessment Program), ACAP (the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program), and EPPR (the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group).35 Each of these
working groups functions as an individual entity with its own
secretariat, own meetings, and own mechanisms for conducting
scientific research and carrying out the plans of the Arctic Council.36 The CAFF and the PAME primarily focus their efforts on
protecting the Arctic ecosystem, while SDWG focuses on the
protection of the economic well-being and overall health of
the Arctic people while promoting their lifestyle and economic
development in an environmentally sustainable way.37 The newest working group, the ACAP, focuses on limiting and reducing
the number of pollutants released into the environment.38 Thus,
by focusing research on specific areas of conservation, these
working groups promote environmental protection of the Arctic,
and help the Arctic Council implement the AEPS.39
Each of these working groups has created environmental
protection programs. For example, the CAFF created the Circumpolar Protected Area Network (“CPAN”), which is designed
to promote biodiversity through the protection of a network of
areas each of which has “a high probability of maintaining ecosystem health and dynamic biodiversity.”40 Thus, the CPAN
links areas, akin to nature reserves, and preserves them so as to
ensure continued biodiversity. Other working groups have instituted projects as well. The AMAP, which monitors and reports
on the effects of numerous pollutants, ozone depletion, and climate change on the Arctic, reports back to the Arctic Council in
an effort to influence its policies.41 These two programs demonstrate how the working groups influence the Arctic Council and
the diversity of programs they implement to protect the Arctic
environment.
The Arctic Council can create policies, though cannot
enforce them as binding law. For example, the Arctic Council
established Arctic Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIA”)
Guidelines to help create uniform policies to promote sustainable development.42 These Arctic EIA Guidelines were not
designed to replace any national or international EIA guidelines,
but rather to create specific guidelines for issues faced when
implementing projects in the Arctic.43 Further, the Arctic EIA
Guidelines focus on cooperation, flexibility, and inclusiveness
in an effort to ensure that all countries can participate and will
work to ensure Arctic protection.44 The primary focus of these
guidelines is to point out that the Arctic environment is unique
necessitating different threshold levels and sensitivity criteria.45
Here, the Arctic Council has tried to create a uniform system for
all countries to use when conducting Arctic area EIAs; however,
countries do not need to follow them.
Through its working groups and draft guidelines for activities like EIAs, the Arctic Council works to govern activity in
the Arctic. However, the Arctic Council remains disjointed since
each working group has its own secretariat and its own home
city, and the Arctic Council itself lacks a permanent secretariat.
Additionally, as a soft law regime, the Arctic Council lacks the
34

power to create legally binding documents. Therefore, while the
Arctic Council is a good start, it may be insufficient to protect
the Arctic environment.

compariSon of the polar regionS
While the Antarctic and the Arctic are often linked together
in discussions and projects such as the IPY, the two regions are
far apart in legal protections. As the IPY framework document
points out, the Polar Regions are “integral components of the
Earth system” since they not only drive environmental changes
around the world, but also respond to changes, such as global
warming.46 Thus, the IPY is designed to take a scientific and
research approach to learning
more about these regions. However, it seems that other new
projects focused on implementation and not just research must be
undertaken to ensure the protection of the Arctic environment.
The Antarctic has been
accessible for exploration for
longer than the Arctic has, given
that much of the Arctic is an
ocean covered in ice for large
parts of the year, and therefore impassable by ships. However,
the rapidly increasing melting ice indicates that soon the Arctic
will be more accessible and navigable which will make natural
resources more attainable. These environmental changes have
created urgency to extend environmental protections and clarify
political control of the Arctic. As the Norwegian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Jonas Støre stated in January 2008, “developments in our polar regions are both a serious warning and a call
to action.”47 This is less of a problem in the Antarctic, where
the Antarctic Treaty System implements the treaty’s provision
ensuring that the region would be used for peaceful, scientific
purposes48 and the Madrid Protocol ensuring that these activities
do not harm the Antarctic environment.49 In contrast, the Arctic
does not have an overarching legal regime in place governing all
activity, but rather is governed by many different sources of law,
both domestic and international, as well as by proposed standards such as the Arctic EIA Guidelines.
Geographically, the sheer distance of the Antarctic from
other countries diffuses the interests of any one nation, while
the Arctic Ocean directly abuts the territory of individual nations
and the Arctic region includes territories of several sovereign
nations. Thus, treaties like UNCLOS, which governs much of
the activity in the Arctic, do not play a large role in the Antarctic.50 UNCLOS allows countries to claim sovereignty over an
exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), which is the area extending
two hundred nautical miles from the coast. Therefore, the Arctic, almost completely surrounded by various countries, is subject to division by nations trying to assert control of the natural
resources there by claiming that areas are within their EEZ.
Currently, though the Antarctic has more binding protections than the Arctic does, the increasing effects of global

warming might cause this to change. Forty years ago, when the
Antarctic Treaty came into being, the Antarctic was the land
with resources the world wanted. Now, the focus is on Arctic
resources, and as the Antarctic did prior to the treaty negotiation, the Arctic lacks a binding regime not only to protect the
environment, but also to determine which countries have control
over the area.
Unlike in the Antarctic where, under the Antarctic Treaty,
countries were prevented from making further claims of sovereignty over the region, the Arctic is now facing a potential land
or seabed grab. In summer 2007, Russia planted its flag on the
Lomonosov Ridge on the basis that it was a continuation of its
continental shelf.51 While this
has little legal impact, it demonstrates the potential conflicts
that could arise. UNCLOS provides a mechanism for determining which country has sovereign
control, but that mechanism
requires scientific information
about the ocean floor that is not
easy to obtain.52 To date, the
Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf has yet
to approve either of the two proposals it has received involving
regions in the Arctic.53 Therefore, UNCLOS may not be the best
mechanism for determining which country controls which part
of the Arctic. Recently, an article by Scott Borgerson warned
that the increased access to Arctic resources and lack of legal
regime could cause the Arctic to “erupt in an armed mad dash
for its resources.”54 Thus, he recommended that the Arctic countries meet to create a treaty to address how to extract resources
including an agreement on “how to carve up the region’s vast
resource pie.”55 Antarctica, on the other hand, does not face
this conundrum because the Antarctic Treaty prevents countries
from making sovereign claims over the region.56
Additionally, without binding legal standards it is hard to
ensure environmental protections. Each country has its own
standards for shipping, air quality, and other similar environment
related issues, however, no guarantee exists that these standards
are the same across borders. While several treaties, including
ones governing the law of the sea, the release of pollutants, and
the protection of species, exist, none of these treaties specifically
addresses Arctic environmental protection in and of itself. The
Arctic Council works to protect the region; however, it lacks
the enforcement mechanism and power to make the participating countries alter their actions. In contrast, the Antarctic is
protected by the Madrid Protocol, a binding legal regime. Thus,
the Antarctic really is an area of peaceful, scientific research as
opposed to these goals being merely aspirational.

Though separated by the
rest of the world,
the two Polar Regions are
inextricably linked.
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OptiOns fOr the future
Despite the urgency to act, the way to protect the Arctic
is still unknown. The Antarctic Treaty System provides a very
good model for environmental protection; however, the feasibility of a similar system working in the Arctic is unclear. The AntSuStainable Development law & policy

arctic Treaty focuses on using Antarctica for peaceful, scientific
purposes and preventing any country from making sovereign
claims.57 This works in Antarctica since it is an isolated, unpopulated land mass, unlike the Arctic, which is not as isolated and is
populated. Thus, to some extent the Arctic resources will have to
be used, however, this can be done sustainably. While the Antarctic is a natural reserve, political conflicts and the desire for
natural resources might prevent the Arctic from being declared
one as well. However, the Arctic Council has set up the CPAN to
ensure the environmental protection of large portions of the Arctic.58 Thus, the Antarctic Treaty System could inform a potential
Arctic Treaty even if it cannot serve as a direct model.
In contrast, some view the Arctic not as an environment
to protect for the good of the world, but rather as a potential
battleground for nations wanting the hidden natural resources.59
As melting ice increases access to the region, more countries
are likely to lay claim over areas with natural resources, such as
petroleum. While a treaty may be necessary to prevent fighting,
this approach could overlook the necessity of creating environmental protections. Although, an Antarctic Treaty-like regime
could come about to prevent the potential land grab. Regardless,
the increased focus on the melting Arctic sea ice seems to indicate that a more binding legal regime than the Arctic Council
needs to be created. In creating this regime though, a primary
focus should be on environmental protections, rather than on
natural resources harvesting, because the world as a whole needs
to ensure that climate change will not wreak havoc on the Arctic
environment, and consequently the rest of the worlds.’

ConCluSion
While the Antarctic and the Arctic share similar attributes
and are often referred to together, they differ in many respects.
The Arctic lacks the comprehensive legal framework that has
protected the Antarctic environment. Currently, the Arctic environment has become a focus of concern as climate change, and
the rapid rate at which the ice cap is melting, becomes a more
prominent issue. However, there is not this level of concern for
the Antarctic. Thus, now might be time to create binding laws,
similar to those that protect the Antarctic environment, to protect
the Arctic environment, and consequently the rest of the world.
The Antarctic currently has relatively well-established
protections, but the Arctic does not. Thus, as competition for
emerging natural resources fuels new interest in the Arctic, and
simultaneously climate change and IPY draw attention to environmental concerns in the region, there is a unique opportunity
for both progress and peril. While environmental concerns could
get lost in a battle for resources, it is also possible that the current political system will focus on pushing forward environmental agreements to prevent environmental change and protect the
world. To not lose this battle, environmental protection plans
must be developed and readied to be introduced in the international arena either on their own or as part of another agreement
when the time comes to act in the Arctic.
Endnotes: A Tale of Two Poles continued on page 65
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Preventing Disaster
as the arctic seas
OPen fOr Business

mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe,
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, scarce and economically viable resources.

by Michael W. Lore*

V

essels navigate freely in the port of Helsinki, Finland
this winter as the usually busy icebreakers standby idle.1
The retreating ice is creating the once-fabled Northwest
Passage, allowing goods to travel between Western Europe and
Eastern Asia with a 4,000-mile shortcut through the Canadian
Arctic.2 The Russian Northeast Passage is also becoming more
accessible, creating a huge potential for increased shipping and
fishing traffic throughout the entire Arctic region. As traffic
increases, countries with jurisdiction over the Arctic should consider international agreements to protect against catastrophic oil
or chemical spills in the region’s fragile ecosystems.
A looming environmental concern is that to save time and
fuel, irresponsible or inexperienced crews on vessels of unregulated countries could crash single hulled containers in the shallow Arctic waters and spill oil or hazardous chemicals into the
fragile sea and land ecosystems. A huge oil or chemical spill,
under existing circumstances, would be difficult to prevent and
practically impossible to clean up. Moreover, Arctic wildlife
consists of a few varieties of species that are found nowhere else
on Earth.3 These species mainly breed in clustered groupings,
which expose them to extremely high risks from potential oil or
hazardous chemical spills.4
In anticipation of the melting ice, Russia has staked its claim
to a huge area of the Arctic for oil and gas exploration,5 and
Canada has asserted sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.6
However, the Arctic environment requires more protection than
any individual state or existing international legal arrangements
provide.7 Russia does not possess the capacity to clean up oil
spills in temperate areas,8 let alone in the more difficult conditions that exist for oil clean-ups in the frigid Arctic waters.9 Canada is constructing three new ships to monitor the Arctic and has
plans to lay a cable to detect passing vessels this summer, but
these resources may not be adequate to monitor all vessels and
will not greatly help in alleviating shipping accidents.10 Maps of
the shallow Arctic seafloor are improving but they are far from
adequate.11 Furthermore, there are no international environmental agreements to set standards to safeguard against the rising
threat of hazardous shipping disasters in the Arctic.
Unlike Antarctica, which the UN declared non-commercial
international territory with an enforceable protocol, the Arctic
does not have an international protected status.12 The United
* Michael W. Lore is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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only “is directed to the unique aspects of the Arctic and the special relationship and contribution of indigenous people and their
communities.”19 In order to prevent the foreseeable environmental pressures and emergencies stemming from the increasing
traffic in the Arctic, Arctic countries should formulate binding
multilateral environmental agreements.
The eminent increased human activity in the Arctic should
spur Arctic countries to collectively create and monitor enforceable environmental regulations to mitigate the impending environmental pressures on the Arctic. Prevention of ecological
disaster in the Arctic must be actively pursued. A reactionary
response to an oil or chemical spill in the Arctic will amount to
a frantic endeavor that will teach us how careless we must have
been to allow the accident to occur in the first place. Failing to
prevent this foreseeable environmental disaster would be international negligence.

Endnotes:
1

Polar bear tracks found near the Kapitan Dranitsyn.

States has been actively pushing the international community
to consider the Canadian Arctic waters an ‘international strait,’
permitting international commerce to pass through the Canadian waters freely under international law, while Canada argues
that the environmental protection of the Arctic is better in their
hands.13 International law defines an international strait with
geographical and functional qualifications. The geographical
standard is not so much in dispute as the functional qualification,
which would require international travel between the Canadian
straits.14 However, Canada does not currently have the resources
to patrol the waters adequately to deter international usage.15
Therefore, Canada may lose sovereignty over the waters as
usage increases with the melting ice and there are insufficient
enforceable international standards to protect the Arctic waters.
The Ministers of Arctic countries in 1993 signed a ‘nonbinding’ declaration in Nuuk, Greenland to address the “special
role and responsibilities of the Arctic Countries with respect to
the protection of the Arctic environment.”16 In the draft declaration, the United States emphasized the “Arctic uniqueness”
in the effort to protect “the integrity of the aquatic, terrestrial,
atmospheric and ice environments of the Arctic and their interdependent ecosystems as whole to the region itself and to the
global environmental processes.”17 Swedish officials proposed
an Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy and noted that the
future of the Arctic environment requires that environmental
pressures and emergencies be prevented rather than reacted to.18
This proposal was not adopted, however, and the actual Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council dropped its
connection with the environment and stated that the declaration
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Hydrocarbon development and
maritime SHipping for tHe circumpolar
arctic in tHe context of tHe arctic council
and climate cHange
by Magdalena A K Muir*

T

introduction

he Arctic sea ice cover is undergoing an unprecedented
transformation—sea ice thinning, a reduction in extent,
and a reduction in the area of multi-year ice in the central
Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (“ACIA”)
Scientific Report documents overall changes, and also provides
sea ice projections for the next
century, which show increasing ice-free areas in the coastal
zones and increases in marine
access throughout the Arctic
Ocean.
One of the consequences
of climate change for the Arctic is the greater opportunity for
hydrocarbon development and
maritime shipping.1 This is in
part due to climate change as a
result of thinner ice and higher
overall temperatures. Recent
energy prices have increased political and commercial interest in
exploiting these resources.2 Increased economic activity in this
region, together with the current retreat of Arctic sea ice facilitates developments such as the Northern Sea Route around Scandinavia, Russia, and Asia, and the Northwest Passage through
the North American Arctic.3 Continued sea ice reductions will
lengthen the navigation season in all regions and increase maritime access to the Arctic’s natural resources

well known,4 and its results have been incorporated in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment
Report.5
The Arctic Human Development Report is the first overview of human well-being covering the entire Arctic region.6
Sponsored by the Arctic Council and published in 2004, the
report was mandated under the
Arctic Council’s 2002 Ministerial Declaration as a priority
project designed to provide the
knowledge base for the sustainable development work of the
Council.7 The report contains
eleven substantive chapters, and
offers a wide-ranging scientific
assessment of achievements and
challenges relating to human
development in the Arctic.8 Arctic societies are resilient in
response to change. Today they
are facing an unprecedented combination of rapid and stressful
changes involving environmental forces like climate change and
socioeconomic pressures associated with global and regional
development. At the same time, this report recognizes that the
Arctic has become a leader in the development of innovative
political and legal arrangements, including co-management
regimes governing the use of natural resources, collaborative
arrangements designed to facilitate cooperation between public
governments and indigenous peoples organizations, and transnational arrangements like the Northern Forum and the Arctic
Council itself. These regimes will also apply to hydrocarbon
development and maritime shipping.9

Recent energy prices
have increased political
and commercial
interest in exploiting these
resources.

climate change and arctic development
These changes represent both a challenge and an opportunity for governments and local Arctic communities as traditional
ways of life and natural ecosystems have been partially protected by the remote and extreme Arctic environment. Opportunities for resource development and marine transportation are
additional challenges. Climate change may increase the fragility
and decrease the resilience of sensitive Arctic environments, as
well as the adaptability of its residents and indigenous peoples.
Climate changes have been extensively documented in the
ACIA Scientific Report, while the impacts of climate impacts on
Arctic people are discussed in the Arctic Human Development
Report, of both 2004. The ACIA Scientific Report is already
Spring 2008

* Magdalena AK Muir is a Research Associate, Arctic Institute of North America,
University of Calgary, Canada and an Advisory Board Member, Climate, EUCC–
The Coastal Union (EUCC), Leiden, Netherlands. She has been engaged in climate issues since 2000 in the Arctic, Europe, and globally. She was Executive
Secretary at Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna International Secretariat
from 2002 to 2004, and in this capacity was involved with coordination and writing of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Scientific Report. Since 2004, she
has been involved in European and global oceans and climate issues, including as
an expert reviewer for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth
Assessment. Ms. Muir can be reached at makmuir@ieels.com.

38

Circum-arctic assessments of hydrocarbon development
and marine shipping are now occurring, which provide state of
the art reviews of hydrocarbon development and marine shipping in the context of this climatic and socio-economic change.
Two of these assessments, the Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment
and the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (“AMSA”), will be
completed for the end of 2008, and are briefly reviewed in this
Article. All these documents and policy initiatives have occurred
under the sponsorship of the Arctic Council, and the eight circum-arctic governments and six international indigenous organizations that make up this Council.
The member states of the Arctic Council are Canada, Denmark-Greenland-Faroe Islands,10 Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America.11 The Council also includes international indigenous organizations, which are also known as Permanent Participants. They
are the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan
Council, Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Raipon and the Saami Council.12 The Arctic
Council is a political organization but the scientific work of the
Council, including the assessments discussed here, are carried
out by six expert working groups that focus on issues such as
monitoring, assessing, and preventing pollution in the Arctic,
climate change, biodiversity conservation and sustainable use,
emergency preparedness and prevention, and the living conditions of Arctic residents.13

arctic oil anD GaS aSSeSSment
In 2002, Arctic Council Ministers requested its working
groups collaborate on an assessment of hydrocarbon activities
in the Arctic, with the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (“AMAP”) Working Group coordinating the work.14
The objective of the assessment is to present a holistic assessment of the environmental, social, economic, and human health
impacts of current oil and gas activities in the Arctic, and to
evaluate the likely course of development of Arctic oil and gas
activities and their potential impacts in the near future. The
assessment is intended to offer a balanced and reliable document
for future management of oil and gas activities in the Arctic and
is intended to be completed for 2008.
The hydrocarbon assessment includes chapters on oil
and gas activities; socio-economic impacts; input and fate of
hydrocarbons in the environment; toxicity and organism-level
impacts, including impacts on human health; and ecosystemlevel impacts. The final chapter provides an overall assessment
and presents recommendations for scientific follow-up. Similarly to the ACIA Scientific Report, there is an overview report
for policy-makers and the general public. Earlier documents and
two draft chapters on present on the AMAP website.15
Key findings of the Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment are that
extensive oil and gas activity has occurred in the Arctic, with
much oil and gas produced and much remaining to be produced.
Natural seeps are the major source of petroleum hydrocarbon
contamination in the Arctic environment, and petroleum hydrocarbon concentrations are generally low. On land, physical dis39

turbance is the largest effect. In marine environments, oil spills
are the largest threat. The impacts on individuals, communities,
and governments can be both positive and negative. Human
health can suffer from oil and gas pollution and social disruption, but revenues can improve health care and overall wellbeing. Technology and regulations can help reduce negative
impacts, but responding to major oil spills remains a challenge
in remote, icy environments. For the future, more oil and gas
activity is expected, and many risks remain. However, planning
and monitoring can help reduce risks and impacts.16

arctic marine ShippinG aSSeSSment
The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment arises from the
Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, which was adopted in 2004 by the
Arctic Council. At that time the Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment Working Group was requested to conduct the
assessment. This assessment is ongoing, and will be presented
to the Arctic Council at the end of 2008. The assessment reviews
existing marine shipping and projected marine shipping for 2020
and 2050. The assessment will also include a discussion of the
environmental, social and environmental impact on present maritime activity and will project future activity. Last, the assessment will provide analysis and recommendations. Additionally,
there is a focus on AMSA datasets including datasets on shipping, traditional and indigenous marine and ice uses, accidents,
and ice conditions. A variety of interim documents are present
on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment website. The
most recent discuss the future of navigation by the mid-century,
and possible future scenarios for development, exploitation, and
political stability.17 The combination of all these documents and
datasets will facilitate a coherent approach to Arctic shipping
and any development of regional or circum-arctic shipping, such
as the Northeast or Northwest Passage.

concluSion
This Article has very briefly reviewed assessments of hydrocarbon activity and marine shipping in the context of the Arctic
Council and climate change. These assessments are part of an
ongoing and extensive program of action of the Council, and
will conclude by 2008. Like the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Scientific Report, each assessment will conclude but also
contain the seeds of their continuance. These assessments form
the groundwork of integrated approaches to hydrocarbon development and maritime shipping that may be national, regional,
circum-Arctic, or global. They also illustrate some of the unique
approaches to resource management that are evolving in the
Arctic. Parties interested in Arctic resource development and its
management should follow these assessments, and related activities of the Arctic Council and its working groups through the
websites and related news services and feeds.

Endnotes: Hydrocarbon Development and Maritime Shipping
continued on page 66
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Polar Bears, oil, and the ChukChi sea:
mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe,
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, scarce and economically viable resources.

the Federal Government sells mineral riGhts in Polar Bear haBitat
in alaska by Matt Irwin*

Spring 2008

Photo Courtesy of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

R

ecent developments in the Chukchi Sea in the Arctic
Circle have pitted environmentalists and indigenous
peoples against the federal government and the oil
industry. The Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) has recently completed the lease sale
of tracts of seabed located on Alaska’s continental shelf in the
Chukchi Sea.1 The lease sale, which took place on February 6,
2008, evidenced an increased interest by the oil industry in the
Chukchi Sea, with a record setting 667 bids on 488 blocks of
seabed and $2.6 billion in total high bids.2 The MMS estimates
that the area contains approximately 15 billions barrels of conventionally retrievable oil and 77 trillion cubic feet of conventionally retrievable natural gas.3
Drilling for oil and natural gas in the Chukchi Sea has
numerous potential negative environmental effects. One of the
most pressing environmental issues in light of the lease sale will
be the plight of the polar bear.4 Oil extraction in the Chukchi
Sea has a threefold impact on polar bear survival. First, because
the Chukchi Sea area is home to approximately one-tenth of the
world’s polar bears, drilling for oil and natural gas in the Chukchi
Sea poses potential harm to polar bear survival from threats like
oil spills and damage to the local ecosystem from the oil and
gas extraction.5 One environmentalist’s estimate of the potential
for an oil spill was as high as fifty percent.6 The second means
by which oil extraction in the Chukchi impacts the survival of
polar bears, and other Arctic wildlife, is perpetuating reliance
on fossil fuels that contribute to climate change. Climate change
poses perhaps the largest threat to polar bear survival because
the break up of Arctic ice sheets due to higher temperatures in
the Arctic diminishes the range for polar bears to hunt, decreases
the ability of mothers to search for proper den sites, and reduces
the availability of den sites.7 Finally, the amount of accessible
oil and gas in the Chukchi Sea perpetuates the economic viability of the Trans-Alaska pipeline and forestalls the end of easy
oil extraction in Alaska.8 The recent rise of oil prices has made
investment in the difficult terrain of the Chukchi Sea and extending the lifetime of the Trans-Alaska pipeline attractive to oil
companies and investors, despite fears and protests by environmental groups and Native Americans.9
By an interesting, if not suspicious, coincidence, the polar
bear was to have the final decision of its listing under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) publically released before the lease
sale on January 8, 2008. However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) declared on January 7, 2008 that it would postpone the release of the final decision for approximately thirty

Polar bear with cub.

days.10 As of March 23, 2008, this decision has not been published. Listing polar bears as endangered or threatened under
the ESA creates many difficulties in creating a recovery plan on
the macro level due to the role of global climate change.11 In
regards to the potential listing of the polar bear under the ESA
and the recent lease sale in the Chukchi Sea, the director of the
FWS has stated that the oil companies that have bid on tracts in
the Chukchi Sea will have to comply with the potential listing
of the polar bear under the ESA.12 The MMS has also stated
that it will not allow oil exploration to take place within fifty
miles (eighty kilometers) from shore to limit the potential harm
to wildlife habitat in the Chukchi region.13
A group of plaintiffs, including Indigenous groups and local
towns in the Chukchi region along with environmental advocacy
groups, filed suit against the MMS and the FWS in the Federal
District Court in Juneau, Alaska on January 31, 2008.14 The
suit alleges, among other things, that the current environmental
impact statement submitted by the MMS has failed to assess the
impact of climate change and other potential impacts resulting
from oil and gas extraction in the Chukchi region.15 The next
few months and possibly years will no doubt see intense litigation and scientific inquiry as to the impact of mineral extraction
in the Chukchi Sea on the survival of polar bears.
Endnotes: Polar Bears, Oil, and the Chukchi Sea
continued on page 67

* Matt Irwin is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washington
College of Law.

40

Mitigating Black carBon as a MechanisM
to Protect the arctic and Prevent aBruPt
cliMate change
by Marcel De Armas & Maria Vanko*

C

introDuction

ping and industrial development in the Arctic becomes a reality,
there is an urgency to include the shipping industry under a comprehensive global climate change agreement and to include BC
in such an agreement. This Article explores the need to include
reducing BC emissions and the shipping industry in a post-2012
comprehensive climate change regime.

limate change is impacting the Arctic earlier and
more intensely than any other area of the planet. Winter temperatures have increased as much as three-tofour degrees Celsius in the past fifty years1 and are projected
to increase four-to-seven degrees Celsius over land areas and
seven-to-ten degrees over the Arctic Ocean by the end of the
the arctic thaw
century.2 One industry that looks likely to benefit, at least in the
In 2007, the Arctic summer sea ice extent reached a record
short term, from the effects of the diminished Arctic sea ice is
minimum level, with coverage twenty-three percent lower than
shipping.
it was relative to the previous record set in 2005
As the region warms, there is an expecand thirty-nine percent lower than the long
tation of increased industrial developterm average from 1979 to 2000. 7
ment and resource extraction, as
NASA reports that perennial sea
well as tourism, including the
ice, the thicker, older ice that is
cruise industry.3 The openless-prone to melting, steeply
ing of Arctic shipping lanes
decreased over the 2008
will reduce global shipwinter season, despite
ping time and costs,
cold temperatures.8 This
shortening the journey
perennial ice once covbetween Japan and the
ered as much of fifty
United Kingdom by
percent of the Arctic,
as much as five thouand now covers less
sand miles.4
than thirty percent.9
Over the past
Sea ice researchers
century, Arctic sea ice
now believe that the
has diminished conArctic summers could
siderably and continbe completely ice free
ues to decline, making
in as early as 2030, conshipping and increased
sequently opening both
resource development in
the Northwest and Norththe Arctic a reality. A direct
east Passages.10
human influence that decreases
Arctic sea ice plays a particreflectivity of Arctic and other ice
ularly important role in global warmis the soot, or black carbon (“BC”), that
ing because its reflectivity helps reduce
is produced when fossil fuels are burned.5
the absorption of solar radiation, thereby
BC emissions significantly contribute to the
reducing atmospheric temperature.11 The
Image of the potential
melting Arctic, and reducing such emissions
loss of sea ice results in greater heat absorpNorthwest and Northeast
may be “the most effective way we know to
tion due to the decreased reflectivity of the
Shipping Passages;
retard Arctic warming.”6
surface. Humans influence the reflectivity of
photo courtesy of ACIA.
Because BC is relatively-short lived in
snow and ice by burning fuels—e.g., coal, oil,
the atmosphere, regulation of this pollutant
is an important strategy to prevent abrupt climate change. BC
produced from burning conventional fuels is largely unregulated
* Marcel De Armas & Maria Vanko are J.D. candidates, May 2008, American
University Washington College of Law.
and plays a significant role in climate change. As increased ship41
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gas, waste, and wood—and creating BC that settles on the snow
and ice.12 BC darkens the surface of the ice which decreases
reflectivity and increases the absorption of solar radiation, thus
resulting in faster heating and melting.13 A thawing Arctic will
in turn lead to additional greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions as
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and methane that are stored in the permafrost are released as it melts.14

Black carBon
A recent study has found
that BC provides the second
strongest contribution to current global warming, after CO2
emissions.15 Fortunately, BC is
short lived in the atmosphere,
usually lasting a few days to a
couple of weeks in the atmosphere compared to CO2, which
has a lifetime of one hundred
or more years.16 Unfortunately,
BC is a highly forcing agent of
climate change,17 and has pernicious localized impacts that are
not exclusive to the Arctic. BC exacerbates desertification and
flooding,18 hastens melting of ice sheets and glaciers,19 perturbs
monsoon season,20 and contributes to hundreds of thousands of
deaths a year and adverse health effects for many more.21 While
most aerosols have a global cooling effect by reflecting sunlight,
BC absorbs sunlight, thus heating the surrounding air and contributing to regional heating and climate change.22 Even though
BC is not always emitted with other aerosols, it tends to intermingle with them, thus masking BC’s radiative forcing. Thus,
a targeted effort to reduce BC would be important even if other
aerosols continue to exist in atmospheric brown clouds.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
estimated BC’s global warming potential between 0.2 and 0.4
watts per square meter (“W/m2”).23 However, recent studies
suggest that this amount is underestimated and inaccurate. A
recent study found climate forcing of BC is 0.9 W/m2; this “is as
much as 55% of the CO2 forcing and is larger than the forcing
due to the other [greenhouse gases] such as CH4, CFCs, N2O or
tropospheric ozone.”24 The effects of BC have previously been
underestimated because BC is emitted with other aerosols—e.g.,
sulfate particles.25 These aerosols mixed with BC reflect sunlight; as a result they increase the probability that the light will
be absorbed by soot particles nearby, hence they are reflecting
the light to the BC.26 Furthermore, when BC gets into the upper
atmosphere, it absorbs light reflected by the surface—especially
snow, glaciers, and ice sheets—and clouds, thus contributing
to the warming of the planet.27 This highlights BC’s warming
potential because not only does it absorb heat from the sun, but it
absorbs heat that was to be reflected back to outer space.
Historically North America and Western Europe were
responsible for BC emissions, however, developing nations, particularly in Asia, are now the main source of BC emissions.28
China and India alone account for twenty-five to thirty-five per-

cent of global BC emissions.29 BC emissions and its effects vary
by region. For example, the “majority of soot emission in South
Asia is due to biofuel cooking, whereas in East Asia, coal combustion for residential and industrial uses plays a larger role.”30
China highlights the rapid growth of BC emissions in developing
countries; between 2000 and 2006 China doubled its BC emissions.31 In comparison, the United States emits about twenty-one
percent of the world’s CO2, but
only 6.1 percent of the world’s
soot.32
One reason for the reduced
BC emissions in North America and Western Europe is air
quality standards, technology
standards, and restrictions on
particulate emissions.33 These
standards are lacking in the
shipping industry and typically
in the developing world. Outside of the shipping and power
generation industries, the major
sources of BC include: (1) biomass burning—burning of forests and savannas; (2) residential
biofuels and coal—used for heating and cooking; (3) diesel
engines—emits 25 to 400 times the amount of particulate matter
than a gasoline engine.34

A recent study has
found that BC provides
the second strongest
contribution to current
global warming, after
CO2 emissions.
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Black carBon controls May Prevent
aBruPt cliMate change and Provide localized
PuBlic health Benefits
By reducing BC emissions the world may buy some additional time before severe effects of climate change are felt,
possibly allowing for the reduction in GHG emissions to a sustainable level. If unchecked, Arctic warming has the potential
for catastrophic global impacts, such as sea-level rise; a complete melting of the Greenland ice sheet would raise ocean levels
by seven meters.35 Implementing controls to limit BC emissions
may help prevent the climate system from passing the tipping
points for abrupt climate changes, such as the disintegration of
the Greenland and/or Antarctic ice sheets.36 The quickest impact
on reducing BC emissions and to provide climate benefits would
be to focus on the shipping and power generation sectors in East
Asia that have the potential for the BC to settle in the Arctic.
Tackling the agricultural and residential sources will require
addressing the underlying cause of poverty.
Tackling biomass burning, and residential cooking and heating may prove to be difficult, since sources involve thousands
or millions of individuals with limited resources.37 However,
there is the possibility of increased financial and development
assistance to otherwise reduce the emissions through technologies such as low-cost fuel-efficient stoves, and the development
of electricity grids. Reducing BC emissions would also provide
strong positive benefits for public health in developing nations.
Exposure to BC from cooking over open fires has been linked to
pneumonia in young children, chronic bronchitis in women, and
increased blood pressure.38 Switching to non-BC emitting cook42

ers, such as solar or bio- or natural gas may result in a seventy
to eighty percent reduction in BC heating over South Asia; a
twenty to forty percent reduction in East Asia; and potentially
reduce 400,000 annual fatalities among women and children that
are attributed to smoke inhalation.39 These preventable deaths
are in addition to the thousands of cardiopulmonary and lung
cancer deaths attributed to particulate matter (“PM”), including
BC, emissions from ships near the coastlines of Europe, East
Asia, and South Asia, in 2002 estimated at 60,000.40

the Global climate
the ShippinG inDuStry,

treaty reGime,
& black carbon

The UniTed naTions Framework ConvenTion
on ClimaTe Change and kyoTo ProToCol
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) was adopted in 1992 and entered into force
in 1994 as a framework for action and cooperation on the issue
of climate change.41 The Objective of the UNFCCC and any
related legal instrument is the “stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”42 While
the UNFCCC does not currently limit BC emissions or identify
BC as a defined GHG, its framework sets forth principles and
mechanisms that enable it to address BC emissions, even as the
science underpinning BC and its contribution to climate change
is refined. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol does not regulate the
shipping industry, thus undermining its goal of emission reductions while allowing a large emitter to keep emitting.
The Kyoto Protocol is a product of the UNFCCC and sets
binding limits of CO2 and other greenhouse gases for developed
country parties for the period of 2008–2012.43 Under the Kyoto
Protocol, developing nations do not have to reduce their emissions, but can participate in the Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”), which enables the developed member countries to
invest in emission-reductions in developing countries, resulting in credits, that can count toward their emission goals.44 BC
emissions are not regulated under the Kyoto Protocol,45 thus
developing country reduction activities will not qualify for CDM
credits. However, some CDM projects have incidental BC emission reductions so long as they also qualify for CO2 credits.46
With its limited time frame and participation, the Kyoto
Protocol was meant as only a first step to solving the climate
problem.47 With the Kyoto Protocol set to expire in 2012, it is
important to consider controlling global BC emission, as well as
recognize the role of the shipping industry, as the Conference
of Parties (“COP”) to the UNFCCC crafts a post-2012 climate
agreement is written.

inCorPoraTing BC inTo a PosT-2012 ClimaTe TreaTy
Under The UnFCCC
Currently, BC is not included in the UNFCCC framework,
but with the new research surrounding BC, it is imperative that
it is included in the post-Kyoto framework. This may include
amending the UNFCCC to include BC as a GHG. BC reductions can provide important climate insurance, particularly with
43

respect to slowing the melting of the Arctic. As a framework
agreement, the UNFCCC is the institutional framework for successive protocols and amendments. The UNFCCC sets forth a
series of principles to guide successor agreements, which will be
revised as time and science progresses. One of the overarching
principles to the UNFCCC is the precautionary principle, which
urges parties to take precautionary measures to “anticipate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and prevent its
adverse effects.”48 The principle provides that where there are
“threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures.”49 The growing scientific knowledge surrounding
BC’s contribution to anthropogenic interference with the climate
system combined with the precautionary principle embodied in
the UNFCCC is grounds to incorporate BC regulations into the
successor-Kyoto agreement.
Addressing BC emissions under the Kyoto Protocol is also
salable under the common-but-differentiated responsibilities
principle embodied in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC requires
parties to be guided “on the basis of equity and in accordance to
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.”50 Accordingly, under the UNFCCC, full consideration is to be given to the specific needs and circumstances of
developing country parties.
Under the common-but-differentiated responsibility principle, as implemented in the Kyoto Protocol, developing country
Parties do not have to make any binding emission reductions.
This approach would not necessarily be successful for controlling global emissions of BC. In particular, the developed (Annex
I) Parties to the Kyoto Protocol generally have already implemented strategies to reduce PM emissions, through domestic
statutes like the U.S. Clean Air Act. Since the bulk of BC emissions comes from the developing world and economically viable
and tested technology already exist to reduce BC emissions from
stationary sources, both developed and developing countries
should take steps to reduce BC emissions and hopefully prevent
abrupt climate change events.
There is the ability to control BC emissions from the developing country Parties available through the mechanisms that
bind all Parties, developed and developing, to the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC provides that all Parties will, inter alia, implement national plans that include measures to mitigate climate
change51 and promote and cooperate in technology transfer.52
The framework also provides that the extent to which developing country Parties will implement their commitments is linked
to developed country’s commitment of financial resources and
technology transfer, taking into account that social development and poverty eradication are the paramount priorities of the
developing country Parties.53
The Bali Action Plan, agreed upon by the 13th Conference
of Parties to the UNFCCC, encourages the development and
transfer of technology to developing country Parties in order to
promote access to affordable environmentally sound technologies.54 The process should recognize the climate benefits and
poverty eradication, social development, and health co-benefits
SuStainable Development law & policy

of providing technology assistance to developing country Parties to limit their BC emissions. Such environmentally sound
technologies may include lower-BC emitting stoves for heating
and cooking, scrubber technology for power plants, and better
fuel refining technology. This may open a viable mechanism
to promote technology transfer of
cooking stoves to address the climate impacts, as well as the health
and development benefits of the
world’s poor.

The Shipping induSTry

By reducing BC emissions
the world may buy some
additional time before
severe effects of climate
change are felt.

As mentioned earlier the Kyoto
Protocol does not set limitations on
BC emissions, nor does it set any
limitations on the global shipping
industry. Ocean going vessels are
instead regulated under the International Maritime Organization
(“IMO”), which has been slow to place any GHG measurement,
monitoring, or limitations on the industry. Indeed, there is no
current, comprehensible and reliable data on global GHG emissions from international shipping.55 However, reports indicate
GHG emissions from the shipping industry are not insubstantial.
For example, one study estimates GHG emissions from oceangoing vessels are at least three percent of the world’s total,56 an
aggregate total higher than many of the developed-country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The study suggests that amount may
be underreported as the estimates are based upon sales of bunker fuel, which is suspected to be underreported.57 Indeed, that
suggestion seems to have validation in a report that was leaked
to the press from the International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners (“INTERTANKO”). INTERTANKO’s report
suggests that emissions are twice what previously believed, and
may total 1.2 billion tons per year, or as much as six percent of
the world’s total.58
In fact, these reports and estimates are worse than they
appear, because ship emissions are usually released in clean
environments.59 Some of these environments suffer disproportionately from shipping’s emissions, such as the Arctic ecosystem with its ice and snow loss. As the Arctic loses ice-cover,
even small amounts of emitted and deposited BC will further
exacerbate Arctic melting.
The few GHG regulations on the shipping industry that the
IMO has proposed are still in its nascent stages, particularly for
BC. The IMO International Correspondence Group on Greenhouse Gas Related Issues noted the high Global Warming Potential (“GWP”) of BC, however, deferred to the ongoing revision
of MARPOL Annex VI to address this issue. Unfortunately,
the revised MARPOL Annex VI does not as of yet address BC.
The revised proposal, which can be adopted by member governments in October 2008 and entered into force by 2010, would
cap the sulfur content of marine fuels by 0.5 percent world wide
by 2020; limitations would fall in stages to 3.5 percent by 2012,
currently sulfur limit is 4.5 percent.61 This is clearly insufficient
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and counterproductive to all the efforts the global community
has put into reducing acid rain and GHG emissions. Moreover,
it avoids the issue of PM, including BC, which kills thousands
of individuals annually and would be one of the most destructive forces aiding global warming in the Arctic, if the shipping
industry increases it presence
in the Polar Regions. The
Arctic would be the more
susceptible of the two poles
because of the interest in the
Northwest and Northeast
Passage shipping routes.
Either through the IMO,
the post-Kyoto framework,
or at the very least at the
national level the shipping
industry should be required
to implement some easy and
practicable steps to reduce
BC emissions. The simple installation of scrubbers on ships or
reducing to an ultra-low sulfur fuel would be a step in the right
direction to reduce ships’ BC emissions.62 Additionally, even
without technology changes, shipping companies could require
their fleets to reduce their speed—ships that slow down by ten
percent use twenty-five percent less fuel.63 Ports should encourage (or require) ships to reduce their engine use as they approach
the shore and the port, and once the ship is at the port, the port
should require ships to rely on shore power instead of their
engines—relying on shore power will reduce particulate emissions because of regulations in many industrialized countries and
will eliminate carbon and particulate emissions if shore power is
generated by renewable sources, such as wind or solar.64
Moreover, countries and the shipping industry need to
keep innovating ways to reduce emissions and copy successful
approaches by other companies. Two items shipping industry
should keep an eye on to reduce emissions and fuel costs is the
use of high tech kites to harness the winds, thus reducing fuel
consumption,65 and the possibility of switching to alternative
fuels for short routes or for routes that can quickly develop the
infrastructure to supply alternative fuels.66

ConCluSion
With the increasingly ice free Arctic and the increase in
under-regulated shipping undermining the efforts of many
countries to reduce emissions, there needs to be a change in the
approach taken to regulate shipping. It seems as if the industry is unwilling to regulate itself, and its regulatory body, the
IMO, is moving to slow and ignoring global action on climate
change. In addition, we are rapidly learning about BC’s threat
to our climate and planet, luckily we can do something about
it now. BC is proving to have negative effects on human health
and fragile ecosystems, such as the Arctic. Yet industrialized
countries have been reducing their BC emissions for many years
and should encourage and assist developing countries to do the
same.
44

The concern for the Arctic is particularly acute, because
climate change’s impacts are disproportionately felt at the poles
and because of the large amounts of sea ice loss. This ice loss
implicates shipping due to its interest in the Northwest Passage
and the Northeast Passage. Ships without appropriate control
technology would emit large amounts of BC that would rest
on the Arctic ice, speed up ice and snow melting, and reduce
surface albedo; this would speed up the cycle of Arctic melting and global warming overall.67 Because BC can have such

a disastrous effect on the Arctic, and predictions that it is the
second or third largest warming agent, behind CO2 and methane, it is necessary for the IMO or any post-Kyoto framework
to include shipping and BC, because every reduction helps. Currently the technology exists to reduce BC emission from industry
and shipping, which would create an immediate benefit for the
global fight against climate change due to its short atmospheric
lifespan. The question remains, however, if the political will to
require some changes is available.
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The ForgoTTen norTh: PeoPles and lands in Peril
By Ursula Kazarian*

A

introduction

rctic indigenous peoples are extremely susceptible to
the immediate impacts of climate change. While many
indigenous groups face serious battles over rights
to land and resources, the Arctic groups face the impending,
compounding factor of some of the most drastic impacts from
climate change. Their dependence on the integrity of local ecosystems for their survival as autonomous groups makes them
even more vulnerable to the melting of ice and permafrost and
to the decline of local animal and fish species.1 This Article provides a broad overview of Arctic countries’ legal relationship
to their respective indigenous groups and discusses legal tools
available to Arctic indigenous groups to protect their traditional
existence from the impacts of climate change in light of competing national interests.

defining indigenouS environmental rightS
in the arctic
in the climate change context
The preservation of indigenous culture and traditional
knowledge in the Arctic is both directly and indirectly threatened by the rapid and dramatic environmental changes occurring in the region. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”), warmer temperatures and unpredictable weather patterns have already caused increased incidences
of non-fatal heart attacks and respiratory diseases. In addition,
the residual effect of climate change—such as a reduction in traditional sources of food—has led to a shift to western diets and,
consequently, to an increase in diet-related diseases including
diabetes and obesity.2 Therefore, beyond encouraging environmental protection in the Arctic solely for its own intrinsic value,
it is important to recognize the distinct challenges that climate
change and the warming Arctic have created, and will continue
to create, for the indigenous peoples whose survival as such is
so intricately tied to the environmental integrity and health of
the region.
While the right to self-determination of peoples was clearly
codified in 1984,3 the details of the “group rights” that fall under
this rubric vary depending on the structure of national legal
systems and the integrity of national enforcement mechanisms.
There are international legal tools for the protection of minority groups against ethnocide,4 for individuals against cruel treatment, and for indigenous peoples.5
The United Nations Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Indigenous Groups defines communities, peoples
and nations as

. . . those which having a historical continuity with preinvasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on
their territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories,
or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve,
develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis
of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance
with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and
legal systems.6
This definition, or a closely related variation of it, has been used
in numerous legal contexts as human rights law develops.
The continued traditions and cultural fabric of the Arctic
indigenous peoples are clearly distinct from the cultures of the
nation-states in which they reside. These peoples are generally
not integrated into the cultural fabric of the rest of the nationstate, at least in part, because of the extreme physical conditions
that have led to geographic isolation of the groups and less physical intrusion by foreign populations. Their livelihoods depend
on the ecosystems that surround them. Thus, if the preservation
of their culture and traditions is recognized by relevant national
legislation, according to international legal principles, an obligation exists to respect the natural systems upon which those
peoples survive.
Total and Indigenous Populations of the Arctic
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figure 1: eStimate of arctic population, 1990.
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Nonetheless, creating consensus to solve the climate change
crisis has proven a formidable task. Competing interests include
inter alia countries’ right to development,7 fair trade principles,8
and indigenous rights. Climate
change litigation invites the additional difficulty of proving causation for recoverable harms. While
filing individual claims in national
and international courts certainly
increases attention to a subject, if
the causation is impossible to pinpoint, then the resulting precedent
would not be particularly useful
in repairing the harms caused by
global warming. It will thus take
the adoption of new attitudes
in the courts of Arctic countries
to enforce the laws already in
place to protect their indigenous
groups, as well as the continued
development of new legal regimes
in the region, to create the case for compensating—and just as
importantly, for preventing—those harms that are either a direct
or indirect result of climate change.
While courts and committees battle over how to address the
global impacts of climate change on local levels, the very nature
of the problem is progressing more quickly than had been anticipated. Ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland are melting faster
than predicted, and in the latter case, the topographical nature
of the glaciers may result in the ice sheet sliding into the North
Atlantic Ocean, with devastating consequences.9 While scientists have debated the cumulative impacts of the disintegrating
ice sheet in western Antarctica and the apparent thickness of the
ice on the eastern side of the continent,10 the landless Arctic is
clearly disappearing at an alarming rate. Scientists predict that
the summer presence of the Arctic ice cap will completely disappear by 2050, if not sooner.11 Along with the changing physical
landscape, the growing geopolitical significance of the Arctic
and its resources is unequivocally clear.12 National governments
are well aware of the accelerated melting rates in the Arctic and
thus the increased access to previously inaccessible hydrocarbon
reserves, and they may be preparing to exploit the rapid change
in environmental conditions for energy stores and economic
gain. Thus, national and international climate change law must
progress to prevent irreparable harm to the region and the people
who live there, as well as address any grievances related to climate change, when, not if, they occur.

will be directly linked either to past national precedent or else by
international cooperation. Given the frequent and obvious conflict between protecting indigenous rights and the national right
to development, it is no wonder that the greatest hope to
preserve indigenous rights lies
generally through international
mechanisms.
Thus, a brief overview of
each Arctic country’s relevant
legal systems and the historical development of opportunities for indigenous peoples on a
national level is helpful.

Warmer temperatures
and unpredictable
weather patterns have
already caused increased
incidences of
non-fatal heart attacks
and respiratory diseases.

aDDreSSing the effectS of climate change
in the arctic
IndIgenous RIghts: CuRRent natIonal legIslatIon
and Case law
Every Arctic country has a different legal and custodial relationship with its respective indigenous peoples. However, it is
clear that defending indigenous rights in light of climate change
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Norway

According to Scott Forrest of the University of Northern British Columbia, Norway
has adopted the most “assimilationist” policy towards its
indigenous peoples out of all of the Nordic countries. He writes,
Whereas Sweden-Finland made a legal distinction
between land uses based on herding and those of agriculture, originating with the establishment of taxlands
. . . Norway acknowledged no such difference. Norway’s attitude toward the Sami is evidenced in a 1902
law, which granted land ownership only to Norwegian
speakers. The effects of Norwegian legislators’ negative attitudes towards the Sami way of life are seen in
the various statutes designed to regulate the practice.
The Reindeer Herding Acts (RHA) of 1854 and
1933 were not designed to protect reindeer herding and
the Sami way of life, but to ensure that herding did not
interfere in the development of other ‘culturally and
economically superior’ land uses such as farming and
forestry.13
Forrest therefore views Norwegian policy as putting the country’s right to development ahead of indigenous rights.

Sweden
According to Forrest, Sweden has taken progressive steps
with regard to Sami rights, but only when they are in alignment
with protecting the rights of non-Sami Swedes:
Swedish law makers took a narrow interpretation of
Sami ethnicity based almost exclusively on economic
activity. Those that participated in a ‘traditional Sami’
livelihood (primarily reindeer herding) were classified as Sami. Likewise, Sami that pursued agriculture
were considered Swedes or Finns. Paternalism thus
only applied to reindeer herders, while Sami who chose
other activities were legally and culturally assimilated.
The Reindeer Herding Act (“RHA”) of 1886
embodied this philosophy as it granted hunting and
fishing rights on designated lands only to herding Sami.
These activities were considered as supplemental to the
SuStainable Development law & policy

primary Sami activity of reindeer herding. Non-herders
who previously had once enjoyed land use for subsistence purposes were now prevented from doing so. The
long term effect of these instruments has been to cause
factionalism among the Sami between herders and nonherders. The 1886 and 1898 RHAs also specified that
the Sami’s right to the land was usufruct (right of use),
not ownership.
Worse was to come in the 1928 RHA, which created a Lapp sheriff administration to regulate Sami
reindeer herding. This marked a new era in state-Sami
relations in Sweden. The motivation for herding legislation in this period was not the protection of herding, but of the new agricultural settlements that were
developing in the north. A policy of segregation was
thought to be the best approach to minimize herdersettler conflicts.14
Forrest, while critical, concedes that Sweden has, in fact,
been cognizant of the Sami’s right to herd reindeer, an activity
that is critical to their cultural survival. In the 1988 case, Kitok v.
Sweden, the UN Human Rights Committee considered a Swedish
decision to uphold a Sami village’s denial of letting a member
back into the village after he had left his work in reindeer husbandry.15 Under Swedish law, a Sami who undertakes another
occupation for three years loses membership rights to herd reindeer, unless the village votes to return membership status to that
person. In this case, the village denied Ivan Kutok that privilege
after he had abandoned reindeer husbandry due to economic
misfortune and then later wished to return. The Committee held
that Sweden did not violate Kitok’s rights under Article 2716 of
the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee further upheld the reasoning from a
Canadian case, Lovelace v. Canada,17 that collective survival for
an indigenous group may take priority over the individual rights
of a single member. This may not build a clear or direct foundation for future climate change cases, but the deference given to
Sami self-governance may play a factor when considering arguments to preserve the Sami way of life through environmental
protection.

Finland
Unlike Norway and Sweden, reindeer herding is not legally
reserved as a Sami right. One of the first significant changes to
reindeer herding in Finland was the transformation of the traditional siida system into government defined reindeer districts
under Russian rule in 1898.18 Under this arrangement, herders
were required to be registered in one of these districts, and the
state had the right to limit the number of reindeer in each district. As in Norway and Sweden, the objective of this administrative restructuring of Sami territory was to provide a system
of compensation for damage done by reindeer.19 This system
had the unintended effect of allowing the herds to safely wander
throughout the district for much of the year without attention.
This encouraged many non-Sami farmers to adopt reindeer herding either as a secondary or primary economic activity.20 The
1948 Reindeer Husbandry Act granted every Finnish citizen the
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right to breed reindeer in an appropriate district, and the Sami
lost what rights to the land they had occupied under the siida
system. Now, reindeer herding in Finland is flourishing, but the
Sami are now a minority among herders and must seek legal
means to exercise their claim to their land.21
In addition to allowing all Finnish citizens to compete with
the Sami in the field of reindeer herding, the Finnish government
has encroached upon Sami territory through logging and mineral
exploitation. In Landsman v. Finland, the UN Human Rights
Committee did not find a violation of Article 27 under a selfdetermination analysis, although it noted that an increase in such
activities would merit a reconsideration.22 In the precedent case,
Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, the Committee had found similar
activities to violate cultural integrity guarantees under Article
27.23 As a result, the Finnish government has come under criticism for violating the Samis’ rights.

Greenland and the Faeroe Islands (Denmark)
Despite a self-ruling Greenlandic government, the Queen of
Denmark is still the head of state for both Greenland and the
Faeroe Islands. Although the government of Denmark has put
forward a strategy on protecting indigenous rights,24 there has
been very little information about the implementation of the
strategy or the enforcement of any indigenous rights laws.

Russia
The Russian Federation lists forty-four distinct indigenous
peoples with populations under 50,000 as having special rights
and protections under the Constitution and federal laws and
decrees.25 Article 69 of the 1993 Constitution for the first time
explicitly established the guaranteed rights of small indigenous
peoples “in accordance with the generally accepted principles
and standards of international law and international treaties of
the Russian Federation.”26 The Constitution effectively overrides any regional or federal legislation that might endanger
small indigenous groups; however, federal and regional legislation can be used to expand these rights.27
A 1992 Presidential decree ordered the councils of ministers of the republics of the Russian Federation and all local and
regional authorities to demarcate the territories inhabited and
used by indigenous minorities for their traditional activities.28
Additionally, the 1999 Law on Guarantee of Rights of Indigenous Minorities guarantees socio-economic and cultural development to all indigenous minorities of the Russian Federation,
protection of nature in the traditional places they inhabit, their
traditional way of life, economic activities, and occupations.29
However, despite these laws, enforcement and implementation
have been cited by numerous groups as the key problems to actually protecting indigenous rights. It is becoming ever more popular to take human rights cases to the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECHR”), although Russia has not always adhered to
the decisions ECHR has handed down to it.

Canada
Canada is home to many indigenous groups, with the Inuit
covering the most territory. A significant achievement for the
Inuit was the creation in 1999 of the territory of Nunavut, which
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means “Our Land” in the Inuit language, Inuktitut. As land is
considered a fundamental right to the preservation of culture and
identity, it is important to note that aboriginal title in Canada can
be extinguished in two ways: by constitutional amendment, and
by agreement of the aboriginal people concerned.30 Although the
creation of Nunavut appears to be a victory in self-government,
the Inuit have in fact ceded their aboriginal rights and title in
exchange for a grant of rights from the Canadian government—
something that could, in theory, open the door to a future constitutional amendment that would revoke the viability of Nunavut’s
semi-autonomy.31 This is significant in that the Inuit must take
great care as to how they proceed within Nunavut’s internal
structure as well as with regard to Nunavut’s political relations
with the Canadian federal government.
Finally, while the Inuit comprise the largest ethnic majority
in the Canadian north, they are actually the smallest group of
aboriginal people in Canada. Other northern indigenous peoples
include the Tlingit, Innu, Cree, Gwich’in, and Metis, who inhabit
and claim aboriginal titles to Northern Territories.32 There have
been the usual conflicts over land rights, and the overlap between
indigenous rights and environmental protection will surely be an
increasingly pursued topic in Canadian courts.

United States
The United States has historically dealt with its Alaskan
natives in a very different manner from the native tribes living in
the continental United States. When the United States acquired
the territory of Alaska from Russia in 1867, Alaskan natives
had a functioning relationship with the Russian Empire. There
were very few ethnic Russians living in Alaska at that time, and
the few settlements they did inhabit were generally impermanent.33 When the United States took possession of the vast territory, Alaskan natives were clearly able to see the strife that
had plagued the natives of the continental United States since its
inception and sought to avoid similar problems concerning title
and rights to land and resources.
The 1884 Organic Act for the Territory of Alaska acknowledged the aboriginal right to possession of traditional territory
until Congress passed such legislation as to specify the terms of
future title acquisition.34 The Supreme Court later found that the
Organic Act did not recognize absolute aboriginal title but did
acknowledge and preserve continuing aboriginal rights, subject
to Congressional action.35
Fearing legal entanglement that would lead to termination
and thus non-recognition of their special status, native groups
joined together to push forward the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) in 1971, through which Alaskan natives
traded aboriginal claims to vast tracts of land for recognized title
to smaller tracts of land and a total monetary compensation of
$962.5 million.36 However, the passage of ANCSA caused ambiguity in the status of native hunting and fishing rights and was
followed in 1980 by the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (“ANILCA”). ANILCA, in turn, included provisions for a preference for subsistence rights over commercial
and sport interests on federal public lands in Alaska, although it
did not limit the subsistence preference to natives.37
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Although ANILCA helped to clarify some of the concerns
left by ANCSA, the fight to clarify native subsistence rights continues. For instance, in Amoco Production v. Village of Gambell
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the outer continental shelf was
outside the boundary of Alaska as defined by ANILCA and therefore was not subject to the subsistence provisions of ANILCA.38
By this decision, the Court favored the interests of oil production
over the competing indigenous hunting and fishing rights. This
is a perhaps ominous indication of the difficulties the Alaskan
natives will encounter in bringing climate change-related claims
to U.S. federal court.
Thus, no established precedent has yet been set in any of these
countries to directly link climate change, environmental protection, and indigenous rights to self-determination in the Arctic.
However, the tide may be turning, as creative new uses of established legal tools are being developed to address the direct causal
link between climate change and rights to cultural preservation.

The Use of The U.s. Alien TorT ClAims ACT To
hold mUlTinATionAl CorporATions ACCoUnTAble
The use of Alien Torts Claims Act (“ATCA”)39 against
multinational corporations (“MNCs”) to address wrongs suffered by individuals or groups has become increasingly popular in U.S. courts in recent years. Long after its awakening in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,40 the ATCA has become a new tool to
bring MNCs that abuse human rights to justice. In Aguinda v.
Texaco, the New York federal court heard claims by citizens—
mostly indigenous tribal leaders—of Ecuador’s rainforest region
that Texaco’s operation of an oil pipeline through their lands
caused environmental degradation that resulted in illness and
destroyed their traditional way of life in the forest, and therefore destroyed their livelihood. Finding in favor of Texaco, the
Court dismissed the claim under ATCA on the basis of forum
non conveniens, allowing the case to go to the Ecuadorian court
system.41 The Court did not, however, claim that the case should
not have been held in the United States; it merely held that in
that particular case, Ecuador was the proper jurisdiction. In fact,
in 2003 the federal district court in New York looked to Aguinda when deciding to hold Talisman Energy, Inc. responsible
in the United States under ATCA for human rights violations in
Sudan, stating:
in deciding the forum non conveniens motion, the Second Circuit [in Aguinda] painstakingly weighed the
various factors militating for and against trying the
action in the United States. Such analysis would have
been wholly superfluous if there was no subject matter
jurisdiction to try the case in federal court in the first
place. Thus, the recent Aguinda decision adds credence
to the notion that corporations may be held liable for
international law violations under the ATCA . . .
While the Second Circuit has not explicitly held
that corporations are potentially liable for violations of
the law of nations, it has . . . acknowledged that corporations are potentially liable for violations of the law of
nations that ordinarily entail individual responsibility,
including jus cogens violations.42
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The Court in Talisman thus helped to further the growing
judicial consensus that MNCs can and will be tried in U.S. courts
under ATCA for human rights violations.43 Thus the ATCA is a
potential tool for Arctic indigenous populations residing outside
of the United States who are adversely impacted by U.S. MNCs
violations.

The Use of The PUblic NUisaNce DocTriNe To holD
MUlTiNaTioNal corPoraTioNs accoUNTable
Since the ATCA cannot apply to U.S. citizens,44 the indigenous peoples of Alaska would be unable to file a tort claim under
ATCA. However, the Inupiat Eskimo tribe of Kivalina in northern Alaska recently filed a complaint under public and private
nuisance law and conspiracy in District Court for the Northern
District of California against several oil and gas companies. The
village is suing the companies for their role in causing and denying global warming and thereby causing the massive ice melt
that threatens their traditional existence and is forcing them to
relocate their village.45 A positive result for Kivalina could signal the emergence of a devastating trend for oil and gas companies in the United States.
Moreover, at least theoretically, the non-U.S. jurisdictional
Arctic indigenous groups could file claims under ATCA against
any number of corporations that are large emitters of greenhouse
gases, for contributing to climate change and thus destroying
their traditional ways by means of environmental degradation.
The main issue would be to prove that actively contributing to
climate change through sustained emissions is either in contradiction to a U.S. treaty, or is contrary to customary international
law on the basis of jus cogens. At present, proving either of these
claims would be extremely difficult if not impossible; however, it
is one option to consider as jurisprudence regarding the impacts
of climate change continues to develop. Finally, even if future
case law acknowledges the causal link between climate change
and self-determination rights of Arctic indigenous peoples, the
focus may shift to the question of proper compensation.
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied damages
to Alaska natives from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, finding that
although the natives were more severely affected by the oil spill
than non-natives, the actual injury to their cultural, spiritual, and
psychological benefits was no different than that of non-native
Alaskans.46 Whether such reasoning is applied to Kivalina’s
complaint may signal the legal trend for climate change-related
damages. However, the policy question of enforcing corporate
responsibility may support Kivalina’s position. For instance,
the payment for the relocation of a tribe, as the Kivalina village
requests, may not be enough to promote a change in the policies of oil companies that would actually halt the environmental
degradation from business activities; it would simply compensate the tribe for the displacement. Punitive damage awards may
offer one possible method to help promote the change of corporate business ethics that impact global warming and climate
change; however, how courts will respond to complaints such as
that of Kivalina remains to be seen.
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oTher Tools for NaTioNal reMeDies Via
iNTerNaTioNal coUrTs
Aside from seeking a decision on the national level, and
while regional instruments such as the Arctic Council47 are under
development, indigenous groups also have the option of utilizing more broadly based international mechanisms. The binding
level of the decisions of international bodies, however, depends
on whether a given country has agreed to supranational jurisdiction. For instance, Russia has not ratified several of the Protocols
specifying particular types of human rights, and this has fueled
widespread controversy in addition to existing criticism over its
compliance with European Court of Human Rights decisions.48
The vast expanse of Russia’s northern territory, coupled with a
marked deficiency in official information pertaining to the rights
of indigenous peoples, results in extreme uncertainty as to how
the rights of Russia’s indigenous groups will be respected in the
future.
Another example is the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (“IACHR”). Unlike the European human rights system,
an individual cannot bring a claim directly into the system; he or
she must first file the claim with the Commission, and upon its
approval it may be forwarded to the Court. A substantial portion
of the cases heard so far has been from indigenous groups, and
the jurisprudence has leaned in favor of enforcing indigenous
rights throughout the Americas.49
However, the decisions are only binding in countries that
have ratified the Convention and submitted to the contentious
jurisdiction of the Court either on a blanket or individual case
basis. The two Arctic countries in the Americas, Canada and the
United States, have ratified the Convention, but they have not
submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction. In 2005 the Inuit Circumpolar Conference submitted a petition to the Commission that
called for an investigation into the United States’ contributions
to global warming and for action to be taken.50 It is an encouraging step forward in increasing awareness, but it is questionable whether it will encourage any change in U.S. activity. If
the Court is to have any “teeth” in addressing Arctic indigenous
claims regarding climate change, the jurisdiction of the Court
over both of the Arctic countries presents a critical necessity.
In sum, securing jurisdiction over the countries of the Arctic,
including Russia, the United States and Canada, remains a major
hurdle for the two regional institutions. Until national level legislation opens itself to international influence, enforcement of
any of the decisions of international courts is less likely. The
same holds true for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”):
while it will not be able to hear a case unless a country submits
to its jurisdiction, the Court can still give an Advisory Opinion
which can serve the same purpose as the non-binding opinions
of the regional human rights courts. It is thus up to the appropriate UN agencies to bring cases to the ICJ for such opinions.
The recently released IPCC report lists policies, instruments, and co-operative arrangements to mitigate the impacts of
climate change worldwide.51 These recommendations are generally aimed at economic incentives and strategies at the nationstate level. While this is probably the most effective direction
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to take at the international legal level, the best national-level
mitigation strategy for the peoples whose lives are effectively
outside of the nation-state system, remains a question. The
patchwork of different fora for discussion of these issues offers
promise that at least the Arctic’s ecosystems and its peoples will
not be ignored; however, the need for a streamlined approach
for the region—cutting across Russia, Scandinavia, Canada, and
the United States—is arguably apparent. Petitions to the IACHR
for one set of tribes and to the ECHR for another set, with little
to no recourse for groups in Russia, results in a dispersed and
weakened minority group that threatens to be forgotten in the
maelstrom of increasing state economic activity in the region.

concluSion
International law is developing more quickly than domestic
law in addressing the needs of indigenous peoples, particularly
with respect to climate change. International legal institutions
recognize the overlap between environment and human rights as
a critical factor to protecting cultural and traditional integrity, as
indigenous peoples are viewed as particularly vulnerable to eco-

logical degradation. The most dramatic effects of climate change
are being seen in low-lying coastal areas in the tropics as well
as in the polar regions, and especially in the Arctic. Not only
are the ice melting and the ecosystem changing; countries are
clamoring to stake their claims to exploration for oil and gas on
the now navigable continental shelf. Such new industrial activity
would bring even more change to the places Arctic indigenous
peoples call home.
Though the dialogue on the international level may be more
willing to acknowledge the moral responsibility to protect indigenous culture and tradition, the real implementation and enforcement of such principles must necessarily come from binding,
national-level initiatives and legislation. International pressure
to strengthen existing national laws or to create new ones that
properly reflect the relationship between indigenous cultures
and global warming induced environmental changes will certainly play an important role in the coming years; however, until
national governments take the definitive step to expressly recognize and protect these rights, the future of these northernmost
indigenous communities remains uncertain.
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mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe,
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for
imporaTioNal
tant, scarce and economically viable resources.

a

MelTiNG world

D

SecuriTy aT The Top of

by Matthew Padilla*

uring the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) sought to contain the Soviet Union’s
territorial expansion. After a period of calm, which culminated in the fall of the Soviet Union, the world is once again
witness to national claims over disputed territory and resources.
In August of 2007, the Russian Federation became the first
nation to literally place their flag
on and claim the North Pole and
the resources that are believed to
exist underneath.1 “The Arctic
is Russian” said Artur Chilingarov, a Russian leader of the
expedition returning from the
thawing pole.2 To which country the Arctic belongs to is at the heart of the current debate,
and the contest has real national security implications which will
have to be dealt with as the great thaw in the north continues.
Climate change has led to significant ice reduction in the
Polar Regions.3 The resulting thaw has led to competition over
what the U.S. Geological Survey estimates to be a quarter of the
planet’s remaining energy reserves.4 In addition, newly opened
shipping routes, specifically the Northwest Passage near Canada
and the Northern Sea Route near Russia are adding to the complexity of claims between the nations.5
The five Arctic countries vying for recognition of their
claims are the United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark, and
Norway. The Law of the Sea Treaty allows for Arctic countries
to map out their territorial claims within ten years of submission.
The northern countries have been making their claims, but not
without controversy over where the boundaries actually should
lie because of the great latent wealth which may exist under the
ocean floor.6 The United States, however, is at a disadvantage
in regards to staking its economic claims because it not a party
to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Despite support from a bipartisan majority of the Senate, President Bush, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, some
Senate Republicans have continued to stall the United States’
ratification of the treaty because they believe that the treaty
would hinder U.S. sovereignty.7
Many national security experts do not believe that this modern race for territorial acquisition will resort to military force.8
Scott Borgerson, a Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations,
believes that there are historical reasons for optimism and he
cites the Antarctic treaty as an example in which despite a contentious time during Cold War, parties were able to negotiate
territorial claims peacefully.9 Nonetheless, the report also notes
that while “armed confrontation remains unlikely, tensions over

territorial waters hearken back to the kinds of border disputes
that once led to interstate war.”10
The U.S. military has recognized the national security
implications due to global warming. In a report commissioned
by the U.S. Navy, titled “National Security and the Threat of
Climate Change,” eleven retired
Admirals and Generals recognized that global climate change
and national security are intertwined.11 The report cited the
Arctic as a “region of particular
concern” because of the added
operations which will be conducted as shipping increases and
more resources are mined from
the ocean depths.12 In addition, the report calls global warming
a “threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile
regions of the world.”13
The U.S. Coast Guard has been at the frontline of policing Arctic resources. Admiral Gene Brooks has called the Bering Strait the “new Strait of Malacca” because of an anticipated
increase in shipping traffic between Europe and the Pacific as
the northern passages open.14 The Strait of Malacca is the nautical passageway and chokepoint through which shipping passes
from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Such increased traffic will add to the strain of missions already undertaken by U.S.
vessels underway.15
It is important to view these events in the grand scheme of
international order and balancing. Whichever country acquires
the bulk of the Arctic resources will likely be at a strategic economic advantage over other national powers. Russia has already
used its growing gas and oil resources to influence its neighbors
and other countries in a manner contrary to U.S. security goals.16
Furthermore, the melting ice in the Arctic should be viewed as a
symptom of the global disruptions which will occur worldwide
due to increased temperatures, affecting regimes large and small
and creating a host of new security problems for states.17 The
United States in particular may be drawn into more “stability
operations” such as those undertaken during Hurricane Katrina
and the Asian Tsunami.18 The United States’ national security
issues arising from melting Arctic ice can be ameliorated, but
the first step is to engage the global community through treaties, such as the Law of the Sea, while making strides to reduce
carbon emissions.19

Climate change has led
to significant ice reduction
in the Polar Regions.
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Litigation Update
new Jersey v. epa
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*

introDuction
On February 8, 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated two Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) actions, the first to delist mercury emitting coal and
oil-fired electric utility steam
generation units (“EGUs”) from
section 112 of the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”), and the second to limit
mercury emissions, under the
much less restrictive, CCA section 111 with the new Clean Air
Mercury Rule (“CAMR”).1 The
suit was filed by the state of New
Jersey, along with thirteen other
states, environmental organizations, and industrial groups.2

legal backgrounD
anD argumentS

In 2000, in response to an EPA study linking anthropogenic
releases of mercury with methylmercury levels in fish, EPA
Administrator announced as “appropriate and necessary”6 the
listing of coal- and oil-fired EGUs as source categories for HAPs
under section 112.7 Coal and oil
EGUs are the largest anthropogenic source emitters of mercury
in the United States. In 2004
EPA revisited its decision of
listing coal- and oil-fired EGUs.
After reviewing a number of
alternatives EPA decided to delist coal- and oil-fired EGUs as
HAP sources under section 112
and institute the less restrictive
Clean Air Mercury Rule. Under
the CAMR, EPA proposed to
limit mercury emissions from
new and existing coal and oil
EGUs, and develop a voluntary cap-and-trade program to
reduce mercury emissions.8
The petitioners in the
case contended that EPA, in delisting coal and oil EGUs, violated the plain text and structure of section 112(c)(9) delisting
requirements. During the trial the EPA admitted that it had not,
and could not make the findings required under CCA Section
112(c)(9) for delisting a HAP source. However, EPA offered
three arguments for the legitimacy of its decision, regardless of
the section 112(c)(9).
First, EPA contended that its decision was justified through
its interpretation of section 112(n)(1)(A) which requires EPA
Administrator to conduct a study of each HAP listed in section
112. Following the study, EPA determines whether it is “necessary and appropriate,” to regulate EGU as HAP sources. EPA
contended that section 112(n)(1)(A) does not restrict the agency
from reviewing previous decisions of “necessary and appropri-

The court found no
ambiguity in section 112
and held that the
EPA’s argument
“deploys the logic of
the Queen of Hearts,
substituting EPA’s desires
for the plain text…”

In 1970, Congress amended
the Clean Air Act, adding section 112, requiring EPA to list
and regulate hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”) that “cause, or
contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness.”3 In response to
the EPAs extremely slow application of section 112, Congress
returned to the issue of HAPs in 1990 by strengthening section
112 to require EPA to list and regulate over one hundred specific
HAPs. The amended section 112 required that EPA regulate
all new and existing sources of HAPs to reflect the “maximum
reduction in emissions which can be achieved by application of
the best available control technology.” 4 Additionally, section
112(c)(9) restricted EPAs ability to delist a HAP source without
first determining that “emissions from no source is the category
or subcategory concerned . . . exceed a level which is adequate
to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no
adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from
any source.”5

*Nathan Borgford-Parnell is a J.D./M.A. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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ate” listings of EGUs. If EPA finds that a listing of source EGUs
had not in fact been “necessary and appropriate,” it contended
that it could delist those sources without meeting the delisting
requirements of section 112(c)(9). Secondly, EPA argued that
the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation of section
112, stating that it is ambiguous and calls into question whether
EGUs should be regulated at all. Finally, EPA pointed out that
it has previously delisted HAP sources without satisfying the
requirements of section 112(c)(9).

HoldingS
As for EPA’s first argument, the court agreed that typically
agencies may reverse a previous “administrative determination
or ruling where the agency has a principled basis for doing so.”9
However, Congress has the power to restrict an agency’s ability
to reverse its self. The Court found that the delisting restriction
in section 112(c)(9) represented an expressed limit on EPA’s
discretion to delist HAP sources. Furthermore, the Court found
that EPA’s position would nullify section 112(c)(9) and allow
the agency to delist any source without regard for the statutory
delisting process.10
In analyzing EPA’s request for judicial deference the court
utilized the two-pronged test laid out in Chevron. Under the first
prong of the test the court looked to determine if “Congress has
directly spoken to the . . . issue.”11 Looking at the plain language of the statute, the court pointed to section 112(c)(6) where
Congress expressly discusses regulation of EGUs.12 The court
found no ambiguity in section 112 and held that the EPA’s argument “deploys the logic of the Queen of Hearts, substituting
EPA’s desires for the plain text . . .”13 Finally, the court found
EPA’s third argument unconvincing, pointing out that previous
examples of statutory violations are not an excuse for current
violations.14
Finding all three of EPAs arguments without merit, the court
vacated the delisting of coal- and oil-fired EGUs. Under EPAs
own interpretations, the mercury regulation under CAMR created within CCA section 111 cannot be used to regulate sources
listed in section 112. With this in consideration, the Court also
vacated CAMR and remanded it to EPA for reconsideration.
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ConCluSion
Environmental groups have hailed the Court’s ruling as a
victory for the health of all Americans by invalidating an attempt
by EPA to get around the much stricter standards required by
CCA section 112 with a weak cap-and-trade program under
CAMR.15 The petitioners contended that the cap-and-trade program would have done little to cap mercury in the short term
and would have delayed any actual reductions by a decade or
more.16 After the decision, one petitioner’s attorney stated, “We
hope the administration will gain some new respect for the law
in its last year and start working to protect Americans from pollution and stop working to shield polluters from their lawful
cleanup obligations.”17
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Book Review
BReak ThRough:
FRom The DeaTh oF enviRonmenTalism To The PoliTics oF PossiBiliTy
by Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger
Reviewed by Emily Alves*

T

he environmental community is at a crossroads. After
decades of advocating for safeguards for nature and conservation of resources, the entire movement has exhausted
its traditional methods of achieving victories. The inability to
implement a widely accepted system of capping global carbon
emissions is an example of this dead end. If the movement is to
continue on and make further progress, then it will need to break
out of its interest group mode and seek alliances to advocate for
ideas that environmentalism has been unfamiliar with thus far.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger caused a controversial stir
with their 2004 article “The Death of Environmentalism.” Break
Through seeks to expand upon those ideas, demonstrating how
the environmental movement has fallen into the trap of becoming just another interest group, and outlining a path towards progressive, effective policy making. Nordhaus and Shellenberger
state that their ultimate goal is to help the community reach its
desired end.
The first half of the book, ‘The Politics of Limits,’ explains
how for decades, the movement has been driven by concern for
one issue and utilizing a single, unoriginal approach. Viewing
their mission as the stewards of the environment, environmental
advocates have sought to staunch human activity in the name of
preserving our lands, water, and air. Advocates have acquired
these goals by pushing through lawsuits and legislation, claiming that public support is on their side by citing poll after poll
where a majority of Americans state that the environment is a
top concern for them. Victories such as the Clean Water Act and
the Clean Air Act have instilled in the environmental community the belief that these small-scale methods will continue to be
effective against massive problems, such as global warming.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue that environmentalists
are mistaken on several points, and are wasting valuable time
and resources as a result. The authors argue that environmentalists are far off base regarding the human aspect of their cause.
By championing the rights of nature over the rights of human
progress, the community does not recognize the fact that the
movement got its start as a ‘post-material need’ for humanity.
55

Having satisfied the minimal levels of need—food, shelter, and
physical safety—citizens of the Western world have shifted their
focus to post-material ones, such as self-fulfillment and a sense
of belonging. These post-material instincts are what trigger the
desire in people to invest in our natural surroundings. Humans
have achieved this level of need due to the immense progress
made in the last few centuries. Therefore, it is extremely counter-intuitive for most people when environmentalists proclaim
that the only way to preserve nature is to halt the human progress that has brought them to a point where they are even able to
consider nature as a priority.
The authors use a case study of Brazil to illustrate this point.
Environmentalists are constantly trying (and failing) to stem the
deforestation of the Amazon. The authors contrast these efforts
with the millions of direly poor Brazilians living either in the
overcrowded favelas of Rio de Janeiro and San Paulo or in the
secluded villages of the Amazon. The message that nature is
superior and in perfect harmony, and we humans must not disrupt this harmony, does not resonate with those seeking to make a
living for themselves. Even in the United States, demanding that
citizens curtail the very activities that have brought them security in the name of maintaining or restoring the damage inflicted
on nature while we were evolving is counter-intuitive and difficult to sell. For all the small scoped victories environmentalists
have achieved in the name of nature, tackling the global issues
simply cannot be done with these overtones and tactics that are
not winning over the hearts and minds of the majority of the
population.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger then spend the second half of
the book, “The Politics of Possibility,” proposing methods that
the environmental community can still pursue in order to achieve
their more lofty goals. As with all single interest groups, environmentalists must seek to expand their appeal. The best way to

* Emily Alves is a J.D. Candidate, May 2011, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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do this is to take up issues that will achieve environmental quality while allowing humans to do what they do best—innovate
and progress. The doomsday scenarios of fatal weather patterns
must be set aside, and replaced with promising predictions of the
innovative future that will ameliorate these conditions. Alliances
must be formed with groups traditionally unallied with the environmentalists, such as the United Auto Workers or the insurance
industry, to advance fuel efficiency standards and increase public health awareness. Concessions will have to be made in order
to meet the majority of the environmentalists’ goals. The new
path will have to entail engaging in progressive, market based
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solutions that will allow citizens to feel that they are working to
improve their standards of living.
The authors then suggest their plan for an Apollo project for
clean energy, a proposal that would invest $300 billion in energy
technologies over the next ten years. This proposal would simultaneously generate an additional $200 billion in private capital
and add about three million new jobs to the market, all while
discovering the most efficient environmentally friendly fuel
technology. It is solutions such as these that will allow environmentalists to leave their single issue, superior politics in the past
and embrace a multifaceted, progressive politics of the future.

56

World NeWs
by Sarah Melikian & Addie Haughey*

AfricA
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe experienced major
blackouts in early 2008.1 In South Africa, the hardest hit country,
the mining sector had to temporarily suspend operations, while
industry, commerce, and telecommunications were affected in
Zimbabwe.2
South African President Thabo Mbeki admitted that the
government failed to plan for shortages after warnings several
years ago.3 Recent economic growth has resulted in demand
exceeding a capacity, which has not increased much in the last
twenty years.4 South Africa is the continent’s largest economy,
and some regions of the country were dark for up to five hours a
day, affecting all sectors of the economy.5 The country accounts
for more than half of the electricity used in sub-Saharan Africa.6
Most of the electricity goes to manufacturing, mining, and commercial users, with about twenty percent used by households and
five percent exported to neighboring countries.7 Major losses
were felt in dairy and egg production, the wine crop, and tourism, especially the restaurant business.8 Neighboring countries
that usually rely on South Africa for energy supply had to turn to
other sources in the region.9
The most talked about casualty was the mining industry, the
largest employer of South Africans. The sector employs almost
a half million people and indirectly supports five million.10
Accounting for fifteen percent of South Africa’s electricity
demand, the largest gold, platinum, coal, and diamond producers
halted operations for five days when electricity supply could not
be guaranteed.11

AmericAs
Even within a single country the regional impact from climate change varies. Recent studies have found that the western states of the United States are facing more drastic and rapid
warming than the rest of the country. Over a five year time span,
the world climate warmed about one degree Fahrenheit,12 but
eleven western U.S. states warmed 1.7 degrees on average over
the same time13 and in some parts of the west, the warming was
as much as 2.2 degrees.14
Data suggests that this trend will not only continue, but it
will also accelerate.15 Economic impacts on recreation, skiing,
hunting, and fishing are already being felt and will only increase
with higher temperatures.16 A total of $2.7 billion in lost crops
have also been attributed to the temperature increase.17
Unlikely supporters from western states are pushing for a
federal climate bill with the teeth to slow these changes in climate as members of Congress from the West realize the dis57

parate impacts their states face.18 State governments are also
responding by joining together to create a regional compact to
curb emissions that aggravate climate change.19

AsiA
Biofuels, long considered a green alternative to oil, are being
criticized for their environmental and social consequences. International environmental groups are claiming that biofuel production in Indonesia is leading to human rights abuses.20 According
to a report published by Friends of the Earth, LifeMosaic, and
Sawit Watch, increased global demand for palm oil is resulting
in the clearing of millions of hectares of forests, which in turn is
threatening the livelihoods of sixty to ninety million indigenous
people in Indonesia.21
More than eighty-five percent of the world’s palm oil is
produced in Indonesia and Malaysia.22 Studies recently released
by researchers at Wetlands International and Delft Hydraulics
note that Indonesia is now the world’s third leading producer
of carbon emissions.23 Friends of the Earth also estimates that
between 1985 and 2000, eighty-seven percent of the deforestation in Malaysia was due to new palm oil plantations and that in
Indonesia, the land devoted to palm oil has more than doubled in
the last eight years.24 Scientists are also finding that biofuel production may create more harmful emissions than fossil fuels.25
The concern has EU governments rolling back the once generous subsidies for biofuels.26

AustrAliA
While the polar bear has become the furry spokesmen of the
environmental movement when it comes to climate change, other
animals are also feeling potentially devastating impacts from
global warming. One example of such a creature is the koala
bear. These Australian marsupials live off of eucalyptus leaves
but their diet is in danger as nutrients in the leaves decrease
because of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses.27
Professor Bill Foley of the Australian National University
says that “the staple diet of these animals is being turned to
leather.”28 As carbon dioxide increases, the amount of vital protein in the leaves decreases and the levels of toxins in the leaves
can reach dangerous levels.29
The koala’s food chain is finely balanced and the decrease
in nutrients and protein in the eucalyptus leaves requires them to
eat more leaves.30 This increase in consumption exacerbates the
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impacts of toxins in the leaves and also increases competition
for food between the koala bears and other animals and insects
that also feed off the eucalyptus.31
Other animals will be impacted by the change in the eucalyptus, but the Koala is particularly vulnerable. The name “koala”
comes from an aboriginal word that means “doesn’t drink.”32
The bears get almost all of the moisture they require from their
diet of leaves, making them even more dependent on the eucalyptus than other species.33 There are currently fewer than 100,000
koalas living in the wild in Australia, and that small population
is at great risk with increasing climate change.34

EuropE
The largest cod fishery on Earth, the Northeast Arctic cod,
is facing a growing threat from illegal fishing.35 The Norwegian
government estimates that in 2005 over 100,000 tonnes of illegal
cod were caught in the Barents Sea, a value of over $350 mil-

lion.36 Norwegian, Russian, and EU fishers take the majority of
the Barents Sea catch, which then gets distributed globally, thus
allowing efforts along the supply chain may help reduce illegal
catches.37 Unfortunately some EU member states are opposing
the European Commission’s proposals to address illegal fishing.38 Thus, the possibility of over fishing in conjunction with
climate change may be to large of a stress on the fishery causing
it to collapse like the North American cod fishery.39
In response to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
several retailers are working to raise consumer awareness of sustainable seafood.40 Some supermarkets are now providing fish
that are certified by the Marine Stewardship Council, the global
environmental standard for sustainable and well-managed fisheries.41 However, this is only the first step of many necessary
along the entire seafood distribution chain to ensure that fisheries are available to feed us today and tomorrow.
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